Title
Department of Health vs. Camposano
Case
G.R. No. 157684
Decision Date
Apr 27, 2005
Former DOH-NCR employees faced dismissal for procurement anomalies; Supreme Court annulled orders due to lack of independent assessment by Secretary of Health, remanding for proper due process.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 167071)

Procedural History

Complaint filed May 15, 1996, at DOH-NCR alleging an anomalous procurement of medicines. Resident Ombudsman’s investigation recommended formal administrative charges on August 6, 1996. Secretary of Health filed formal charges on August 8, 1996. AO 298 (October 25, 1996) created an ad hoc committee to investigate the DOH-NCR administrative cases; the PCAGC took over the investigation on December 2, 1996. PCAGC issued a resolution (January 23, 1998) finding respondents guilty and recommending dismissal. President Ramos dismissed Dr. Majarais by AO 390 (April 20, 1998) and remanded the records regarding the other respondents to the Secretary of Health for appropriate action. Secretary Reodica issued orders dismissing Camposano, Agustin, and Perez (May 8, 1998; denial of reconsideration June 5, 1998). Respondents appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and thereafter to the Court of Appeals (CA); the CA set aside the CSC resolutions and ordered reinstatement, which led to the present petition for review to the Supreme Court.

Factual Allegations

The principal factual allegation concerns the DOH-NCR purchase on May 13, 1996 of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid, valued at P330,000.00, from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory, purportedly procured without required public bidding. The Resident Ombudsman’s report, PCAGC resolution, and DOH Secretary’s orders flow from investigation and findings regarding that transaction and related administrative charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and violations of RA 3019.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether the PCAGC had jurisdiction to investigate the administrative complaints against respondents.
  2. Whether the Secretary of Health improperly relinquished adjudicatory authority by merely adopting the PCAGC’s findings and recommendations without an independent assessment, thereby violating administrative due process.
  3. Whether the Secretary’s dismissal orders were valid in light of the investigative process and the alleged exhaustiveness of the PCAGC inquiry.

Court’s Holding — Overview

The Supreme Court partly granted the petition: it sustained the validity of the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 (thereby upholding the legality of the investigation), but annulled and set aside the Secretary of Health’s May 8, 1998 and June 5, 1998 orders dismissing the respondents for being violative of administrative due process. The records were remanded to the DOH for correction of the due-process defects.

Jurisdictional Analysis of PCAGC and AO 298

The Court analyzed Executive Order No. 151 (EO 151), which, by its terms, confers jurisdiction on the PCAGC to investigate administrative complaints “against presidential appointees.” EO 151’s text and preamble were read to limit the Commission’s investigative jurisdiction to presidential appointees (and, as amplified later by other executive instruments, certain high-ranking positions). However, the investigation of respondents was not undertaken pursuant strictly to EO 151 but pursuant to AO 298, which created an Ad Hoc Investigating Committee composed of the PCAGC members and directed adherence to Civil Service procedures (PD 807, Sections 38–40) and required forwarding findings and recommendations to the disciplining authority for action. The Court found that the President has constitutional authority over the Executive Department and the power to create an ad hoc committee to investigate officials and employees under the Executive Department. Consequently, AO 298 provided a lawful basis for the investigation despite the initial textual limits of EO 151. The Court further noted subsequent executive measures (e.g., Executive Order No. 12 and the PAGC) that addressed jurisdictional gaps in EO 151 with respect to non-presidential appointees, but held that AO 298 itself sufficed to validate the investigative mandate in this case.

Administrative Due Process Principles Articulated

The Court reiterated cardinal due process requirements for administrative disciplinary proceedings: (1) right to a hearing including opportunity to present evidence; (2) tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) decision must have some basis; (4) existence of substantial evidence; (5) decision should be premised on evidence in the record and disclosed to parties; (6) the disciplining authority must act on its own consideration of the law and facts and not blindly adopt a subordinate’s views; and (7) the decision must disclose reasons so respondents can prepare an intelligent appeal. These principles derive from long-standing administrative and constitutional jurisprudence and the Administrative Code (EO 292), as applied under the 1987 Constitution’s allocation of executive powers and disciplinary prerogatives.

Application of Due Process to Secretary’s Orders

Although a department secretary may legitimately delegate investigatory tasks to subordinates or other bodies (and the delegation to an investigating committee or the PCAGC was permissible), the Secretary of Health retained the adjudicatory power and the duty to independently assess evidence and apply governing law before imposing disciplinary sanctions. The Secretary’s two-page dismissal order was criticized for failing to demonstrate independent consideration of facts and law, for relying mechanically and exclusively on the dispositive portion of the PCAGC resolution, and for even misquoting that resolution by omitting references to two respondents. The Secretary’s denial of the motion for reconsideration did not cure these defects. By contrast, the Court observed that the President’s separate, more elaborate decision concerning Dr. Majarais reflected an independent re-study and articulation of findings and legal analysis — an approach the Secretary should have emulated. Mere delegation of investigation cannot substitute for the disciplining authority’s obligation to personally weigh evidence and state reasons for its decision.

Precedential and Doctrinal Support

The Court relied on precedent that permits delegation of investigatory functions but requires that the disciplining authority render the final adjudication on the merits based on its own consideration (e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents as cited). The Supreme Court also referenced

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