Title
Francisco vs. Boiser
Case
G.R. No. 137677
Decision Date
May 31, 2000
Co-owners dispute redemption rights after sale of property share; Supreme Court rules notice must come from vendor, not vendee, to trigger redemption period.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 137677)

Key Dates

August 6, 1979 — Adalia and sisters sell 1/5 share to mother, Adela Blas (vendor).
August 8, 1986 — Adela Blas, without other co-owners’ knowledge, sells her 1/5 share to respondent Zenaida Boiser (vendee).
May 30, 1992 — Respondent allegedly sends petitioner a letter with a copy of the deed of sale and sends letters to tenants demanding 1/5 of rentals.
June 8, 1992 — Petitioner writes tenants advising them to disregard respondent’s demand.
August 5, 1992 — Petitioner receives summons and complaint (Civil Case No. 15510) filed by respondent; petitioner alleges she first learned of the sale on this date.
August 12, 1992 — Petitioner deposits P10,000.00 with the Clerk of Court as redemption price.
September 14, 1995 — Petitioner files Civil Case No. C-17055 for legal redemption.
May 31, 2000 — Supreme Court decision (applicable under the 1987 Constitution).

Applicable Law

Primary statutory provision: Article 1623 of the Civil Code (New Civil Code) governing the right of legal pre-emption or redemption by co-owners and the requirement of a written notice by the vendor or prospective vendor.
Property registration law relevant to registration consequences: Presidential Decree No. 1529, A51 (noting effect on registration when vendor’s affidavit is lacking).
Constitutional basis: Decision rendered under the 1987 Philippine Constitution (case decided in 2000).

Facts Relevant to the Legal Issue

Petitioner and three sisters were co-owners; their mother became co-owner by purchase in 1979. In 1986 the mother sold her 1/5 share to respondent; that sale allegedly was not communicated to the other co-owners. In 1992 respondent sought to collect 1/5 of rentals and sued petitioner for her share of rentals. Petitioner claims she first learned of the 1986 sale only upon receipt of summons on August 5, 1992, and exercised legal redemption by depositing the redemptive amount (P10,000) on August 12, 1992. Respondent maintains that she gave written notice earlier (May 30, 1992) by sending petitioner a letter and a copy of the deed and by notifying tenants; petitioner’s own June 8, 1992 letter to tenants is evidence she received respondent’s communication.

Procedural History and Lower Courts’ Findings

At trial the RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint, reasoning that Art. 1623 does not prescribe a particular form for the vendor’s written notice and that petitioner admitted receipt of respondent’s May 30, 1992 letter and copy of the deed; the court treated respondent’s letter as substantial compliance with the written notice requirement, counting the 30-day redemption period from at latest June 8, 1992. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in toto. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the CA was denied, prompting the petition to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issue Presented

Whether the May 30, 1992 letter sent by respondent (the vendee) to petitioner, containing a copy of the deed of sale, satisfies the vendor-origin written notice requirement under Article 1623 of the Civil Code for purposes of the 30‑day period to exercise legal redemption; alternatively, whether petitioner’s receipt of summons on August 5, 1992 constituted actual knowledge that started the redemption period.

Conflicting Precedents and Doctrinal Background

The parties and courts relied on several authorities with differing emphases:

  • Decisions treating any written communication or a copy of the deed as satisfying Art. 1623 so long as the co-owner is informed in writing (De Conejero; Badillo; Distrito; Etcuban). These courts emphasized substance over technical form.
  • Earlier and later authorities emphasizing the plain wording of Art. 1623 that the written notice must be given by the vendor or prospective vendor (Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.; Salatandol v. Retes). Salatandol reaffirmed the vendor-only notice requirement and reasoned that the legislature deliberately selected vendor-origin notice to ensure certainty and to prevent secret sales from frustrating co-owners’ redemption rights.
  • The Court also considered cases allowing actual knowledge (Alonzo) to start the redemption period where written notice is unnecessary because co-owners already have actual notice.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Rationale

The Supreme Court reviewed the divergent lines of authority and the specific facts of this case. While acknowledging the textual command of Art. 1623 that notice must come from the vendor, the Court found it unjust in the present circumstances to require coercion of the vendor to give notice where the sale had been deliberately kept secret for years (sale in 1986 kept concealed until 1992). The Court reasoned that petitioner’s actual knowledge—through receipt of summons and the complaint on August 5, 1992—constituted a trigger for the 30-day redemption period. The Court relied on precedent allowing actual knowledge to start the redemption period (Alonzo) and refused to condone further delay in the exercise of redemption rights when the sale had already been established and when the vendee’s communications (including litigati

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