Title
De la Cerna vs. Potot
Case
G.R. No. L-20234
Decision Date
Dec 23, 1964
Spouses executed a joint will in 1939; probate decree for Bernabe’s estate upheld, but Gervasia’s share invalid due to joint will prohibition, requiring intestate succession.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-20234)

Factual Background

The spouses Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca executed a joint last will and testament on May 9, 1939, in which they devised two parcels of land (Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677, situated in sitio Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon, province of Cebu) and the improvements thereon to Manuela Rebaca, their niece, with a provision that each spouse would while living continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands. Bernabe died on August 30, 1939. The joint will was submitted to probate by Gervasia and Manuela and, after publication and absence of opposition, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in Special Proceedings No. 499, admitted the will to probate by Order of October 31, 1939, legalized the document, directed summary distribution in favor of Manuela Rebaca de Potot subject to her furnishing a bond in the sum of P500.00 to answer for any claims.

Subsequent Events Concerning the Wife’s Share

Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, a petition for the probate of the same joint will insofar as it concerned Gervasia was filed on November 6, 1952, as Special Proceedings No. 1016-R before the same Court of First Instance. The petition was dismissed on March 30, 1954, for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot, and her attorney to appear at the hearing.

Trial Court Proceedings and Later Trial Ruling

An action for partition was instituted by the heirs of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna, which the Court of First Instance ultimately heard and in which the trial court declared the joint will null and void for contravening the statutory prohibition against joint wills found in Art. 669, old Civil Code (and its counterpart Art. 818, new Civil Code), thereby sustaining petitioners’ contention that a joint will executed by spouses was invalid as to both or either.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered dismissal of the partition action. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, although the Civil Code prohibited joint wills either for reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person, the probate decree entered in 1939 by a court of competent jurisdiction had conclusively admitted the will and rendered the probate decree binding. The Court of Appeals relied on authority such as Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, and other pronouncements that a final decree admitting a will to probate settled the due execution of the testament.

Issues Presented on Appeal to the Court

The principal legal questions were whether the 1939 probate decree admitting the joint will could be given conclusive effect despite statutory prohibition of joint wills, and whether that probate decree bound the heirs of the surviving wife so as to bar partition of her undivided interest at her death.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioners, heirs of the deceased husband, contended that the joint will was void ab initio under Art. 669, old Civil Code, and that the trial court correctly declared the testament null and void; they maintained that no valid testamentary disposition could defeat their intestate rights. Respondents, chiefly Manuela Rebaca Potot, relied on the finality and conclusive effect of the 1939 probate decree to uphold the testamentary disposition in her favor and to defeat the partition suit.

Ruling of the Court

The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and clarified its scope. The Court held that the 1939 final decree of probate admitting the will of Bernabe de la Cerna was conclusive as to his testamentary disposition and therefore bound petitioners with respect to the share of the deceased husband. The Court further held, however, that the 1939 probate decree could affect only Bernabe’s share and not the share of his wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was alive at the time of that probate; accordingly, the validity of Gervasia’s participation in the joint will had to be reexamined de novo upon her death.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the probate court’s error in admitting a joint will in 1939, if erroneous as a matter of law, did not vitiate the probate court’s jurisdiction nor the conclusive effect of its final decree; longstanding authority established that a final judgment on probate is binding upon the world (citing Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). The Court underscored the policy that litigation must have an end, invoking the maxim interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium and prior jurisprudence cited in the Court’s decision. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that prior to the Civil Code a will could not be probated during the testator’s lifetime and that a joint will is to be regarded as a separate will of each testator; therefore the probate decree admitting Bernabe’s will could not adjudicate the rights arising from Gervasia’s share because her estate was not then in issue. The Court relied on its prior exposition in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, which explicated the reasoning in Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, to support the proposition that the joint will’s validity as to each testator must be examined with respect to that testator’s estate at the time his or her estate is in court.

Disposition and Practical Effect

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the partition action

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