G.R. No. L-24693 - Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-24693)

Factual Background

The petitioners, an association of eighteen hotel and motel operators together with one member and its president-manager, alleged that they operated legitimate, licensed businesses in the Ermita and Malate districts, employed about two thousand five hundred persons and represented investments exceeding P3 million, and that Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila unduly infringed their rights. The ordinance amended several sections of the compilation of Manila ordinances and inserted new provisions that increased annual license fees for motels and hotels, imposed detailed registration and recordkeeping requirements for transient guests, classified motels into two classes with minimum facility requirements, restricted acceptance of persons under eighteen except when accompanied by parents or guardians, limited the frequency of leasing a room to not more than twice every twenty-four hours, and prescribed penalties including cancellation of license upon subsequent conviction.

Challenged Provisions of Ordinance No. 4760

Petitioners attacked Section 1 for imposing P6,000.00 per annum for first-class motels and P4,500.00 for second-class motels and for requiring that guests fill prescribed registration forms in a lobby open to public view with detailed personal data and inspection of premises by the Mayor or Chief of Police; Section 2 for classification and minimum facility requirements and for prohibiting acceptance of minors under eighteen except when accompanied; and Section 4 for a penalty scheme that could result in automatic cancellation of a license after a subsequent conviction, which petitioners alleged would destroy their businesses and investments; petitioners alleged these provisions were unreasonable, arbitrary, vague, invaded privacy, and violated the privilege against self-incrimination, thus contravening the due process guaranty.

Stipulation of Facts Submitted to the Court

Instead of taking evidence, the parties submitted a stipulation dated September 28, 1964, which admitted the organization and capacity of the petitioners, the respondent’s authority to enforce city ordinances, the petitioners’ licensure and operation in Malate and Ermita, the enactment and approval dates of Ordinance No. 4760, the explanatory note submitted by then Councilor Herminio Astorga, and that the City of Manila derived P101,904.05 in 1963 from license fees paid by one hundred five hotels and motels; the stipulation was the factual record upon which the lower court and this Court reviewed the constitutional challenge.

Lower Court Proceedings and Judgment

The lower court issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction on July 6, 1963 and, after memoranda by the parties and the parties’ stipulation of facts, concluded that Ordinance No. 4760 was unconstitutional and therefore null and void, permanently enjoined the respondent Mayor from enforcing the ordinance, and dismissed the ordinance as violative of due process in its various provisions regarding fees, registration, facility requirements, age restrictions, leasing frequency and penalties.

Issues Presented on Appeal

The principal issue on appeal was whether Ordinance No. 4760 violated the due process guaranty and was therefore void, and ancillary issues included whether the ordinance exceeded municipal authority in regulating motels, whether the increased license fees were arbitrary or an improper exercise of power, whether the registration and inspection requirements unreasonably invaded privacy or compelled self-incrimination, whether facility and classification requirements and leasing restrictions were arbitrary restraints on freedom to contract, and whether the ordinance was impermissibly vague.

Petitioners’ Contentions

Petitioners contended that the ordinance was beyond the Municipal Board’s authority insofar as motels were not referenced in the charter or law, that the license fee increases were unreasonable and oppressive, that the registration requirement violated privacy and the privilege against self-incrimination and was vague, that classification and minimum facility requirements and the twice-per-day leasing restriction unreasonably impinged on freedom of contract and lacked certainty, and that the penalty provision entailing license cancellation upon subsequent conviction would result in destruction of business and investments and therefore violated due process.

Respondent’s Contentions

The respondent Mayor defended the ordinance as a valid exercise of the municipal police power aimed at curbing immorality and prostitution, maintaining public morals and order, and as a legitimate source of municipal revenue; respondent asserted the presumption of validity attached to ordinances, that petitioners bore the burden to prove unconstitutionality, that petitioners lacked standing to assert invasions of privacy and privilege that more properly belonged to transient guests, and that the ordinance bore a reasonable relation to a proper public purpose.

Ruling of the Supreme Court (Disposition)

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, dissolved the injunction and lifted the restraint on enforcement of Ordinance No. 4760, and awarded costs against the petitioners, reasoning that the petitioners had failed to meet the burden of overcoming the presumption of validity attaching to municipal legislation and that the ordinance was not void on its face.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court emphasized the strong presumption of validity accorded to legislative enactments and the necessity of a factual foundation to rebut that presumption, citing O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. and earlier Philippine precedents including U. S. v. Salaveria and Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, and held that where a measure is within the scope of the police power and factual questions may condition constitutionality, courts should not declare the statute void in the absence of record evidence demonstrating unreasonableness. The Court found that the explanatory note to the ordinance and the stipulation of facts established the municipal concern over an alarming increase in prostitution and clandestine use of motels, that measures designed to curb those evils fell squarely within police-power purposes to protect public morals, and that increased license fees could be sustained either as

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-24693)

Parties and Procedural Posture

The petitioners were Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc., Hotel del Mar, Inc., and Go Chiu acting in their corporate and representative capacities.
The respondent was The Honorable City Mayor of Manila sued in his official capacity as the executive charged with enforcing city ordinances.
Victor Alabanza appeared as intervenor-appellee asserting interest as a user of petitioners' facilities.
The petition for prohibition was filed on July 5, 1963 and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court on July 6, 1963.
The parties filed a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964 and submitted legal memoranda on January 22, 1965 and February 4, 1965.
The lower court declared Ordinance No. 4760 unconstitutional and made the preliminary injunction permanent, prompting the present appeal.

Key Factual Allegations

The petitioners alleged that the association represented eighteen hotels and motels employing not less than 2,500 persons and representing an investment of more than P3 million.
The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760 on June 13, 1963, which was approved on June 14, 1963 by Acting Mayor Herminio Astorga.
The ordinance raised annual license fees for motels and hotels, required public registration of transient guests with extensive personal data, classified motels into classes with minimum facility requirements, restricted acceptance of persons under eighteen years except when accompanied, limited leasing of rooms to no more than twice every 24 hours, and prescribed penalties including cancellation of license upon subsequent conviction.
The stipulation of facts reflected that the city derived P101,904.05 in 1963 from license fees paid by 105 hotels and motels.

Ordinance Challenged

Section 1 of the ordinance imposed increased annual license fees and required registration forms to be completed in a lobby open to public view containing detailed personal data and supporting documentary numbers.
Section 1 also authorized inspection of premises and records by the City Mayor, the Chief of Police, or their authorized representatives.
Section 2 classified motels into two classes and prescribed minimum facilities for first-class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant, and laundry services, while imposing facility requirements on second-class motels.
Section 2 made it unlawful to accept persons under eighteen years unaccompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and limited leases of rooms to no more than twice in any 24-hour period.
Section 4 provided increasing penalties for violations and mandated automatic cancellation of licenses upon a subsequent conviction.

Constitutional Contentions

The petitioners contended that the Municipal Board lacked authority to regulate motels because motels were not referenced in the revised charter or other law.
The petitioners argued that the increased license fees in Section 1 were unreasonable and violative of due process.
The petitioners maintained that the public registration requirement was arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, vague, invaded the right to privacy, and violated the prohibition against self-incrimination.
The petitioners asserted that the classification and minimum facility requirements in Section 2 were arbitrary and offended due process.
The petitioners argued that the age restriction an