G.R. No. 232131 - Ifurung vs. Carpio-Morales

Petitioner Rey Nathaniel C. Ifurung, acting in propria persona as a taxpayer, concerned citizen, and member of the Bar, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
He seeks a declaration that Section 8(3) (in relation to Section 7) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) is unconstitutional for transgressing Section 11 (in relation to Sections 8 and 10) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Additionally, the petitioner requests that all individual respondents be declared de facto officers with their positions declared vacant.

Respondents include the incumbent Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales and the deputies: Melchor Arthur H. Carandang (Overall Deputy Ombudsman), Gerard Abeto Mosquera (Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon), Paul Elmer M. Clemente (Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas), Rodolfo M. Elman (Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao), and Cyril Enguerra Ramos (Deputy Ombudsman for the Military).
The petitioner alleges that the respondents have been holding office in excess of their constitutional term, having continued past 1 February 2015.
Petitioner emphasizes that, unlike other constitutionally created positions which serve only the unexpired term of a predecessor, the law purportedly allows for the appointment of successors to serve a full seven-year term regardless of the vacancy’s cause.

Petitioner argues that by conferring a full term of seven years on the successor in case of vacancy (due to death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability), Section 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 contravenes the constitutional mandate that offices such as the President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House serve only for the unexpired term when replacing their predecessors.
He further contends that the Office of the Ombudsman is not sui generis; constitutional principles applied to other offices (built on the intent of the framers during the formulation of the 1987 Constitution) should similarly restrict the tenure of the Ombudsman and its deputies.

The petitioner illustrates the evolution of the Ombudsman’s office by citing its origins from the concept of the “ombudsman” in Sweden and its institutional development in the Philippines—from the Permanent Commission during the Revolutionary Government to various executive orders and presidential decrees.
A detailed table presented by the petitioner shows the term durations and actual service dates of previous Ombudsmen, highlighting discrepancies in the prescribed seven-year term and actual practice.
He invokes the jurisprudence in Gaminde v. COA as well as others (e.g., TaAada v. Angara, Imbong v. Ochoa) to argue that the rotational system applied to constitutional commissions should analogously apply to the Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner claims that continued service of the de facto Ombudsman and deputies leads to illegal disbursements of public funds for their salaries.
He asserts that the petition involves a constitutional organ of the government, thereby rendering the issue one of transcendental importance which affects the very fabric of public accountability and the proper exercise of presidential prerogatives regarding appointments.
The petitioner relies on the principle that when a constitutional issue of critical importance is raised, direct resort to this Court is permissible despite the general rule on the hierarchy of courts.

Whether Section 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, which provides that in the event of a vacancy the successor (including the Overall Deputy acting as Ombudsman) shall be appointed for a full seven-year term, is unconstitutional because it violates Section 11 in relation to Sections 8 and 10 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

Whether the filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition is the correct and proper remedy to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory provision.
Whether the petition is a proper collateral attack on the title of the public officers without resorting to other remedies such as a petition for quo warranto.

Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition given that a constitutional issue of transcendental import is raised.
Whether the petitioner, by proving a direct material interest as a taxpayer and concerned citizen and citing established jurisprudence (e.g., Funa v. Villar), has acquired the requisite locus standi.