Title
Dapin vs. Dionaldo
Case
G.R. No. 55488
Decision Date
May 15, 1992
Heirs of Monica Pocong sued Marciana Dapin over a 23-hectare land, alleging fraudulent self-adjudication. Trial court ruled for heirs, nullifying Marciana's claim. SC upheld decision, dismissing petitioners' appeal as untimely and pro forma.
mandamus
trial court
record on appeal

Case Summary (G.R. No. 55488)

Factual Background

The private respondents alleged that the petitioners unlawfully deprived Monica Pocong of her share of inheritance in the agricultural land that Felix Dapin owned. The parties’ stipulation of facts established that Felix Dapin acquired the subject agricultural land before his marriage with Monica Pocong and that he died sometime in 1960, while Monica Pocong died in 1975. It further showed that on November 12, 1973, Marciana Dapin executed an affidavit of adjudication adjudicating the parcel to herself as the only surviving heir of Felix Dapin, which led to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9,411 on April 18, 1974. The land was fully planted to coconuts and was taxed in Marciana Dapin’s name.

During the trial, multiple hearings scheduled on April 17 and November 16, 1978, and May 3 and August 16, 1979, were postponed at the petitioners’ instance. On August 16, 1979, the trial court reset the case to September 7, 1979, warning that if counsel did not appear, the court would consider the case submitted on the evidence already adduced.

Trial Court Proceedings and Adverse Orders

Petitioners’ counsel failed to appear on September 7, 1979, and the trial court issued an order considering the case submitted for decision. By then, petitioner Adriano Malmis had already testified for the defense. On September 26, 1979, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the September 7, 1979 order, explaining that the hearing was allegedly reset by a “gentlemen’s agreement” since September 7 fell within the first week of the month when counsel purportedly had difficulty attending due to participation in the Sangguniang Pampook. They acknowledged partial fault for not filing a formal motion but claimed reliance on the agreement. They requested reconsideration and another chance to present additional evidence.

On November 9, 1979, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. On April 22, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision granting partition and awarding damages in favor of the private respondents. The court declared, in substance, that Monica Pocong was entitled to one-half of Felix Dapin’s estate when he died intestate, and that when Monica Pocong died in 1975, her children succeeded her as owners of that one-half share. The trial court further held that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Marciana Dapin was intended to defraud Monica Pocong and her heirs and was therefore null and void. It treated the property as a registered property covered by Felix Dapin’s certificate of title.

After judgment, the private respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal on April 24, 1980. Petitioners manifested on May 21, 1980 that they had not yet received a copy of the decision and prayed to be furnished one before the trial court acted. The record showed they received a copy on May 13, 1980. Petitioners and counsel did not appear on the May 30, 1980 hearing of the motion for execution pending appeal, and the trial court granted it.

On June 2, 1980, through new counsel, the petitioners filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on June 6, 1980. On June 13, 1980, they filed a notice of appeal. However, the record on appeal was filed only on June 17, 1980.

Motions to Deny Appeal and the Mandamus Issue

The private respondents moved to deny the appeal, arguing that because petitioners received the decision on May 13, 1980, the record on appeal was filed four days late, and therefore the appeal was not perfected on time. They maintained that the petitioners’ motion for new trial filed on June 2, 1980 was pro forma, hence it did not suspend the appeal period.

On July 25, 1980, the trial court granted the motion to deny appeal. It agreed with the private respondents that because the motion for new trial was pro forma, it did not interrupt the statutory period for perfecting the appeal.

Petitioners then sought mandamus, praying that the Supreme Court compel the trial judge to approve the record on appeal. They argued that the record on appeal was timely because their motion for new trial was not pro forma.

The Parties’ Positions on the “Pro Forma” Character of the New Trial Motion

The petitioners’ motion for new trial alleged, as their main basis, honest mistake or excusable negligence—specifically, counsel’s failure to appear on September 7, 1979, which they attributed to reliance on the alleged agreement to postpone the hearing. The allegations portrayed the decision as having been based on petitioners’ failure to appear, and they asked for another chance to present additional evidence.

The Supreme Court observed that this same ground of honest mistake or excusable negligence had already been raised in the earlier motion for reconsideration dated September 26, 1979 seeking to set aside the September 7, 1979 submission for decision. The Court thus treated the new trial motion as belonging to the category of pro forma motions, referring to Samudio v. Municipality of Gainza, 100 Phil. 1013 (1957), where a motion for new trial based on the very same ground previously raised was held not to suspend the period for appeal.

Newly Discovered Evidence Theory and Its Defects

Petitioners attempted, before the Supreme Court, to argue that the trial court erred in viewing the motion for new trial as merely pro forma because they supposedly introduced “new matter,” involving the presence and status of Moya Amadya Dapin (also referenced in some material as Manuela Dapin). They claimed that in April 1980, the mother of petitioner Marciana Dapin—whom they had previously referred to as dead—appeared and was alive, and that her reason for leaving her husband and child involved maltreatment. They further asserted that they had been led to believe since childhood that she died on June 10, 1940.

The Supreme Court treated this as effectively invoking the second ground for new trial under Rule 37, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court, namely newly discovered evidence. It reiterated that a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence properly lies only if the evidence was discovered after trial; could not have been discovered and produced during trial with reasonable diligence; and is material (not merely cumulative or impeaching) and would likely alter the result. It also emphasized that, to avoid being stamped as pro forma, the evidence claimed to be newly discovered must be specifically described in the motion, citing Loria v. Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 1067 (1962). It further noted decisions that set the requisites and standards for newly discovered evidence, including Pantig v. Baltazar, 191 SCRA 830 (1990), Velasco v. Ortiz, 184 SCRA 303 (1990), and Tumang v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 328 (1989).

Applying these principles, the Court found petitioners’ motion insufficiently specific and vague. It held that petitioners merely alleged that Felix Dapin acquired the property with Moya Amadya Dapin, and that the testimony of Marciana Dapin and Moya Amadya Dapin and a certain Timoay Ganding was necessary. In the accompanying affidavit, they alleged only that the marriage with Moya Amadya Dapin was solemnized according to Subano customs and that Moya Amadya was alive. The Court ruled that the motion failed to specifically describe the “newly discovered evidence” in the manner required, and it noted that the motion did not explain the discrepancy in the mother’s name—referred to as Moya Amadya in the motion but as Manuela in Marciana’s affidavit of self-adjudication. It also found the motion lacking in the required factual assertions that the evidence was discovered after trial; that it could not have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence; and that it was material and would probably alter the result.

Even beyond the technical defects, the Court expressed strong doubts about the alleged reappearance of Moya Amadya. It reasoned that the timing of the supposed return cast serious doubt on its credibility, since petitioners’ manifestation after receiving the adverse decision on May 13, 1980 was where they claimed the mother had actually been alive. The Court found it implausible that a mother would leave her two-year-old child and later “resurrect” herself only after forty years under a different name, particularly where the alleged husband had been dead for twenty years. It further found it questionable that petitioners did not recall with particularity the exact date of such an unusual event. The Court also noted that the “return” was asserted only after petitioners received the decision, which suggested to the Court that the evidence was a mere afterthought designed to confuse issues.

The Court also inferred, from the petitioners’ theory, that by introducing Moya Amadya (and by claiming the property was conjugal between Felix and Moya), petitioners hoped to reduce the potential recovery of the

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