G.R. No. 232131 - Ifurung vs. Carpio-Morales

Case Summary (G.R. No. 232131)

Nature and Relief Sought

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition challenging the constitutionality of Section 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 (in relation to Sec. 7) and seeking a judicial declaration that the incumbent Ombudsman and Deputies are de facto officers and that their positions are vacant. The petition contends that appointment to vacancies should be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor and that granting a full seven‑year term to successors when the vacancy arises for reasons other than expiration violates Sec. 11, in relation to Secs. 8 and 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner's Core Arguments

Petitioner argues: (1) the framers intended the Office of the Ombudsman to be on par with constitutional commissions and thus subject to the same term‑of‑office constraints; (2) Sec. 8(3) R.A. No. 6770 improperly allows successors to enjoy a fresh seven‑year term where the predecessor did not serve a full seven years; (3) recurring noncompliance with the seven‑year requirement has led to overstaying incumbents and unlawful disbursements for salaries; and (4) the issue is of transcendental importance warranting direct recourse to the Supreme Court.

Respondents’ Principal Defenses

Respondents (OSG) contend: (1) Sec. 11, Art. XI plainly prescribes a seven‑year term for the Ombudsman and Deputies without reappointment and without distinguishing causes for appointment; (2) the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission and therefore the rotation and unexpired‑term rule applicable to constitutional commissions are inapposite; (3) the proper remedy to oust an officer is quo warranto (Topacio v. Ong), and petitioner’s remedy is improper insofar as it seeks to vacate incumbents’ titles; and (4) longstanding executive and statutory practice, as reflected in pre‑1987 presidential decrees and RA 6770, supports appointments for full seven‑year terms.

Procedural and Jurisdictional Issues

The Court first addressed whether certiorari/prohibition was a proper vehicle to test the statute’s constitutionality and whether it had jurisdiction. It recalled that certiorari/prohibition may be employed to determine grave abuse of discretion by any branch and that judicial review is available where a constitutional question affecting public welfare is raised. The Court found certiorari proper to challenge Sec. 8(3) R.A. 6770 because the petition attacks the validity of a statute and not the personal qualifications of the incumbents (distinguishing Topacio v. Ong).

Justiciability, Ripeness and Standing

The Court found an actual case or controversy and ripeness: if Sec. 8(3) were unconstitutional, incumbents would be de facto and their continued occupancy could entail unlawful salary disbursements. The Court applied liberal standing doctrines (citing Funa v. Villar): as a taxpayer claiming illegal disbursement and a concerned citizen raising a transcendental constitutional issue, petitioner satisfied the minimum requirements for standing. The Court therefore accepted jurisdiction.

Hierarchy of Courts and Direct Recourse

Petitioner sought direct relief from the Supreme Court, invoking exceptions to the hierarchy of courts doctrine (e.g., issues of transcendental importance, time element, and constitutional organs). The Court reiterated its jurisprudential exceptions permitting direct resort to the Supreme Court for extraordinary writs when warranted and found these exceptions sufficient here; the OSG did not meaningfully dispute the petitioner's arguments on this point.

Historical Antecedents of the Ombudsman Office

The Court reviewed the historical development of the Ombudsman in the Philippines—from precursors under the Revolutionary Government and various executive bodies to the Tanodbayan under P.D. Nos. 1487, 1607 and 1630, and finally constitutionalization in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. P.D. No. 1487 and its successors provided for seven‑year terms and expressly provided that where the office became vacant the Senior Deputy would serve as Acting Tanodbayan “until the Tanodbayan shall have been appointed for a full term,” a formulation repeated in later instruments and reflected in RA 6770.

Statutory Construction and Presumption of Constitutionality

The Court emphasized the presumption of constitutionality of statutes and applied standard rules of statutory construction: read words in their ordinary sense, avoid expanding clear language, and give effect to express terms (expressio unius est exclusio alterius). The Court stressed that the party challenging a statute bears the heavy burden to demonstrate clear constitutional transgression.

Whether the Ombudsman Is a Constitutional Commission

The Court held that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission. It distinguished Art. IX (constitutional commissions: CSC, COMELEC, COA) from Art. XI: constitutional commissions are collegial bodies with en banc decision‑making and explicit rotational term provisions; the Ombudsman is a single head with deputies assigned separate territorial or functional jurisdictions and does not decide by majority vote of members. Thus, structural and textual differences preclude treating the Ombudsman as a constitutional commission for rotational‑term purposes.

Construction of Sec. 10, Art. XI (Rank and Salary)

Analyzing the framers’ debates and ordinary meanings of “rank” and “salary,” the Court concluded Sec. 10’s command that the Ombudsman and Deputies “shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary” was meant only to fix rank and salary for purposes of classification and remuneration—not to import other features of constitutional commissions such as staggered terms or the rotation mechanism. The Court applied the maxim that express mention of certain items excludes others.

Applicability of Gaminde and the Rotational Scheme

The Court explained Gaminde v. COA concerned the constitutional commissions and held that the terms of first appointees to the commissions should be deemed to start on 2 February 1987 to effectuate the staggered seven‑five‑three rotation. That reasoning, the Court held, is limited to Art. IX constitutional commissions because the Constitution explicitly prescribes rotational terms and associated rules for those entities; Gaminde does not extend to the Ombudsman, which is not structured under Art. IX and lacks a constitutional staggered‑term scheme

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 232131)

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 filed by Rey Nathaniel C. Ifurung in propria persona.
Petitioner seeks: (a) declaration that Section 8(3) in relation to Section 7 of R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is unconstitutional for transgressing Section 11 in relation to Sections 8 and 10 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution; and (b) declaration that the individual respondents are de facto Ombudsman and Deputies Ombudsman and that their positions are vacant.
Petitioner invoked the Court’s power to rule on constitutionality pursuant to Sections 4(2) and 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, asserting transcendental importance and no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in ordinary course of law.

Parties

Petitioner: Rey Nathaniel C. Ifurung — claims status as taxpayer, concerned Filipino citizen, and member of the Bar; invokes Funa v. Villar for locus standi.
Respondents: Conchita C. Carpio Morales (Ombudsman), Melchor Arthur H. Carandang (Overall Deputy Ombudsman), Gerard Abeto Mosquera (Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon), Paul Elmer M. Clemente (Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas), Rodolfo M. Elman (Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao), Cyril Enguerra Ramos (Deputy Ombudsman for the Military), and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) represented respondents in filing Comment and Memorandum.

Factual and Temporal Background Summarized by Petitioner

Petitioner alleges a recurring statutory wrong: Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, in relation to Sec. 7, allows successors to be appointed for a full seven-year term notwithstanding vacancies occurring before expiry — alleged to contravene Sec. 11 and the framers’ intent.
Petitioner asserts that the constitutional framers intended the Office of the Ombudsman to have autonomy and independence equivalent in stature to the constitutional commissions (COMELEC, COA, CSC, CHR), and therefore the limitation on terms that applies to those bodies should apply to the Ombudsman and deputies.
Petitioner supplied a table of Ombudsman appointments and alleged actual tenures versus the seven-year term framework, arguing that successive appointments have not complied with an intended seven-year reckoning beginning 2 February 1987 and that incumbents have been serving de facto beyond their proper terms (specifically alleging overstays since 1–2 February 2015).
Petitioner warned of the potential for political maneuvering where full seven-year appointments on vacancies could deprive incoming Presidents of appointment prerogatives and asserted continuing illegal disbursements (salaries) to de facto officers.

Petitioner’s Legal Theories and Authorities Invoked

Locus standi: relies on Funa v. Villar and the Court’s liberal approach to standing for taxpayers and concerned citizens when issues are of transcendental importance; cites David and related jurisprudence delineating minimum norms for non-traditional suitors (taxpayer: illegal disbursement claim; concerned citizen: transcendental importance).
Remedy/litigation vehicle: invokes TaAada v. Angara and Imbong v. Ochoa to justify certiorari/prohibition as appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues where no plain, speedy, adequate remedy exists.
Substantive claim: Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is unconstitutional because it permits appointment for a full seven-year term upon vacancy caused by death, resignation, removal or permanent disability, thereby contravening the constitutional term scheme as petitioner interprets Secs. 8, 10 and 11, Art. XI.
Relies on Gaminde v. COA and its statement that the starting point of the terms of the first appointees to constitutional commissions is 2 February 1987.

Respondents’ (OSG) Contentions

The OSG characterizes Sec. 11, Art. XI as clear: the Ombudsman and deputies “shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment” without any distinction depending on how a vacancy arose; hence Sec. 8(3) is consistent with the Constitution.
OSG argues petitioner’s reading would create a distinction not present in the Constitution between successors who fill vacancies after full terms and those who fill vacancies before expiry.
OSG emphasizes that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission; parity in “rank and salary” under Sec. 10 does not import the staggered term or rotation scheme of the constitutional commissions.
OSG asserts that petition effectively seeks to unseat public officers and that the proper remedy for collateral attack on title is quo warranto; cites Topacio v. Ong as authority for dismissal where petition partakes of quo warranto in nature.
OSG notes that the rotational system and its rationale in Gaminde and earlier jurisprudence are particular to constitutional commissions and their collegial composition, and thus inapplicable to the Ombudsman.

Issues Framed by the Court

I. Whether Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is unconstitutional for violating Sec. 11 in relation to Secs. 8 and 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution and applicable jurisprudence.
II. Whether the instant petition is the proper remedy (certiorari and prohibition vs quo warranto).
III. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to resolve the matter.

Court’s Determination on Proper Remedy and Jurisdiction

Court holds that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 because certiorari and prohibition are remedies by which grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution.
Court distinguishes Topacio v. Ong: Topacio involved a petition that effectively reviewed qualifications (natural-born status) of a judicial appointee and was held to partake of quo warranto; present petition attacks the validity of a statute (Sec. 8(3)) rather than the personal qualifications of respondents.
Court finds that petitioner’s claims meet the requisites for judicial review: an actual case or controversy exists; the question is ripe; there is alleged direct adverse effect (including alleged illegal disbursement of public funds); and the issue is of alleged pervasive constitutional significance.
Court accepts petitioner’s invocation of jurisprudential exceptions to the hierarchy of courts doctrine and finds reasons to assume jurisdiction given transcendental importance, urgency, and nature of the constitutional question.
Court remarks on petitioner’s failure to name other potentially relevant respondents (e.g., Department of Budget and Management) but notes the OSG’s representation would have covered arguments of other branches and sets aside this procedural deficiency.

Legal Standards on Judicial Review and Locus Standi Applied

Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies and determine grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government (Art. VIII).
Court reiter