Title
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. L-47822
Decision Date
Dec 22, 1988
A merchant sued a junk dealer for cargo loss after a hijacking. The Supreme Court ruled the dealer, a common carrier, was not liable due to force majeure, as the hijacking was unforeseeable and beyond reasonable control.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-47822)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Contract for carriage formed in November 1970; goods loaded on 1 December 1970; only 150 of 750 cartons delivered; the remaining 600 cartons were taken when the truck was hijacked. Petitioner filed suit on 6 January 1971 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan seeking P22,150.00 (value of lost goods), damages, and attorney’s fees. Trial court (10 December 1975) found respondent a common carrier and held him liable for value, damages and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals reversed (decision of 3 August 1977). Petitioner’s petition to the Supreme Court was denied; the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on 22 December 1988.

Applicable Law and Legal Standards

Governing statutory provisions relied upon by the Court: Civil Code Article 1732 (definition of common carriers), Article 1733 (standard of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers), Article 1734 (enumerated causes exempting carriers from liability), Article 1735 (presumption of fault in cases not covered by Article 1734 unless extraordinary diligence is proved), and Article 1745 (provisions of contracts contrary to public policy, including stipulations attempting to exempt carriers from liability for acts of thieves or robbers except where such acts involve grave or irresistible force). The Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) is invoked to show the overlap between “common carrier” and “public service.”

Issue Presented

Whether respondent Cendana should be characterized as a common carrier and, if so, whether he is liable for the value of the 600 cartons lost by reason of the hijacking — or whether the loss constitutes a fortuitous event (force majeure) that absolves him of liability under the Civil Code.

Court’s Analysis on Status as Common Carrier

The Court interpreted Article 1732 broadly: a common carrier is anyone engaged in transporting goods for compensation offering services to the public, without requiring that carriage be the carrier’s principal business, that services be regular or scheduled, or that the clientele be general rather than limited. The Court emphasized that the absence of a certificate of public convenience does not prevent the imposition of common‑carrier liabilities under the Civil Code. To exempt a person who actually furnishes transportation services from common‑carrier obligations because he lacks regulatory permits would conflict with public policy and undermine protections afforded to users of transportation services.

Court’s Analysis of Liability Standard and Exceptions

The Court reiterated that common carriers are held to “extraordinary diligence” under Article 1733 and that Articles 1734 and 1735 together form the liability framework: Article 1734 lists five specific causes (natural calamities, acts of public enemy, acts or omissions of the shipper, character/packing of goods, acts of competent public authority) that exempt carriers; that list is closed. Losses caused by other events — including hijacking — fall under Article 1735, which presumes carrier fault unless the carrier proves extraordinary diligence. Article 1745(6) further limits contractual attempts to disclaim liability for acts of thieves or robbers except where such acts involve “grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.”

Application to the Hijacking Facts

The hijacking did not fall within the five exceptions of Article 1734; therefore Article 1735’s presumption of fault attached. The question became whether respondent proved that he exercised the extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier. The Court framed the limits of extraordinary diligence in cases of robbery/hijacking: carriers are not required to engage in conduct that would compel them or their employees to risk life by resisting armed attackers (for example, hiring a guard to engage brigands in a firefight). The Court examined the criminal record: an information for robbery was filed and the trial court in Tarlac found the accused had acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence or force; three of five hold‑uppers were armed; the driver and helper were kidnapped and detained, and the truck was subsequently recovered by police in another jurisdiction. Those facts supported a finding that the robbery involved grave or irresistible violence.

Court’s Conclusion on Force Majeure and Liability

Given the nature and circumstances of the

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