Title
Supreme Court
Francisco vs. Boiser
Case
G.R. No. 137677
Decision Date
May 31, 2000
Co-owners dispute redemption rights after sale of property share; Supreme Court rules notice must come from vendor, not vendee, to trigger redemption period.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 137677)
Expanded Legal Reasoning Model

Facts:

  • Background on the Property and Parties
    • Petitioner Adalia B. Francisco and her three sisters (Ester, Elizabeth, and Adeluisa) were co-owners of four parcels of registered lands, where the Ten Commandments Building is located at 689 Rizal Avenue Extension, Caloocan City.
    • On August 6, 1979, the co-owners sold 1/5 of their undivided share to their mother, Adela Blas, for P10,000.00, making her a co-owner to that extent.
  • Subsequent Sale and Notification
    • On August 8, 1986, without the knowledge of the other co-owners, Adela Blas sold her 1/5 share for P10,000.00 to respondent Zenaida F. Boiser, who is another sister of the petitioner.
    • The sale took place without formal notice being given by the vendor (Adela Blas) to the other co-owners.
  • Petitioner's Exercise of the Right of Redemption
    • On August 5, 1992, petitioner received summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 15510, filed by respondent, demanding her share of the rentals collected from the building’s tenants.
    • In response, petitioner informed respondent of her intent to exercise her right of redemption as a co-owner upon learning of the sale only after receipt of the summons.
    • On August 12, 1992, petitioner deposited the redemption price of P10,000.00 with the Clerk of Court as a permissive counterclaim in the said case; however, the counterclaim was dismissed when Civil Case No. 15510 was dismissed due to respondent’s non-suit.
  • Litigation History Leading to the Present Case
    • On September 14, 1995, petitioner instituted Civil Case No. C-17055 before the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City.
      • She contended that the 30-day redemption period under Article 1623 of the Civil Code had not started to run because the vendor (Adela Blas) never properly notified her or the other co-owners about the sale.
      • Petitioner claimed she only learned about the sale on August 5, 1992, upon receipt of the summons.
    • Respondent argued that petitioner had been informed as early as May 30, 1992:
      • Respondent sent a letter on May 30, 1992, to petitioner accompanied by a copy of the deed of sale, effectively notifying her of the sale.
      • The same day, respondent sent letters to the building’s tenants instructing them to remit 1/5 of the monthly rentals to her.
    • Evidence of notification is supported by petitioner’s own letter dated June 8, 1992, in which she directed the tenants to disregard respondent’s request and continue paying full rentals to her.
    • On August 19, 1996, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint for legal redemption, holding that:
      • Article 1623 does not require any peculiar form of notice aside from informing the co-owner in writing about the sale.
      • The letter from respondent, supplemented by the copy of the deed, amounted to substantial compliance with the notice requirement.
      • The 30-day period for redemption was thus calculated from as early as June 8, 1992, rather than from the summons received on August 5, 1992.
    • The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision on October 26, 1998, and upon the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the appellate court on February 16, 1999, petitioner elevated the case to this Court.

Issues:

  • Sufficiency of Notification under Art. 1623
    • Whether the letter dated May 30, 1992, sent by respondent (the vendee) to petitioner, which contained a copy of the deed evidencing the sale, is sufficient to comply with the written notice requirement prescribed by Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
    • The issue also examines whether the notice must be given by the vendor (or prospective vendor) specifically, or if a notice given by the vendee (or respondent) can suffice.
  • Effect on the Exercise of the Right of Redemption
    • Whether, given the reception of the summons and subsequent actions, petitioner’s right of legal redemption was preserved or extinguished due to the timing and source of notice.
    • The timing of the notification, and thus the commencement of the 30-day period within which petitioner could exercise her right, is also a pivotal issue.

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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