G.R. No. 164594 - Sebastian vs. Lagmay-Ng

The case involves petitioners Marciana Dapin and Adriano Malmis and private respondents who are heirs of Monica Pocong, concerning a partition action and claims for damages.
The dispute centers on a 23-hectare agricultural land originally acquired by Felix Dapin, with subsequent controversies regarding the distribution of the estate upon his death.

Felix Dapin acquired a parcel of agricultural land at Lunib, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-20316 (1404) issued in 1934.
After Felix Dapin’s death in 1960, the land, planted with fruit-bearing coconut trees, was subject to inheritance issues; Marciana Dapin, a daughter by a previous relationship, executed an affidavit of adjudication, resulting in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9411 issued in 1974.
The property was also reflected in a tax declaration (No. 3506/1) in the name of Marciana Dapin.

On August 2, 1979, private respondents filed the initial action for partition and damages, alleging that Marciana Dapin had wrongfully deprived Monica Pocong of her rightful share in the estate.
Prior to trial, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts that detailed relevant matters such as the acquisition, planting, and titles of the property; the deaths of Felix Dapin (1960) and Monica Pocong (1975); and the execution of the self-adjudication affidavit by Marciana Dapin.

Several hearings were scheduled (April 17, November 16, May 3, and August 16, 1979), with postponements attributed to the petitioners or their counsel, Atty. Achilles Peralta.
On August 16, 1979, the court reset the case for a hearing on September 7, 1979 with a warning that failure of counsel to appear would result in the case being considered submitted for decision.
Counsel for the petitioners failed to appear on September 7, 1979, leading the trial court to rule the case as submitted for decision.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on September 26, 1979, explaining their absence based on an alleged verbal agreement to postpone the hearing and asserting a failure to file a proper postponement motion.

On November 9, 1979, the lower court denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On April 22, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision granting the partition and awarding damages in favor of the private respondents.
During the execution phase, petitioners and private respondents exchanged motions regarding the record on appeal:

Private respondents advanced a motion for execution pending appeal shortly after the April 22 decision.
Petitioners sought to delay execution by requesting a copy of the decision and later filed a motion for new trial on June 2, 1980.

The petitioners’ motion for new trial (filed by new counsel, Atty. Pelagio Estopia) was denied on June 6, 1980.
A notice of appeal was filed on June 13, 1980, but the complete record was submitted on June 17, 1980.
Private respondents contended that the record on appeal was filed late because the motion for new trial was merely pro forma, hence failing to suspend the appeal period.
On July 25, 1980, the trial court granted the private respondents’ motion to deny the appeal based on the untimely submission of the record on appeal.
Ultimately, the petitioners sought a writ of mandamus from the Court to compel the respondent judge to approve their record on appeal.

Whether the record on appeal, filed on June 17, 1980, is considered late given that the appeal period was allegedly not suspended by the filing of the motion for new trial.
Whether the petitioners’ failure to file the record on time (by the original deadline of June 13, 1980) negates their right to a timely appeal.

Whether the petitioners’ motion for new trial was a genuine presentation of new evidence or simply a pro forma motion intended to delay or suspend the appeal period.
Determining if the motion introduced any truly “newly discovered evidence” or was merely a repetition of the arguments previously raised in the motion for reconsideration.

Whether the alleged reappearance of Marciana Dapin’s mother, identified as Moya Amadya (or Manuela), was properly pleaded as newly discovered evidence.
Whether the petitioners met the three critical requisites for newly discovered evidence: (a) discovery after trial; (b) impossibility of discovery with reasonable diligence during trial; and (c) materiality that could alter the case outcome.

Whether a pro forma motion for new trial can effectively suspend the running of the appeal period.
How the precedent (e.g., Samudio v. Municipality of Gainza) influences the assessment of the petitioners’ procedural maneuvers.