Title
Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
Case
G.R. No. 190293
Decision Date
Mar 20, 2012
The Supreme Court dismissed petitions challenging Proclamation 1959, finding them moot after its prompt withdrawal by President Arroyo, relating to a martial law declaration in Maguindanao.
martial law
habeas corpus
proclamation

Case Summary (G.R. No. 190293)

Factual Background

On November 23, 2009, armed men massacred fifty-seven civilians on a Maguindanao highway, many of them media personnel and relatives of a gubernatorial candidate. On November 24, 2009 President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. On December 4, 2009 she issued Proclamation No. 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Province of Maguindanao except for identified MILF areas. The President submitted a written report to Congress on December 6, 2009 describing alleged armed formations, closures of local government offices, disruptions to the judiciary, and other circumstances she characterized as an armed public uprising depriving the Executive of its powers. Congress convened in joint session on December 9, 2009. On December 12, 2009 the President issued Proclamation No. 1963 revoking Proclamation No. 1959 and restoring the writ, citing reported surrenders and arrests, the clearing of armed positions, and the resumption of court operations.

Procedural History

Multiple petitioners filed consolidated actions in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1959 and seeking injunctive, prohibitory, and declaratory relief, as well as writs of certiorari and prohibition. The Court consolidated the petitions, required respondents’ comments, and appointed amici curiae to file briefs. The petitions raised both justiciability and substantive constitutional questions respecting the sufficiency of the factual basis for the President’s exercise of the Commander-in-Chief powers under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Parallel criminal proceedings were initiated against members of the Ampatuan family; venue of the rebellion information was transferred to RTC Quezon City, which dismissed the charge of rebellion for lack of probable cause, a dismissal later denied relief by the Court of Appeals in its own procedural posture.

Issues Presented

The Court posed and addressed several threshold and substantive questions including: whether the lifting of martial law by Proclamation No. 1963 rendered the petitions moot and academic; whether the term “rebellion” in Section 18, Article VII bears the same meaning as rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; whether martial law or suspension of the writ authorizes warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures; whether the President’s and Congress’ review functions are joint or sequential such that Congress’ action (or inaction) precludes judicial review; whether conflicting decisions of Congress and the Court could arise and which would prevail; and whether the record supplied a sufficient factual basis for Proclamation No. 1959.

Majority Disposition

The Court, through the ponencia, dismissed the consolidated petitions as moot and academic. The majority held that President Arroyo’s revocation of martial law on December 12, 2009 — before Congress completed its review and while the petitions were pending — was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy, and, given the brief eight-day duration and the lack of meaningful implementation of martial law, there was nothing of practical value for the Court to review.

Majority Reasoning

The majority emphasized institutional prudence and the avoidance of unnecessary constitutional adjudication. Relying on the principle that courts should be cautious in reviewing executive and legislative acts and on prior decisions such as Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, the Court noted that the Constitution places an automatic and primary review duty on Congress under Section 18, Article VII and that the President and Congress function in tandem in initiating and sustaining emergency measures. The Court observed that the suspension and martial law here were short-lived and not materially implemented: the military did not supplant local government control, no mass indiscriminate arrests were reported, those detained were charged or released, and no habeas corpus petitions were brought during the eight-day period. The majority treated the President’s prompt withdrawal as rendering the controversy moot and concluded that the Court should not resolve abstract or academic questions or substitute its judgment for that of Congress absent a continuing justiciable controversy. The majority also referred to the thirty-day mandate in Section 18, Article VII for the Court’s decision in appropriate proceedings, and accepted that the Court’s failure to decide within the constitutional temporal command in this instance effectively amounted to a default occasioned by mootness.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio

Justice Carpio dissented, arguing that the Court should have exercised its constitutional review function under Section 18, Article VII and that Proclamation No. 1959 lacked a sufficient factual basis. He rejected the mootness rationale, invoking exceptions that permit adjudication of otherwise moot cases where grave constitutional questions, exceptional public interest, the need for controlling principles, and the capacity for repetition yet evasion are present. He reasoned that the Constitution permits “any citizen” to file an appropriate proceeding and that standing is therefore satisfied. On the merits Justice Carpio maintained that “rebellion” in Section 18 must be understood to have the same meaning as rebellion in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the appropriate quantum of proof for a valid presidential declaration is probable cause rather than the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt or other higher civil or administrative standards. Applying those standards to the record, he concluded that there was no probable cause of an actual rebellion; contemporaneous statements by Executive and military officials referred to a “looming” or “in the offing” rebellion and admitted absence of an actual rebellion, intelligence briefings described armed groups but not an organized public uprising to overthrow government, and the Ampatuan forces did not demonstrate intent to remove allegiance to the State. Justice Carpio therefore would have declared Proclamation No. 1959 unconstitutional for lack of factual basis and remediable under the Court’s thirty-day review power.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Velasco, Jr.

Justice Velasco, Jr. also dissented. He agreed with the view that the Court should not evade the constitutional issues and that the exceptions to mootness applied. Justice Velasco emphasized separation of powers and the Court’s duty to formulate controlling principles to guide the Executive, the Legislature, and the public on the use of Commander-in-Chief powers. He acknowledged the gravity of the Maguindanao events and, while expressing concern about overbroad pronouncements limiting presidential action in exigent circumstances, he concluded that he would declare Proclamation No. 1959 unconstitutional but qualified his views as to the tenor of the Court’s ruling and the margin afforded to presidential judgment in matters of

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