Case Summary (G.R. No. L-23861)
Relevant Dates
Key dates include the original judgment against Cruz on March 28, 1963, her first motion to set aside the judgment on May 22, 1963, and her petition for relief filed on August 1, 1963. The appeal followed the denial of her petition for relief.
Applicable Law
The case is governed by Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines the procedures for obtaining relief from judgments and orders. This rule is significant as it establishes the time limits and grounds upon which such relief may be granted.
Background of Proceedings
Cruz, having been defaulted in an ejectment suit, sought to overturn the decision on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, as the process had involved service of summons to her salesgirl, Teresita Burce, rather than to her directly. After multiple attempts to set aside the decision and to obtain a new trial, all of which were denied by the court, Cruz eventually filed a petition for relief to the Court of First Instance.
Delay in Filing Petition
The Court of First Instance dismissed Cruz's petition for relief primarily due to her failure to file within the 60-day period mandated by Section 3 of Rule 38, having learned of the judgment on May 22 and filing the petition on August 1, which resulted in a 71-day delay. The court ruled this delay as a failure to comply with the absolute and inextendible time requirements outlined in the rules.
Petitioner’s Argument on Deducting Time
Cruz attempted to argue that the time spent in the inferior court contesting the default judgment should be deducted from the 60-day period. However, the court was unyielding, stating that the timelines established by Rule 38 cannot be interrupted or extended by subsequent proceedings. Thus, the filing in the wrong court did not affect the running of the statutory period.
Insufficient Merit for Relief
Aside from the timeline issue, the court found further infirmities in Cruz's petition. The affidavits presented did not establish a probability that a different outcome would result from a new trial, as they merely indicated that Cruz’s salesgirl had failed to deliver the summons and had not communicated with her since. Additionally, the affidavits failed to demonstrate any fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that would justify relief under Rule 38.
Procedures Followed by the Court
Cruz contested the manner of handling her petition, asserting that the Court of First Instance issued a dismissal without a hearing. However, the court clarified that responses from the respondents were sufficient for making a decision based on legal issues, as there were no disputes of fact requiring an oral argument. The court's ruling was derived from this allowance under Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court, which permits judgment on the pleadings where the material allegations are admitted.
Reconsideration Opportuni
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-23861)
Case Background
- The case involves a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Emiliana Cruz against respondents Ernesto Oppen, Inc., Hon. Crisanto Aragon (Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila), and the Sheriff of Manila.
- The dispute originated from a default judgment rendered on March 28, 1963, by the City Court of Manila, which ordered Cruz to vacate Stall No. 78 of the Manila Cartimar Market and to pay a total of P71.00 for rental arrears, plus daily rental fees until the premises were vacated.
Procedural History
- Cruz moved to set aside the default judgment on May 22, 1963, claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons—stating that it was served to her salesgirl, Teresita Burce, who failed to inform her.
- The initial motion was denied on May 25, 1963. Cruz subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on June 4, 1963, supported by Burce's affidavit explaining her inability to deliver the papers.
- This second motion was also denied on June 8, 1963.
- On August 1, 1963, Cruz sought relief from the Court of First Instance, arguing that the previous judgment and writ of execution should be set aside.
Arguments of the Parties
- Respondents contended that Cruz's petition was time-barred, as she filed it 71 days after learning of the judgment, exceeding the 60-day limit prescribed by Rule 38.
- Cruz argued that t
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