Title
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
Case
G.R. No. L-24693
Decision Date
Jul 31, 1967
Hotel operators challenged Manila's Ordinance No. 4760, claiming it violated due process, privacy, and was oppressive. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of police power to regulate public morals, ruling it reasonable and not arbitrary.

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-24693)

Facts:

Ermita‑Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc., Hotel Del Mar, Inc. and Go Chiu v. The Honorable City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L‑24693, July 31, 1967, Supreme Court En Banc, Fernando, J., writing for the Court.

Petitioners — the Ermita‑Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc., one of its members Hotel del Mar, Inc., and Go Chiu (president and general manager of Hotel del Mar) — filed a petition for prohibition on July 5, 1963 against the City Mayor of Manila, sued in his official capacity, seeking to enjoin enforcement of Ordinance No. 4760. An intervenor, Victor Alabanza, also appeared in the proceedings below.

The petition alleged that the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760 on June 13, 1963 (approved June 14, 1963 by acting Mayor Herminio Astorga), and asserted the ordinance was unconstitutional on due process grounds. The attack focused on provisions raising annual license fees for motels and hotels (e.g., P6,000 for first‑class motels, P4,500 for second‑class), requiring detailed public registration of guests (name, birthdate, address, occupation, nationality, passport number, companions’ names/ages/sex), authorizing inspection by city officials, classifying motels and prescribing minimum facilities, prohibiting unaccompanied persons under 18, limiting room rentals to twice in 24 hours, and providing cancellation of license upon subsequent conviction.

The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on July 6, 1963 restraining enforcement of the ordinance effective July 8, 1963. The Mayor answered (Aug. 3, 1963), denied invalidity, asserted the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power to curb immorality, and moved to dissolve the injunction. Rather than present evidence, the parties filed a stipulation of facts (Sept. 28, 1964) and memoranda (Jan.–Feb. 1965), the stipulation summarizing the ordinance’s enactment, the association’s membership and Manila’s license revenues.

Relying on the pleadings and stipulation, the trial court held the ordinance unconstitutional and ...(Subscriber-Only)

Issues:

  • Did the lower court err in declaring Ordinance No. 4760 unconstitutional without an evidentiary foundation sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity of municipal legislation?
  • On the merits, is Ordinance No. 4760 void on its face as violative of due process — specifically as to (a) increased license fees, (b) registration and inspection requirements (privacy/self‑incrimination), (c) classification and facility requirements, (d) prohibition on unaccompanied minors a...(Subscriber-Only)

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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