G.R. No. 161037 - Factor vs. Martel, Jr.

Petitioners: Norma S. Factor, Fe S. Factor, Honesto Factor De Leon, Marilyn Factor Burgos, Rueben (or Reuben) Ma. Factor, and Beatriz F. Chan, along with Narciso S. Factor, Jr.
Respondent: Antonio V. Martel, Jr., represented by his attorney-in-fact, Atty. Napoleon G. Rama.

The case was initially handled by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 202, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 02-0030, which issued a Decision on August 26, 2002 denying relief.
Martel, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by a Resolution dated September 27, 2002, setting aside the earlier decision and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession.
The petitioners sought review through the Court of Appeals. On October 16, 2003, the appellate court denied the petition, a decision later affirmed by a Resolution dated December 9, 2003.
Subsequent to the appellate decisions, pending the resolution of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, Martel, Jr. sold the subject lots to Pepito L. Ng on August 17, 2003.

Benito J. Lopez was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-61176 located at Barrio Almanza, Las Piñas City.
On December 29, 1993, Lopez sold the land to Antonio V. Martel, Jr. for P75,000,000.

Following the sale, Martel, Jr. had the land subdivided into five lots, from which individual titles were subsequently issued, including TCT Nos. T-69568 and T-69572—the subject of this controversy.

On May 25, 1995, Martel, Jr. discovered a Decision dated December 8, 1994, from the Pasig RTC, Branch 71, granting registration and confirmation of title in favor of a group of Factors based on an earlier claim (LRC Case No. N-9049) filed in 1975.
Benito J. Lopez and allied parties later filed a motion on May 30, 1995 to reopen and review that decree.
On January 27, 1997, the Pasig RTC reversed its earlier order by setting aside the decree of registration in favor of the Factors.

Relying on the ruling in the Pasig RTC case and the subsequent developments, Martel, Jr. filed an ex parte petition seeking a writ of possession over the lots covered by TCT Nos. T-69568 and T-69572.
The writ was issued after the RTC’s decision was reconsidered and granted in Martel, Jr.’s favor on September 27, 2002.

Argued that a writ of possession may be issued strictly pursuant to a decree of registration in the original land registration proceedings.
Asserted that because they (or their predecessors-in-interest) had been in continuous possession since time immemorial and had initiated LRC Case No. N-9049, the issuance of the writ was erroneous.
Claimed that Martel, Jr. (and by extension his successor, Ng) should have filed an independent action for ejectment rather than seeking a writ of possession.

Maintained that a writ of possession is a proper remedy to enforce a judgment to recover possession and that its issuance does not prescribe even if the case was not part of the original registration proceedings.
Asserted that the writ could extend to anyone adversely occupying the land during the pendency of such proceedings, relying partly on the long-standing continuous possession of the property claimed by the Factors.

The appellate court, upon thorough consideration, eventually found merit in the petitioners’ challenge regarding the proper conditions for issuing a writ of possession.
The Court emphasized the requirement that a writ to enforce possession under land registration must be based on a final decree and proper execution procedure, leaving the remedy of an action for ejictment (accion reinvindicatoria) as the proper recourse for the respondent if adverse possession is involved.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in issuing a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 02-0030.

Does the issuance of a writ of possession require that the order be based on a final and executory decree of registration?
Was the writ issued pursuant to the conditions prescribed by the law governing land registration proceedings?

Whether or not a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is the proper remedy to take possession of the properties subject to the case.

Should an individual who was not a party to the original registration proceedings, but who later took possession through adverse means, be ousted by a writ of possession?
Is the recourse provided by a writ of possession appropriate in circumstances where the proper remedy might be an independent action (accion reinvindicatoria) for recovery of ownership?