Case Digest (G.R. No. L-23861) Core Legal Reasoning Model
Core Legal Reasoning Model
Facts:
This case, Emiliana Cruz vs. Ernesto Oppen, Inc., et al. (G.R. No. L-23861), was decided on February 17, 1968, by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The petitioner-appellant, Emiliana Cruz, sought to reverse an order by the Court of First Instance of Manila that dismissed her petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court. The underlying events began on March 28, 1963, when the City Court of Manila rendered a default judgment against Cruz, ordering her to vacate Stall No. 78 of the Cartimar Market and to pay rentals amounting to P71.00, plus daily rentals of P2.70 until she vacated the premises. Cruz claimed that she was not properly summoned because the summons and complaint had been served to her salesgirl, Teresita Burce, who failed to deliver these documents to her.
Cruz moved to set aside the default judgment on May 22, 1963, citing lack of jurisdiction but was denied. She later filed a motion for reconsideration on June 4, attaching an affidavit from B
Case Digest (G.R. No. L-23861) Expanded Legal Reasoning Model
Expanded Legal Reasoning Model
Facts:
- Parties and Procedural Background
- Petitioner-Appellant: Emiliana Cruz; Respondents-Appellees: Ernesto Oppen, Inc., Hon. Crisanto Aragon (as Judge of the Municipal [formerly Municipal] Court/City Court of Manila) and the Sheriff of Manila.
- The dispute arose from an ejectment suit involving Stall No. 78 of the Manila Cartimar Market, whereby petitioner was ordered to vacate the premises and pay rentals.
- Proceedings in the City (Municipal) Court
- On March 28, 1963:
- The respondent judge in the City Court rendered judgment by default against petitioner.
- The judgment ordered petitioner to vacate Stall No. 78; to pay P71.00 for rentals in arrears; and to pay daily rentals at P2.70 from March 20, 1963 until the premises were vacated.
- On May 22, 1963:
- Petitioner moved to set aside the default order, the decision, and the writ of execution issued to enforce the judgment.
- The ground invoked was lack of jurisdiction over her person, based on the allegation that the summons and complaint were improperly served upon her salesgirl, Teresita Burce, who did not deliver the papers to her.
- On May 25, 1963:
- The respondent judge denied the motion to set aside the order.
- On June 4, 1963:
- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, reiterating the jurisdictional ground.
- An affidavit from her salesgirl, Teresita Burce, was attached. This affidavit stated that:
- The papers (summons and complaint) were served upon Teresita;
- On June 8, 1963:
- The reconsideration motion was again denied by the respondent judge.
- Petition for Relief in the Court of First Instance
- On August 1, 1963:
- Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of First Instance seeking relief from the city court’s judgment.
- She requested that the default order, decision, and writ of execution be set aside and that trial on the merits be granted.
- Respondents filed an answer dated October 14, 1963:
- They argued on matters of law that the petition was time-barred.
- They contended that even if timely, the negligence of petitioner’s salesgirl was inexcusable.
- On December 16, 1963:
- Petitioner replied, arguing that her petition was timely.
- She maintained that the salesgirl’s negligence was not attributable entirely to her and that her failure to answer the complaint in the lower court should not be solely imputed to her.
- On June 8, 1964:
- Respondent corporation filed a motion to resolve its answer to the petition, effectively functioning as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
- This motion was served and received by petitioner’s counsel on June 25, 1964.
- On July 3, 1964:
- The Court of First Instance issued an order dismissing petitioner’s petition for relief with costs against her.
- The basis for dismissal was that petitioner had knowledge of the city court’s judgment on or before May 22, 1963 and that her petition filed on August 1, 1963 was filed 71 days later, thereby exceeding the 60-day period prescribed by Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court.
- Subsequent Developments:
- A motion to reconsider the dismissal was filed by the petitioner but was denied on the same day it was set for hearing (August 15, 1964).
- Petitioner then elevated the case on appeal.
Issues:
- Timeliness of the Petition for Relief
- Whether the petition was filed within the 60-day period after petitioner became aware of the city court’s judgment.
- Whether the elapsed time of 71 days from the petitioner’s notice (May 22, 1963) to the filing of the petition (August 1, 1963) renders the petition time-barred under Rule 38.
- Applicability of the Doctrine on Tolling or Deduction of Time
- Whether the time consumed by the motions (set aside and reconsideration in the city court) should be deducted from the 60-day period.
- Whether the pendency of city court proceedings can toll the running of the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief.
- Sufficiency of the Evidentiary Support for Relief
- Whether the affidavits (including that of Teresita Burce) demonstrated excusable negligence sufficient to warrant relief from the judgment.
- Whether the evidence in the affidavits indicated a probability of a different outcome should the judgment be set aside and a new trial ordered.
- Procedural Aspects of Judgment on the Pleadings
- Whether the resolution of respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings without an oral hearing violated the petitioner’s right to a full hearing on the merits.
Ruling:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Ratio:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Doctrine:
- (Subscriber-Only)