Title
Fabia vs. David
Case
G.R. No. L-123
Decision Date
Dec 12, 1945
Josefa Fabie, as usufructuary, sued Ngo Soo for unpaid rent and eviction. Juan Grey intervened, claiming ownership. Courts ruled Fabie had possessory rights, mandamus compelled merits review, and Grey’s appeal was timely.
A

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-123)

Facts:

Josefa Fabie v. Jose Gutierrez David, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ngo Boo Soo and Juan Grey, G.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945, Supreme Court En Banc, Ozaeta, J., writing for the Court.

The petitioner Josefa Fabie was the usufructuary for life of the income from certain houses in Manila under the ninth clause of her mother's will; the naked title to one of those properties (Santo Cristo) was in respondent Juan Grey. In Civil Case No. 1659 before the Court of First Instance of Manila the parties (including Fabie and Grey) submitted a written stipulation which the court approved and embodied in its September 2, 1944 decision. By that stipulation and judgment the usufructuary was to collect the rents beginning September 1944, bear taxes, insurance and repairs, and, in case of her default, the owner could perform those acts and recoup expenses from subsequent rents; the stipulation was made binding on successors and assigns.

In June 1945 Josefa Fabie filed an action for unlawful detainer (desahucio) in the Municipal Court against Ngo Boo Soo (defendant), alleging month-to-month tenancy and seeking eviction and unpaid rents. Ngo Boo Soo answered asserting long-standing tenancy under a lease with the owner Juan Grey; Grey intervened, claiming as owner that the 1944 stipulation and judgment recognized only the usufructuary’s right to receive rents but not the right to administer, lease or evict tenants, which he asserted belonged to him.

The Municipal Court (Judge Mariano Nable) ruled for the plaintiff, holding that paragraph 9 of the stipulation made the usufructuary the administratrix and ordering eviction and payment of rent. Juan Grey appealed to the Court of First Instance (Judge Arsenio P. Dizon), which dismissed the municipal-court decision on the ground that the issues involved administration of property and lease conditions — matters beyond the municipal court’s jurisdiction. Judge Jose Gutierrez David denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and sustained the dismissal.

Petitioner brought an original action in the Supreme Court seeking annulment of the Court of First Instance’s orders of dismissal and a...(Subscriber-Only)

Issues:

  • Is the Municipal Court action one of unlawful detainer within the jurisdiction of the municipal court (Rule 72, Sec. 1), or does it involve title or the respective interests in the property so as to place it beyond municipal-court jurisdiction?
  • If the Court of First Instance unlawfully dismissed the appeal, does mandamus lie to compel that court to hear and decide the case on the merits (Rule 67, Sec. 3)?
  • Was the intervenor Juan G...(Subscriber-Only)

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.