Title
Imbing vs. Tiongson
Case
A.M. No. MTJ-91-595
Decision Date
Feb 7, 1994
Judge Benjamin Tiongson dismissed for gross immorality after abandoning family, fathering children with another woman while married, undermining judicial integrity.
gross immorality
dismissal from service
disqualification from reemployment
A

Case Summary (A.M. No. 34-MJ)

Factual Background

The complaint was submitted through a letter dated July 25, 1991 addressed to then President Corazon C. Aquino, endorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator on September 6, 1991. Attached to it was complainant’s sworn letter-complaint dated May 9, 1991 addressed to then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, with documentary annexes, including affidavits of the Subanen tribal head who officiated the alleged marriage and joint affidavits of local witnesses, baptism and birth documents, and photographs.

Complainant alleged that respondent, then City Judge of Pagadian City, brought his family to Manila upon assignment. She claimed that respondent later abandoned her and the children for another woman, leaving her without financial support, prompting her return to her hometown in Zamboanga del Sur. She prayed that the Court order the deduction of P5,000.00 monthly from respondent’s salary and, upon retirement, grant her at least one-third of respondent’s retirement benefits for the education of their children.

Initial Proceedings and Respondent’s Denials

After referral by the Office of the Court Administrator, the Supreme Court issued a resolution on February 13, 1992 requiring respondent to comment within ten days. In his March 21, 1992 comment, respondent emphatically denied that he and complainant were married, that he was the father of Benjamin, Jr., and that he neglected to support Anna Freya. Respondent also attached an earlier July 7, 1991 letter he had addressed to the Chief Justice, where he argued that complainant was already married and had a child with another man at the time of the alleged marriage on November 1, 1981, and that her husband and child were reportedly living in the same municipality.

Respondent acknowledged paternity of Anna Freya, but denied paternity of Benjamin, Jr., maintaining that his reassignment to Manila occurred in January 1983 and that he and complainant stopped seeing each other at that time. He theorized that Benjamin, Jr. could have been fathered by someone else, given complainant’s alleged cohabitation with other men after their separation.

Complainant then filed a communication dated March 23, 1992 withdrawing her complaint, stating that the parties had settled and that respondent agreed to increase support. Despite the withdrawal, the Court did not end its inquiry. It still referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for investigation, report, and recommendation within sixty days.

Investigation, Deposition Attempt, and Desistance

The investigation proceeded before then Executive Judge Bernardo P. Pardo. Extensions were granted, and a notice of investigation dated October 13, 1992 set the hearing for November 13, 1992. On that scheduled date, Executive Judge Pardo recommended the designation of a judge from Pagadian City to take complainant’s deposition because of postponement requests and “security reasons.” Those reasons were premised on telegrams stating that complainant feared threats from respondent, alleging that he would kill her if she went to Manila to pursue the case.

Accordingly, in a resolution dated July 22, 1993, the Supreme Court designated Executive Judge Franklyn A. Villegas of Branch 19, Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City to take complainant’s deposition. On September 23, 1993, Judge Villegas conducted the deposition proceedings. Respondent appeared without counsel, and complainant likewise appeared without counsel. When asked whether she still wished counsel and whether her deposition should proceed, complainant confirmed the authenticity of the signature in a letter respondent submitted—an alleged March 23, 1992 letter wherein she desired to withdraw the complaint. Complainant reiterated her desire to close the investigation. She then manifested she no longer wanted her deposition taken that afternoon.

Despite complainant’s desistance, Executive Judge Villegas later submitted a report and recommendation dated October 14, 1993, which found respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and recommended dismissal with prejudice to re-employment in government service, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and forfeiture of retirement benefits, if any.

The Supreme Court’s Substantive Findings: Immorality and Lack of Moral Integrity

The Supreme Court treated the matter as an administrative case governed by the governing standard that a judge must be beyond reproach not only in the performance of judicial duties but also in private conduct. The Court reiterated that there is no dichotomy of morality and that public confidence in the judiciary depends on the judge’s personal integrity.

In assessing respondent’s conduct, the Court focused on respondent’s admissions and the surrounding circumstances. The Court found particularly “abhorrent” respondent’s insistence that he was not married to complainant and his parallel acknowledgement that, at the time of his relationship with complainant, he was aware that complainant was married to and had a child with another man residing in the same municipality. The Court held that this awareness made respondent guilty of adultery, at least for purposes of evaluating gross immorality in an administrative proceeding.

The Court also examined the alleged marriage of November 1, 1981 and rejected respondent’s prevarication. Respondent maintained it was impossible for him to contract marriage because complainant was supposedly already married. The Court countered that respondent had actually identified himself as the father of Anna Freya, supported by the birth certificate bearing his name and signature as the “father of the child,” and by respondent’s personal records in the Court’s judicial notice, including his GSIS Information for Membership where Anna Freya was listed as his daughter. The Court also relied on the contemporaneous documentary references to a marriage date and place in the birth certificate of Anna Freya, and on affidavits presented to support the alleged Subanen rites.

While the Court stated that it was not validating the alleged marriage as such, it explained that Article 78 of the Civil Code (the then-applicable governing law) permitted certain marriages between Mohammedans or pagans living in non-Christian provinces to be performed according to custom and rites. The Court found that the complainant was a Protestant and respondent was a Catholic, so Article 78 could not validate the purported marriage. The Court further concluded that respondent could not have been unaware of the invalidity because the evidence indicated respondent knowingly availed of the rites as a scheme or subterfuge to enable supposed connubial rights under the guise of marital coverture.

The Court also addressed the status of respondent’s prior civil marriage. Respondent’s personal records stated that he married Estrellita R. Tiongson on March 10, 1963, and they had two children. There was no showing that this marriage was dissolved or annulled, nor that Estrellita had died at the time of respondent’s affair with complainant and when Anna Freya was born. The Court therefore presumed that the prior marriage continued. It found that respondent’s own records gave substance to the investigation report finding that at the time respondent sired Anna Freya, he was a “much married man.”

Respondent’s Paternity Arguments and Limited Scope of the Administrative Case

The Court did not finally determine whether Benjamin, Jr. was respondent’s biological child, noting that no evidence had sufficiently established his true filiation and that such a determination belonged in the proper forum. It emphasized, however, that its disposition of the administrative case did not dispense with respondent’s obligation to provide continuing support to Anna Freya, as regulated by law.

Effect of Complainant’s Desistance and Alleged Threats

The Supreme Court also treated complainant’s withdrawal as non-determinative. It held that once administrative charges had been filed, the Court could not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and determine the truth of the allegations based on the complainant’s desistance. It emphasized that the Court had an interest in the conduct of members of the judiciary and that personal interests of the parties could not control disciplinary power.

The Court further doubted the voluntariness of complainant’s desistance. It recalled that complainant had requested that her deposition be taken in Pagadian City due to respondent’s alleged threats to kill her if she pursued the complaint in Manila. It also noted that during the deposition setting, respondent appeared without counsel, and complainant was similarly unassisted. The Court observed that Judge Villegas did not inquire into the reasons for complainant’s abrupt change of heart, and it viewed the circumstances as reinforcing its misgivings.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Sanction

In imposing the penalty, the Court anchored its reasoning on the Code of Judicial Ethics and its lon

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