Title
City of Manila vs. Serrano
Case
G.R. No. 142304
Decision Date
Jun 20, 2001
Manila expropriated Lot 1-C for housing; heirs contested, citing R.A. 7279. SC ruled certiorari proper, remanded for evidentiary hearing on compliance with land acquisition modes.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 142304)

Factual background and chain of title

The City Council enacted Ordinance No. 7833 authorizing expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s First District (Tondo). Lot 1‑C (343.10 sq. m.) derives from titles issued in the De Guia family and passed by inheritance, partition, transfer, and sale, culminating in TCT No. 226048 issued to Demetria De Guia. The City filed an amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case No. 94‑72282) against owners of the lots, including the Serrano respondents who asserted rights as occupants and successors.

Respondents’ position and defenses at trial and to the Court of Appeals

Respondents claimed long occupation (over 40 years), alleged that Lot 1‑C was their only residential land, and argued exemption from expropriation under R.A. No. 7279 because it involved residential land and the statute exempts parcels not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities. They contended that partitioning the lot among heirs would leave each with only about 50 square meters and that the Act was intended to protect small property owners from losing the whole of their residential land.

Trial court orders: deposit and writ of possession

Upon the City’s motion, on October 9, 1998 the trial court directed deposit of P1,825,241.00 (assessed value) with the authorized depository. After the deposit was made, on December 15, 1998 the trial court ordered issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City pursuant to Rule 67, A(2) of the Rules of Court, which permits plaintiff government entities to enter upon property upon deposit of the assessed value.

Court of Appeals ruling and its rationale

The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated November 16, 1999, held that Lot 1‑C was not exempt under R.A. No. 7279 because it exceeded 300 square meters. Nevertheless, relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Filstream International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals concluded that the City should first have attempted other modes of land acquisition enumerated in Section 10 and given priority to modes listed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7279 before resorting to expropriation. Because the City did not demonstrate compliance with those requirements, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ petition for certiorari, reversed the trial court order, and permanently enjoined the trial court from proceeding with the expropriation case.

Grounds of the City’s petition to the Supreme Court

The City raised three principal contentions: (1) the Court of Appeals should not have given due course to respondents’ Rule 65 certiorari petition and should have required a Rule 45 petition for review in the Supreme Court; (2) the Court of Appeals wrongly treated the trial court’s October 9, 1998 order authorizing possession as tantamount to final condemnation and therefore applied the Filstream doctrine prematurely; and (3) the Court of Appeals erred in issuing a perpetual writ of injunction preventing the trial court from proceeding with the expropriation case.

Supreme Court: propriety of the remedy (Rule 65 vs Rule 45)

The Supreme Court affirmed that Rule 45 is available only for final judgments or orders and is therefore inapplicable to interlocutory orders such as the trial court’s issuance of a writ of possession. Where an order is interlocutory and there is no appeal available, Rule 65 is the appropriate remedy when a tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents alleged such excess in jurisdiction in the issuance of the writ of possession, making their petition under Rule 65 properly filed in the Court of Appeals.

Supreme Court: consideration of R.A. No. 7279 issues by the Court of Appeals

The Supreme Court found that respondents had sufficiently raised, before the Court of Appeals, the propriety of expropriation under R.A. No. 7279. Although respondents emphasized the “small property” exemption, their challenge necessarily implicated other provisions of R.A. No. 7279 governing priorities and modes of land acquisition (Sections 9 and 10). Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not exceed its role in examining pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7279 to resolve respondents’ asserted defenses.

Supreme Court: Filstream precedent and prematurity of the Court of Appeals’ holding

The Supreme Court distinguished Filstream. In Filstream the trial court had already issued a final condemnation order and the Supreme Court’s intervention addressed a completed condemnation. Here, by contrast, the trial court had only ordered deposit of the assessed value and the ministerial issuance of a writ of possession under Rule 67; no final condemnation or evidentiary determination of compliance with R.A. No. 7279 had yet occurred. The Supreme Court therefore held that it was premature for the Court of Appeals to conclude, at that interlocuto

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