Title
Corpuz vs. Del Rosario
Case
G.R. No. 149261
Decision Date
Dec 15, 2010
A libel case arose from a defamatory memorandum by ASG Corpuz against ASG del Rosario, alleging harm to his reputation. Prosecutors found probable cause, upheld by courts, emphasizing executive discretion in such determinations.
libel complaint
resolution
public prosecutor

Case Summary (G.R. No. 149261)

Factual Background: The Libel Complaint and the June 13, 1997 Memorandum

The complaint alleged that Corpuz’s June 13, 1997 memorandum was issued maliciously without good intention, with the purpose of discrediting and dishonoring del Rosario’s name as a government employee. Del Rosario asserted that the memorandum’s import adversely affected his credibility and his performance of his official functions as an Assistant Solicitor General, among others.

The record shows that, during the preliminary investigation, the controversy centered on the content and effect of the memorandum, particularly the words stating that “there is no such thing as ‘palabra de honor’ as far as ASG del Rosario is concerned.” Del Rosario’s complaint maintained that such language imputed a defect that tended to discredit his integrity and character.

Preliminary Investigation and Prosecutorial Findings of Probable Cause

After the preliminary investigation, Investigating Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata issued on November 21, 1997 a Resolution recommending the filing of an information. The prosecutor found the questioned words in Corpuz’s memorandum to be defamatory, as they allegedly imputed a kind of “defect” on del Rosario that tended to discredit his integrity as Assistant Solicitor General and the functions he held. The prosecutor further ruled that malice was presumed from the defamatory imputation. She also found that the disposition of addressing the memorandum not only to the Solicitor General but also to all Assistant Solicitors General showed the absence of good intention.

The prosecutor therefore concluded that there was undue publication of the allegedly libelous memorandum because it had been received and read by officers concerned. Based on these determinations, the prosecutor held that the evidence established probable cause to indict del Rosario with the crime of libel and recommended the filing of the corresponding information.

Approval by the City Prosecutor and Filing of the Information

On December 8, 1997, the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati City approved the investigating prosecutor’s Resolution. Thereafter, an Information for libel was filed against Corpuz before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

Review within the Prosecution Service and Final DOJ Action

Corpuz sought reconsideration and appellate review within the prosecution hierarchy. Her appeal from the City Prosecutor’s resolution was not given due course by NCR Regional Prosecutor/Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno on March 10, 1998. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on September 8, 1998. She then appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ), challenging the City Prosecutor’s Office findings.

On August 17, 1999, the DOJ Secretary treated the appeal as a second motion for reconsideration and denied it with finality. Corpuz thereby exhausted administrative review within the DOJ.

Petition for Certiorari Before the Court of Appeals and Its Denial

Corpuz elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari, contending that the public prosecutors had gravely abused their discretion by finding a prima facie case of libel and that they exceeded their jurisdiction when her appeal from the City Prosecutor’s resolution was not given due course.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 27, 2001, denied the petition. The CA found that Corpuz failed to show exceptional circumstances that would justify resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari. It also ruled that Corpuz’s arguments that the memorandum was a privileged communication and that there was absence of malice were matters of defense that should be properly threshed out during trial.

The CA ultimately held that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, and it denied the petition.

Issues Raised by Corpuz Before the Supreme Court

Corpuz sought Supreme Court review and assigned errors that, in substance, challenged: first, the CA’s characterization that the prosecutors’ findings were essentially factual; second, the CA’s view that the memorandum’s alleged privilege and alleged absence of malice were defensive issues for trial; and third, the CA’s position that certiorari was unavailable because other remedies existed in the trial court.

Notably, in her Reply, Corpuz clarified that she was not assailing certain prosecutorial factual/legal findings, including the prosecutor’s presumption of malice from the defamatory imputation, the prosecutor’s determination regarding the memorandum’s recipients and readership, and the characterization that the words imputed a defect tending to discredit del Rosario’s integrity.

Thus, the main issue in the Supreme Court proceedings became whether the CA correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion had been committed when the prosecutors concluded that the elements of libel were prima facie established, despite Corpuz’s claim that the findings did not conform to law and jurisprudence. She insisted that there were no findings of fact sufficient to show the existence of the libel elements and that the prosecutors’ findings were not enough to constitute probable cause.

The Parties’ Positions on Probable Cause and Privileged Communication

Corpuz argued that the prosecutors’ determination of probable cause was erroneous because the evidence and findings did not sufficiently establish the statutory elements of libel. She further contended that her memorandum was covered by the protective mantle of a privileged communication, invoking the first exception in Article 354 relating to “a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty.”

The respondent maintained, and the CA agreed, that the prosecutors had acted within their discretion and that Corpuz’s assertions, particularly those concerning privileged communication and lack of malice, were defensive and evidentiary matters that should be resolved during trial rather than in certiorari proceedings.

The Supreme Court’s Standards for Judicial Review of Probable Cause

The Supreme Court reiterated the settled doctrine that the determination of probable cause for filing an information is an executive function that properly pertains, at the first instance, to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. Judicial review, particularly in cases challenging the DOJ Secretary’s action, was limited to determining whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that evaded or refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court emphasized that the petitioner had the burden to establish the existence of such exceptional circumstances.

Legal Basis: Elements of Libel and the Meaning of Probable Cause

The Court explained that probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information referred to such facts as were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime had been committed and that the accused was probably guilty. It clarified that probable cause did not require proof beyond reasonable doubt or clear and convincing evidence of guilt. It sufficed that the evidence showed it was more likely than not that a crime had been committed and that the accused committed it.

The Court then enumerated the elements of libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (one) the imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance; (two) the imputation must be malicious; (three) it must be given publicity; and (four) the victim must be identifiable.

It held that, based on the prosecutorial resolution and the record, these elements had been duly established at the preliminary investigation stage in a manner sufficient to show a prima facie well-founded belief that a crime of libel had been committ

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