Case Digest (G.R. No. 149261)
Facts:
Assistant Solicitor General Azucena B. Corpuz was accused in an affidavit-complaint filed with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati City by Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. del Rosario for libel, arising from a June 13, 1997 memorandum allegedly issued with malice to discredit complainant’s integrity and official functions. After preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor recommended filing an information; the City Prosecutor approved the resolution and an Information for libel was filed in the RTC of Makati City.
Corpuz’s appeal to the Chief State Prosecutor was denied, and the DOJ Secretary denied her appeal with finality. She sought certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition for lack of grave abuse of discretion; she then filed a Rule 45 petition in the Supreme Court.
Issues:
- Whether the CA erred in treating the prosecutors’ probable-cause findings as essentially factual matters.
- Whether the CA erred in ruling that claims of privileged communication and absence of malice were matters of defense for trial.
- Whether the CA erred in finding certiorari unavailable because other remedies remained in the trial court.
Ruling:
The petition was DENIED and the CA decision AFFIRMED, as no grave abuse of discretion attended the finding of probable cause for libel. The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor and the DOJ Secretary had carefully considered the factual and legal antecedents and that the evidence supported the conclusion that probable cause existed.
The Court held that Corpuz’s assertions on privileged communication and lack of malice were evidentiary defenses that required full-blown adjudication, not review for arbitrariness at the preliminary investigation stage.
Ratio:
For purposes of filing an information, probable cause required only facts engendering a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and that the accused probably committed it; it did not demand proof beyond reasonable doubt. Judicial review of the prosecutor’s probable-cause determination is confined to whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, defined as an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power or a whimsical refusal to perform a duty.
Applying this standard, the Court found that the prosecutor’s resolution addressed the elements of libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code—imputation of a vice or defect, malice, publicity, and identifiability—sufficient to establish prima facie probable cause. The Court further ruled that whether the memorandum was covered by the privileged communication exception under Article 354 required evidentiary evaluation that belongs to trial, since it was a matter of defense not suitable for resolution during preliminary investigation.
Doctrine:
- Determination of probable cause for filing an information is an executive function vested in the prosecutor and, ultimately, the DOJ Secretary.
- Judicial review of such determinations is limited to whether the prosecutor or the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
- Probable cause requires only a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and that the respondent probably committed it, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
- The elements of libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code must be established prima facie for probable cause at the preliminary investigation stage.
- Claims of privileged communication and absence of malice are defenses requiring evidentiary testing in the trial of the criminal case, not certiorari review absent clear arbitrariness.
- In the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, courts should give credence to prosecutors’ findings of probable cause in preliminary investigation.