Title
Factor vs. Martel, Jr.
Case
G.R. No. 161037
Decision Date
Feb 4, 2008
A dispute over land ownership in Las Piñas, involving conflicting titles, a writ of possession, and improper procedural shortcuts, resolved by the Supreme Court favoring long-term possessors.
writ of possession
land registration dispute
accion reinvindicatoria

Case Summary (G.R. No. 161037)

Factual Background

Benito J. Lopez was the registered owner of a parcel covered by TCT No. S-61176 located at Barrio Almanza, Las Piñas City. On December 29, 1993, he sold the land to Antonio V. Martel, Jr. for P75,000,000. Martel, Jr. subdivided the parcel into five lots, including the lots covered by TCT Nos. T-69568 and T-69572, which later became the subject of the present controversy.

In LRC Case No. N-9049, the Pasig RTC, Branch 71 (then formerly the RTC of Rizal) issued a Decision dated December 8, 1994, granting an application for registration and confirmation of title. That case had been filed on December 9, 1975 by Teodorica, Enrique, Beatriz, Rueben, Mario, and the heirs of Ricardo and Narciso, all surnamed Factor, as applicants. Their claim was anchored on possession since time immemorial over lands that included the lot covered by TCT No. T-57471, from which Lopez’s title emanated.

Procedural History in the Land Registration Case and Aftermath

On May 30, 1995, Lopez, together with Pepito L. Ng and their spouses as formal parties, filed a motion for leave to admit petition to reopen and review the decree of registration. The Pasig RTC later reversed its earlier order that had directed the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of the Factors. In an Order dated January 27, 1997, the Pasig RTC denied the motion for reconsideration in its earlier posture, reconsidered and set aside its Decision dated December 8, 1994, and ultimately dismissed the case without costs.

Relying on the Pasig RTC’s January 27, 1997 ruling, Martel, Jr. filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the lots covered by TCT Nos. T-69568 and T-69572. The petition was docketed as LRC Case No. 02-0030 before the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 202 on March 15, 2002.

In a Decision dated August 26, 2002, the RTC denied Martel, Jr.’s petition for a writ of possession. Martel, Jr. moved for reconsideration, and the RTC granted it in a Resolution dated September 27, 2002, setting aside the August 26, 2002 Decision and directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Martel, Jr., against the Factors and all persons claiming rights under them, ordering the Deputy Sheriff to place Martel, Jr. in possession.

Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari. In a Decision dated October 16, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was also denied in a Resolution dated December 9, 2003.

During the pendency of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, Martel, Jr. sold the lots to Pepito L. Ng for P151,800,000 on August 17, 2003.

The Parties’ Contentions Before the Supreme Court

Petitioners assailed the issuance of the writ of possession and insisted that such writ could be issued only pursuant to a decree of registration in an original land registration proceeding. They argued that the ex parte petition for a writ of possession was filed outside the original land registration proceeding that had concluded in 1905. They further contended that LRC Case No. N-9049 had been brought at their instance and was still pending appeal at the time writ issuance was sought; thus, execution could not lawfully be enforced.

Petitioners also maintained that Ng, as successor of Martel, Jr., should have filed an ejectment action rather than seek a writ of possession.

Ng countered that the right of a successful party in a land registration case to ask for a writ of possession does not prescribe, and that the writ could issue not only against persons defeated in the case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land during the proceeding until the final decree of registration was issued. He anchored his position on the allegation in LRC Case No. N-9049 that the Factors and their predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous possession since time immemorial. Ng rejected laches on the ground that his predecessor had immediately filed opposition upon learning of LRC Case No. N-9049 and had applied for a writ of possession while the case was on appeal.

Issues for Resolution

The petition required joint resolution of two interrelated questions: first, whether the Court of Appeals erred in allowing a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 02-0030, and second, whether a petition for a writ of possession was a proper remedy to recover possession of the properties subject of the proceedings.

Legal Basis and the Supreme Court’s Reasoning

The Court held that a writ of possession is used to enforce a judgment for recovery of possession of land. It orders the sheriff to enter the land and give possession to the party entitled under the judgment. The Court recognized that writs of possession may be issued in several instances, including: (1) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2) certain foreclosure situations under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (3) execution sales.

In land registration proceedings, the Court explained, a writ of possession is an order issued by the RTC directing the sheriff to place the applicant, oppositor, or the successful litigant in possession of the property.

Applying these principles, the Court examined Ng’s two grounds for the writ. First, Ng argued that no writ had yet been issued to enforce the decree of registration allegedly favorable to his predecessors-in-interest in the original land registration case; second, he asserted that the Court of Appeals had favorably resolved the opposition to registration of the lots in petitioners’ name.

The Court rejected Ng’s reliance on OCT No. 25 issued on January 20, 1905. It reasoned that the issuance of a writ of possession is anchored not only on the identity of the party defeated in the registration case, but also on the legal status of those who occupy the land adversely during the proceedings until issuance of the decree. The Court reiterated a settled rule: a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to a decree of registration in original land registration proceedings, and it may be enforced against parties who adversely occupied the land during the proceedings up to the decree.

The Court found that petitioners applied for registration and confirmation of the land covered by TCT No. S-61176 in 1975, which was long after the decree of registration was issued in 1905, and petitioners were not parties to the original registration case. On those facts, petitioners were held to be outside the adverse occupants contemplated by law for writ enforcement. Consequently, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had gravely erred when it allowed a writ of possession in favor of Martel, Jr. through the mechanism employed in LRC Case No. 02-0030.

The Court further emphasized that when the parties against whom a writ is sought have been in possession for at least ten years, and their entry into possession appeared to be after the issuance of the final decree, and they were not parties to the registration proceedings, the writ of possession would not issue. The Court stated that a person who took possession after final adjudication in registration cannot be summarily ousted through a writ secured by mere motion. The Court underscored that regardless of whether those possessors had title or lacked it, they could not be ousted without being given their day in court in proper independent proceedings.

On Ng’s argument that Martel, Jr. merely sought execution of the Pasig RTC’s decision in LRC Case No. N-9049, the Court held that the procedural shortcut was impermissible. It invoked Section 34 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which makes the Rules of Court applicable insofar as not inconsistent, and then applied Rule 39, Sec. 1 on execution upon judgments or final orders. The Court observed that Ng’s manifestations did not establish that the Court of Appeals decision in LRC Case No. N-9049 had become final and executory. Even assuming finality, the Court noted that a writ of possession remained unavailing because the motion for issuance was not filed in the same case for which execution was sought.

The Court concluded that, pending the final outcome of LRC Case No. N-9049, Ng’s only remedy to take possession was an accion reinvindicatoria against petitioners, to recover ownership over real proper

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