Title
Fajardo vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 239823
Decision Date
Sep 25, 2019
Fajardo, a PCSO cashier, failed to account for P1.8M in public funds, admitted liability, and was convicted of malversation despite claims of duress and irregular audits. SC upheld the conviction.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 239823)

Procedural History and Disposition Below

Criminal Information filed June 21, 2011 charging malversation under Article 217, RPC. Regional Trial Court (Quezon City, Branch 224) convicted Fajardo (Decision dated February 17, 2017) and sentenced her to reclusion temporal (indeterminate term of thirteen years four months to nineteen years four months) plus perpetual special disqualification and order to pay P1,877,450. Sandiganbayan affirmed with modification (Decision dated March 5, 2018), reducing the imposable penalty to an indeterminate term of six years and one day to ten years and one day of prision mayor under RA 10951 (Section 40) and recognizing voluntary surrender as mitigating. Motion for reconsideration denied (April 18, 2018); petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court was subsequently denied.

Applicable Law

Primary statute: Article 217, Revised Penal Code (malversation of public funds or property), as amended (presumption that failure to produce public funds upon demand is prima facie evidence of conversion to personal use). Amendment under RA 10951 (Section 40) adjusts penalty ranges according to the amount involved. Constitutional provisions relied upon in the decision: 1987 Constitution — rights discussed include the right to counsel (as applied in administrative vs. criminal contexts) and the right against self-incrimination (Article III, Section 17). Relevant jurisprudence cited includes Magnanao v. People (elements of malversation), Carbonel v. CSC (right to counsel in administrative inquiries), and cases on the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination and retractions.

Elements of the Offense and Court’s Finding on Proof

The elements of malversation are (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) custody or control of public funds or property by reason of office; (c) the funds or property are public and the officer is accountable; and (d) appropriation, taking, misappropriation or permitting another to take them through abandonment or negligence. The Court found each element satisfied: Fajardo was a public officer with custody of a P3,000,000 cash advance; audits revealed a total shortage of P1,877,450; she failed to account for or produce the missing funds when required, thereby giving rise to the statutory prima facie presumption of conversion to personal use which she did not rebut with competent evidence.

Evidence Considered—Audits, Count Sheets, and Admissions

The prosecution relied on two spot audits by the PCSO Internal Audit Department (IAD). The November 13, 2008 count sheet initially indicated a shortage (figures of P734,421 and a later adjusted P218,461 explained by the auditors as reflecting subsequent cash disbursements to tellers), and the January 8, 2009 audit disclosed the larger shortage of P1,877,450. The IAD also noted that cash and checks presented during the first audit were missing by the second audit. Fajardo’s letters of January 15 and 27, 2009 expressed willingness to cooperate, acknowledged a mistake, offered to waive monetary benefits, and offered partial cash settlement (P300,000). The courts treated these communications and the audit results as establishing the factual predicate for conviction.

Burden of Proof and Presumption of Malversation

Because the total cash advance was proven to have been in Fajardo’s custody by reason of her office, the statutory presumption attached when she failed to produce the funds upon demand. Under Article 217, this failure operates as prima facie evidence that the funds were put to personal use; the burden then rested on Fajardo to rebut that presumption with competent evidence showing lawful disposition or proof of theft/pilferage by others. The Court found she did not meet that burden; allegations of pilferage or that a co-employee (Carlos/Oscar Lector) had access were unsupported by evidence and no complaint was filed against that co-employee.

Administrative Admissions, Right to Counsel, and Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Fajardo argued that her January 15 and 27, 2009 letters were involuntary and that she had been denied counsel, constituting violations of her rights against self-incrimination and to counsel. The Court applied the governing principles: the right to counsel (as discussed in Carbonel) is not automatically required in administrative investigations because the exclusionary rule of Section 12 (custodial protections) applies primarily to custodial criminal interrogations. The right against self-incrimination (Article III, Section 17) protects against compelled testimonial acts or compelled answers to specific incriminatory questions; it does not allow wholesale refusal to appear or to respond in non-custodial administrative fact-finding. The Court concluded the letters were voluntarily given during an administrative fact-finding and no specific testimonial compulsion or custodial interrogation was shown; consequently the letters were admissible and carried probative weight. The subsequent retraction before the Ombudsman was treated as unreliable and insufficient to negate the earlier admissions.

Audit Irregularities, Procedural Challenges, and Presumption of Regularity

Fajardo contended the spot audits suffered serious irregularities (lack of opportunity to balance accounts, sealing of the vault days after the first audit, and failure to include certain item

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