Title
Fabia vs. David
Case
G.R. No. L-123
Decision Date
Dec 12, 1945
Josefa Fabie, as usufructuary, sued Ngo Soo for unpaid rent and eviction. Juan Grey intervened, claiming ownership. Courts ruled Fabie had possessory rights, mandamus compelled merits review, and Grey’s appeal was timely.
dispute
usufructuary
owner
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-123)

Factual Background

The will vested in the usufructuary the income of houses at 372–376 Santo Cristo, Binondo, and 950–956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, and prohibited alienation during minority. The Santo Cristo property was owned by JUAN GREY. In civil case No. 1659 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the usufructuary and the owner litigated administration of these houses and, by stipulation approved and made an order of court on September 2, 1944, the parties agreed that beginning September 1944 the usufructuary would collect all rents and would pay taxes, insurance, and make repairs, with the owner entitled to step in on default and recoup expenses from subsequent rents.

Commencement of Unlawful Detainer Action

In June 1945 the petitioner sued in the Municipal Court for unlawful detainer against NGO BOO SOO, alleging month-to-month occupation of the Santo Cristo premises, an offer by the defendant to pay PHP 300 monthly which the petitioner refused because she needed the house to live in after her residence was burned, and prior notices to vacate on March 24 and April 14, 1945. The petitioner pleaded her status as administratrix and usufructuary.

Defenses and Intervention

The defendant answered that he had been tenant since 1908 under a lease with the owner JUAN GREY, that the petitioner was merely usufructuary entitled only to receive rents, and that she had no authority to eject tenants. JUAN GREY intervened, asserting ownership and contending that under the stipulation and the decision in civil case No. 1659 the owner retained the right to administer the property, select tenants, and fix rent; he thus denied the petitioner’s authority to bring the action.

Municipal Court Judgment

Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court found that paragraph 9 of the stipulation incorporated in the decision of civil case No. 1659 vested administration in the usufructuary and that the petitioner had proved her cause. The court ordered NGO BOO SOO to vacate and to pay rent at the rate of P137.50 monthly beginning April 1, 1945, and it dismissed the complaint in intervention.

Court of First Instance Appeal and Dismissal

On appeal the Court of First Instance, through Judge Arsenio P. Dizon, dismissed the case, holding that the principal issue was who was entitled to administer the property and the lease conditions, matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. Judge Jose Gutierrez David denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and sustained the dismissal.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The Court first determined whether the Municipal Court action was a purely possessory proceeding within Rule 72 or an action involving title or respective interests in land such that it lay beyond municipal jurisdiction. The Court also addressed whether mandamus lay to compel the Court of First Instance to hear and decide the appeal on the merits and whether the intervenor JUAN GREY had filed his appeal in time.

Supreme Court’s Disposition

The Court held that the action instituted by the petitioner in the Municipal Court was an action for unlawful detainer within the original jurisdiction of that court. The Court set aside the orders of dismissal of the Court of First Instance dated September 22 and October 31, 1945, and directed that court to try and decide the desahucio case on the merits. The costs of the Supreme Court action were assessed against NGO BOO SOO.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Jurisdiction

The Court observed that title to the naked ownership was admitted in JUAN GREY while the usufructuary right to all rents and the obligation to pay taxes and make repairs was admitted in JOSEPA FABIE by the will and by the final judgment in civil case No. 1659; thus there was no dispute over title or respective interests. The dispositive issue was who had the right to administer, possess, and control the property, including the selection of tenants and fixing of rent. Because possession and the right to control were directly in issue, the Court characterized the action as possessory and not as one requiring adjudication of title, and it applied the controlling rule that courts must consult the averments and the relief sought to determine whether an action is within inferior-court jurisdiction. The Court concluded that to permit the owner to assert exclusive administration despite the will and the stipulation would deprive the usufructuary of the effective enjoyment of her right to rents.

Construction of the Prior Judgment and the Usufructuary’s Rights

The Court construed the stipulation incorporated in the judgment of civil case No. 1659 and the ninth clause of the will together. It concluded that the usufructuary’s right to collect rents, to pay taxes, insurance, and repairs, and to conserve the property necessarily included the right to administer the property, to select tenants, and, as a corollary, to occupy the premises herself if she so elected, provided she fulfilled her obligations. The owner’s historical role as collecting agent did not establish a continuing right to administer after the parties’ stipulation and the court’s decree vested administration in the usufructuary.

Remedy by Mandamus and Adequacy of Appeal

The Court found that mandamus lay under Rule 67, Section 3, because the Court of First Instance had unlawfully neglected the duty to hear and decide an appeal that the law required it to entertain w

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