Title
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. L-47822
Decision Date
Dec 22, 1988
A merchant sued a junk dealer for cargo loss after a hijacking. The Supreme Court ruled the dealer, a common carrier, was not liable due to force majeure, as the hijacking was unforeseeable and beyond reasonable control.
common carrier
liability
loss of merchandise

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-47822)

Factual Background

Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer who transported scrap from Pangasinan to Manila in two six-wheeler trucks he owned and who, on return trips, carried cargo for merchants at discounted freight rates as a sideline. In November 1970 Petitioner Pedro de Guzman, an authorized dealer of General Milk Company (Philippines), Inc., contracted with Respondent Cendana to haul 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a General Milk warehouse in Makati to petitioner’s establishment in Urdaneta. On December 1, 1970, 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by Respondent Cendana and 600 cartons on a truck driven by his employee Manuel Estrada. Only 150 cartons reached petitioner; the truck carrying the remaining 600 cartons was hijacked along the MacArthur Highway in Paniqui, Tarlac, and the driver and helper were taken and detained.

Trial Court Proceedings

On January 6, 1971, Petitioner sued private respondent in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for P22,150.00, the claimed value of the lost merchandise, plus damages and attorney’s fees. The trial court, in a decision dated December 10, 1975, found Respondent Cendana to be a common carrier and held him liable for P22,150.00, P4,000.00 as damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Court of Appeals Ruling

On appeal Respondent Cendana argued that he was not a common carrier, that the loss was due to force majeure, and that damages and attorney’s fees should not have been awarded. The Court of Appeals, by decision dated August 3, 1977, reversed the trial court and held that respondent transported return loads as a casual occupation or sideline and therefore was not a common carrier, and that the hijacking excused liability.

Issues Presented on Review

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari Petitioner assigned errors to the Court of Appeals’ conclusions that Respondent Cendana was not a common carrier, that the hijacking constituted force majeure, and that Respondent therefore was not liable for the value of the undelivered cargo.

Legal Standard on Common Carrier

The Court examined Article 1732, which defines common carriers as those “engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.” The Court held that Article 1732 does not distinguish between principal and ancillary activities, nor between regular and occasional service, nor between a carrier offering services to the general community and one serving a limited clientele. The Court noted the parallel in the Public Service Act, Section 13(b), which treats as public service any person who, for hire and with general or limited clientele, transports freight whether permanent, occasional, or accidental. The Court thus concluded that liability under the Civil Code arises the moment a person acts as a common carrier, irrespective of whether a certificate of public convenience has been secured.

Legal Standard on Carrier’s Liability and Force Majeure

The Court reiterated that common carriers, by reason of public policy, are held to extraordinary diligence under Article 1733, and that Article 1734 lists five specific exempting causes—flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural calamity; act of the public enemy in war; act or omission of the shipper; the character of the goods or defects in packing; and order or act of competent public authority—and that this list is closed. Losses falling outside those five categories are governed by Article 1735, which presumes the carrier at fault unless it proves it observed extraordinary diligence. The Court also cited Article 1745, which declares unreasonable stipulations that would absolve a carrier for acts of employees or for acts of thieves or robbers except where such robbers acted with “grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.”

Application to Facts: Hijacking and Extraordinary Diligence

The Court found that hijacking is not among the five exempting causes of Article 1734, and therefore Article 1735’s presumption of carrier fault applied unless Respondent proved extraordinary diligence. The Court considered what extraordinary diligence required in the context of armed robbery and held that the duty does not compel a carrier to provide an armed guard and to engage in a firefight at the risk of lives. The limits of the duty are reached where loss results from robbery attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, in which case the event may be regarded as fortuitous.

Criminal Evidence Supporting Fortuitous Event

The record showed that an information for robbery was filed in Criminal Case No. 198, People of the Philippines v. Felipe Boncorno, Napoleon Presno, Armando Mesina, Oscar Oria and one John Doe, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch 2, charging that the accused took the second truck and its cargo and kidnapped the driver and helper. The trial court in that criminal case found that the accused acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence or force; three of the five hold-uppers were armed, the driver and helper were detained for several days and released in another province, and the truck was later found by the police in Quezon City. The trial court convicted the accused of robbery, though not of robbery in band because the prosecution did not prove that more than three of the hold-uppers were armed.

Supreme Court Disposition

Applying the foregoing law to the facts and to the crimi

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