Case Summary (G.R. No. 92163)
Key Dates
Arrest of Senator Enrile: afternoon, February 27, 1990; held overnight at NBI; transferred to Camp Tomas Karingal February 28, 1990. Habeas corpus petition filed February 28, 1990 (with supplemental petition March 2, 1990). Writ issued returnable March 5, 1990; oral arguments March 6, 1990. Decision rendered June 5, 1990. Applicable constitutional framework: 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Applicable Law and Precedents Referenced
Primary statutory and doctrinal sources: Article 48, Revised Penal Code (rules on concurso of crimes); Articles 134 and 135, Revised Penal Code (definition and penalties for rebellion/insurrection); Rule 117, Sec. 2, Rules of Court (motion to quash); Executive Order No. 187 (repealing P.D. No. 942 and restoring prior provisions); key precedents: People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515, 1956) and subsequent cases that considered Hernandez; Soliven v. Makasiar (on judge’s duty regarding probable cause); Ocampo v. Bernabe; Chavez v. Court of Appeals; and other cited authorities.
Facts as Found by the Court
Prosecutors (Trampe, Abesamis, Manangquil) filed an information charging Enrile, the Panlilios and Honasan with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the failed coup period (November 29–December 10, 1990). A warrant issued by Judge Salazar resulted in Enrile’s arrest and detention without bail recommendations or bail fixed. Petitioners alleged deprivation of constitutional rights: being held for a non-existent offense; charged without prior complaint or preliminary investigation; denied bail; and arrested on a warrant issued without the issuing judge personally determining probable cause.
Procedural Posture and Immediate Relief
This Court issued the writ of habeas corpus and, provisionally on March 6, 1990, granted conditional liberty upon filing cash or surety bonds (P100,000 for Enrile; P200,000 for the Panlilios), expressly without prejudice to extended disposition. Four Members voted against granting bail to Enrile in that provisional resolution. The Solicitor General filed a consolidated return and argued that Hernandez should not apply because the information charged common crimes committed on the occasion of rebellion (compound crime) rather than crimes that were necessary means for committing rebellion (complex crime).
Issues Presented
- Whether the Hernandez doctrine remains binding and whether rebellion can be complexed with other common offenses committed on the occasion of or in furtherance of rebellion.
- Whether the information filed charged a valid offense or a non-existent crime (i.e., rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder).
- Whether the prosecutors conducted a preliminary investigation and whether a complaint had been filed.
- Whether the issuing judge discharged an obligatory personal determination of probable cause before issuing the arrest warrant.
- Whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy to secure bail and vindicate rights alleged to have been violated.
Majority Holding on the Hernandez Doctrine
The Court (majority) reaffirmed People v. Hernandez as binding precedent. The majority rejected efforts to abandon Hernandez and rejected limiting Hernandez to cases where common crimes were necessary means for rebellion. By majority votes, the Court held that Hernandez prohibits complexing rebellion with any other offense committed in its course — whether as necessary means or merely occurring on the occasion thereof — and therefore rebellion absorbs such offenses.
Rationale for Reaffirming Hernandez
The Court emphasized Hernandez’s substantive and logical bases and noted recent executive action (EO No. 187, issued June 5, 1987) which repealed P.D. No. 942 and thereby nullified a prior attempt to legislatively countermand Hernandez (Art. 142-A under the former regime). The Executive action was characterized as effectively reinstating Hernandez’s principle by executive fiat; absent compelling reasons to overturn the doctrine, the Court accorded it the same recognition.
Interpretation of the Information
The Court ruled that, despite objectionable phrasing that attempted to complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, the information must be read in light of Hernandez as charging simple rebellion. The petitioners therefore were charged with a statutory offense (simple rebellion), not a non-existent offense, and should be considered amenable to bail before final conviction.
On Preliminary Investigation and Complaint
The Court found that a complaint had been filed by the NBI Director and that a preliminary investigation was conducted by the panel of prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the information. The Court rejected the petitioners’ contention that no initial complaint or preliminary investigation occurred.
On Judicial Duty to Determine Probable Cause
The petition that Judge Salazar issued the warrant without personally examining complainants and witnesses was addressed by reference to prior rulings: a judge need not personally examine witnesses under oath if he properly evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents. Short intervals between raffle and warrant issuance do not, without more, overcome the presumption that official duty was regularly performed.
Bail, Proper Forum, and Remedy
Given the reading of the information as charging simple rebellion (bailable before conviction), the Court held petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right. However, the Court emphasized procedural propriety: ordinarily the trial court has original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail and the accused should seek relief there first (by motion to be admitted to bail or motion to quash where appropriate), then to the Court of Appeals, and ultimately to the Supreme Court if necessary. The Court criticized the direct resort to habeas corpus as an improper circumvention of the regular judicial ladder and warned against short-circuiting trial court jurisdiction in ordinary cases.
Balancing Jurisdictional Concerns with Practical Considerations
Although the Court reiterated that the criminal action was the appropriate initial forum, it recognized the exceptional public interest and delay already incurred and therefore resolved the habeas corpus petitions on the merits. The Court declared it would henceforth be less tolerant of petitions that needlessly bypass lower courts.
Vote and Relief Ordered
The primary ruling reaffirming Hernandez garnered strong majority support (eleven to three on key points). The Court ordered that the information be read as charging simple rebellion and that petitioners are entitled to bail before final conviction. The earlier provisional grant of bail was made definitive in this sense: the cases were remanded to the respondent judge to fix the amounts of bail to be posted; once the trial court fixes bail and petitioners post the required bonds, any corresponding bail bonds filed with this Court become functus officio. No pronouncement as to costs.
Separate and Dissent
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 92163)
Case Caption, Citation and Procedural Posture
- Reported at 264 Phil. 593, decided En Banc, G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990.
- Petition for habeas corpus filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (G.R. No. 92163); contemporaneous and virtually identical petition by spouses Rebecco E. Panlilio and Erlinda E. Panlilio (G.R. No. 92164).
- The Court treated one petition (originally certiorari and prohibition) as a petition for habeas corpus in G.R. No. 92164 upon motion of petitioners.
- The writ of habeas corpus was issued returnable March 5, 1990; plea was set for hearing March 6, 1990.
- On March 6, 1990 the Court granted provisional liberty conditioned on cash or surety bonds (P100,000.00 for Senator Enrile; P200,000.00 for the Panlilios), expressly without prejudice to a more extended resolution on provisional liberty and without deciding the legal issues raised.
Factual Background (Undisputed)
- On the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by NBI Director Alfredo Lim pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar, Presiding Judge, RTC Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 90-10941.
- The information, signed and filed the same day by a prosecutorial panel (Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis, Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.), charged Senator Enrile, the Panlilios and Gregorio Honasan with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990 (as reflected in the source text).
- Senator Enrile was first detained overnight at NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail—none recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant.
- On February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal, Quezon City, and given over to the custody of Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres, Superintendent of the Northern Police District.
- On February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus (a supplemental petition followed on March 2, 1990), alleging multiple constitutional deprivations.
Issues Raised by Petitioners (As Presented)
- Petitioners asserted that they were deprived of constitutional rights by being:
- (a) held to answer for a criminal offense that allegedly does not exist in the statute books;
- (b) charged by information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation conducted, denying due process;
- (c) denied the right to bail;
- (d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the issuing judge first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.
- Additionally, the propriety and applicability of the People v. Hernandez doctrine to the facts and charges were squarely contested.
Respondents' and Government Arguments (Summarized)
- The Solicitor General, in a consolidated return filed March 5, 1990, urged that Hernandez should not apply because:
- In Hernandez the murders and common crimes were alleged to be necessary means for the commission of rebellion (second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code);
- The information against Enrile charged murders and frustrated murders committed on the occasion of, but not in furtherance of, rebellion — a distinction characterized as the difference between a "delito complejo" (where one offense is a necessary means for another) and a "delito compuesto" (one act constituting two or more offenses) under Article 48's first and second clauses.
- Respondents also defended the issuance of the warrant without the presiding judge’s personal oral examination of witnesses and justified the procedure followed by evaluating prosecutor's reports and supporting documents.
Options/Lines of Decision the Court Considered
- The Court identified three main options arising from parties’ pleas:
- (a) Abandon Hernandez and adopt Justice Montemayor’s minority view in Hernandez that rebellion can be complexed with common offenses under Article 48.
- (b) Limit Hernandez to cases where other offenses were means necessary to commit rebellion (i.e., crimes committed in furtherance or as a necessary means) but exclude acts committed on the occasion of rebellion which are not necessary to it.
- (c) Maintain Hernandez as holding that rebellion absorbs all other offenses committed in its course, whether necessary to its commission or merely on the occasion thereof.
Controlling Precedent and Statutory Provisions Discussed
- People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) — central doctrine under review: absorption of common crimes (murder, arson, robbery) into the single crime of rebellion where those acts are alleged as ingredients or necessary means of rebellion; principle pro reo in Article 48’s favoring the accused was emphasized in Hernandez.
- Article 48, Revised Penal Code — first clause (where one act constitutes two or more offenses) and second clause (where one offense is a necessary means for another) were central to arguments about "complex" vs. "compound" crimes.
- Articles 134 and 135, Revised Penal Code — definitions and modes of rebellion discussed in concurring opinions (relationship between overt acts, criminal purpose, and listed acts of rebellion).
- Executive Order No. 187 (issued June 5, 1987) — repealed P.D. No. 942 and other enactments that had sought to neutralize Hernandez (including Article 142-A as introduced under the former regime), and thereby, by executive action, restored prior law; the majority considered this action as reinforcing Hernandez.
- Other cases cited in the decision and opinions include People v. Lava; People v. Geronimo; People v. Romagosa; People v. Rodriguez; Soliven v. Makasiar; Ocampo v. Bernabe; Chavez v. Court of Appeals; Celeste v. People; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons — cited in support of various propositions on procedure, bail, and habeas corpus.
Court’s Interim Rulings and Procedural Votes
- On March 6, 1990 the Court issued a Resolution granting provisional liberty conditioned on bail bonds (P100,000 for Enrile; P200,000 for the Panlilios) while stating it was without prejudice to a more extended resolution on provisional liberty and not passing on the legal issues then.
- Voting noted in the record:
- Four Members voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile; two Members voted against granting bail to the Panlilios (a separate remark indicates two Members were on leave).
- On the question of abandoning Hernandez, eleven Members voted against abandoning it; two Members felt the doctrine should be re-examined.
- The Court, by a vote of 11 to 3, ruled that the information filed did, in fact, charge an offense (and must be read as charging simple rebellion).
Majority Decision — Legal Reasoning and Holdings
- Hernandez remains binding precedent:
- The maj