Case Summary (G.R. No. 142304)
Factual background and chain of title
The City Council enacted Ordinance No. 7833 authorizing expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s First District (Tondo). Lot 1‑C (343.10 sq. m.) derives from titles issued in the De Guia family and passed by inheritance, partition, transfer, and sale, culminating in TCT No. 226048 issued to Demetria De Guia. The City filed an amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case No. 94‑72282) against owners of the lots, including the Serrano respondents who asserted rights as occupants and successors.
Respondents’ position and defenses at trial and to the Court of Appeals
Respondents claimed long occupation (over 40 years), alleged that Lot 1‑C was their only residential land, and argued exemption from expropriation under R.A. No. 7279 because it involved residential land and the statute exempts parcels not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities. They contended that partitioning the lot among heirs would leave each with only about 50 square meters and that the Act was intended to protect small property owners from losing the whole of their residential land.
Trial court orders: deposit and writ of possession
Upon the City’s motion, on October 9, 1998 the trial court directed deposit of P1,825,241.00 (assessed value) with the authorized depository. After the deposit was made, on December 15, 1998 the trial court ordered issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City pursuant to Rule 67, A(2) of the Rules of Court, which permits plaintiff government entities to enter upon property upon deposit of the assessed value.
Court of Appeals ruling and its rationale
The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated November 16, 1999, held that Lot 1‑C was not exempt under R.A. No. 7279 because it exceeded 300 square meters. Nevertheless, relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Filstream International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals concluded that the City should first have attempted other modes of land acquisition enumerated in Section 10 and given priority to modes listed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7279 before resorting to expropriation. Because the City did not demonstrate compliance with those requirements, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ petition for certiorari, reversed the trial court order, and permanently enjoined the trial court from proceeding with the expropriation case.
Grounds of the City’s petition to the Supreme Court
The City raised three principal contentions: (1) the Court of Appeals should not have given due course to respondents’ Rule 65 certiorari petition and should have required a Rule 45 petition for review in the Supreme Court; (2) the Court of Appeals wrongly treated the trial court’s October 9, 1998 order authorizing possession as tantamount to final condemnation and therefore applied the Filstream doctrine prematurely; and (3) the Court of Appeals erred in issuing a perpetual writ of injunction preventing the trial court from proceeding with the expropriation case.
Supreme Court: propriety of the remedy (Rule 65 vs Rule 45)
The Supreme Court affirmed that Rule 45 is available only for final judgments or orders and is therefore inapplicable to interlocutory orders such as the trial court’s issuance of a writ of possession. Where an order is interlocutory and there is no appeal available, Rule 65 is the appropriate remedy when a tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents alleged such excess in jurisdiction in the issuance of the writ of possession, making their petition under Rule 65 properly filed in the Court of Appeals.
Supreme Court: consideration of R.A. No. 7279 issues by the Court of Appeals
The Supreme Court found that respondents had sufficiently raised, before the Court of Appeals, the propriety of expropriation under R.A. No. 7279. Although respondents emphasized the “small property” exemption, their challenge necessarily implicated other provisions of R.A. No. 7279 governing priorities and modes of land acquisition (Sections 9 and 10). Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not exceed its role in examining pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7279 to resolve respondents’ asserted defenses.
Supreme Court: Filstream precedent and prematurity of the Court of Appeals’ holding
The Supreme Court distinguished Filstream. In Filstream the trial court had already issued a final condemnation order and the Supreme Court’s intervention addressed a completed condemnation. Here, by contrast, the trial court had only ordered deposit of the assessed value and the ministerial issuance of a writ of possession under Rule 67; no final condemnation or evidentiary determination of compliance with R.A. No. 7279 had yet occurred. The Supreme Court therefore held that it was premature for the Court of Appeals to conclude, at that interlocuto
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 142304)
Case Citation and Court
- Reported in 411 Phil. 754, Second Division, G.R. No. 142304, decided June 20, 2001.
- Decision penned by Justice Mendoza; concurred in by Justices Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.
Nature of the Proceeding
- Petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the decision (November 16, 1999) and resolution (February 23, 2000) of the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals had reversed an order (December 15, 1998) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Manila, and had perpetually enjoined the RTC from proceeding with the City of Manila's complaint for eminent domain in Civil Case No. 94-72282.
- The Supreme Court's review focused on whether the Court of Appeals correctly enjoined further proceedings, and whether respondents pursued the correct remedy in the appellate court.
Parties
- Petitioner: City of Manila.
- Respondents: Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, and Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano.
- Other persons referenced in title chain and pleadings: Feliza (Feliza/Feliza De Guia), heirs of Feliza De Guia (including Alberto De Guia, Edgardo De Guia), Lee Kuan/Kian Hui, Demetria De Guia (respondents' mother), administrator Ms. Linda De Guia.
Subject Property and Titles (Chain of Ownership and Transactions)
- Property of interest: Lot 1-C, area 343.10 square meters, located in Manila's First District in Tondo.
- Original relevant title: TCT No. 70869 issued in the name of Feliza (Feliza/Feliza De Guia).
- Subsequent developments in title and transfers:
- Estate of Feliza De Guia settled among heirs by court-approved compromise agreement; RTC, Branch 53, Manila decision dated May 8, 1986.
- 1989: Death of Alberto De Guia (one of Feliza's heirs); partition of his estate assigned Lot 1-C to Edgardo De Guia.
- April 15, 1994: Edgardo De Guia issued TCT No. 215593 covering Lot 1-C.
- July 29, 1994: Property transferred to Lee Kuan Hui (TCT No. 217018).
- January 24, 1996: Property sold to Demetria De Guia (respondents’ mother), and TCT No. 226048 was issued in her name.
Ordinance and Purpose of Expropriation
- December 21, 1993: City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833 authorizing expropriation of certain properties in Tondo (covered by TCT Nos. 70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273) to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City.
- One of the properties included for expropriation was Lot 1-C (343.10 sq.m.), the parcel contested in this litigation.
Procedural Chronology in Trial Court
September 26, 1997: City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case No. 94-72282) in RTC, Branch 16, Manila, naming supposed owners including the Serrano respondents.
Respondents filed a consolidated answer on November 12, 1997, asserting:
- Their mother, the late Demetria De Guia, acquired Lot 1-C from Lee Kian/Kuan Hui.
- They have been bona fide occupants of Lot 1-C for more than 40 years.
- Expropriation would dislocate them; Lot 1-C is their only residential land left by their deceased mother.
- Lot 1-C is exempt from expropriation because dividing 343.10 sq.m. among them would yield about 50 sq.m. each, implicating the exemption for residential lands not exceeding 300 sq.m. under R.A. No. 7279.
- They prayed for a declaration that Lot 1-C is exempt from expropriation and for cancellation of the notice annotated on the back of TCT No. 226048 regarding pendency of Civil Case No. 94-72282.
October 9, 1998: Trial court issued an order directing the petitioner to deposit P1,825,241.00 (equivalent to the assessed value of the properties).
Petitioner made the deposit as ordered.
December 15, 1998: Trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City of Manila.
Respondents’ Petition to Court of Appeals
- Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, asserting:
- Expropriation of Lot 1-C would render them landless despite being actual occupants.
- Lot 1-C is exempt from expropriation under R.A. No. 7279 because the law exempts residential lands not exceeding 300 sq.m. in highly urbanized cities.
- Division of Lot 1-C among respondents would result in approximately 49 sq.m. per person, raising the exemption issue.
- R.A. No. 7279 was not intended to deprive an owner of an entire residential land but to limit expropriation to area in excess of 300 sq.m.
- The Court of Appeals was asked to annul the trial court order and enjoin expropriation actions.
Court of Appeals Decision and Ruling (November 16, 1999; Resolution Feb. 23, 2000)
- The Court of Appeals held:
- Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation on the ground of being a "small property" because it exceeds 300 sq.m.
- However, relying on the ruling in Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals (284 SCRA 716, 1998), the other modes of land acquisition enumerated in Sections 9-10 of R.A. No. 7279 must first be tried by the city government before resorting to expropriation.
- Petitioner City of Manila failed to show that it had tried other modes of acquisition.
- Consequently, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ petition, reversed the trial court order, and issued a perpetual writ of injunction enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the complaint for eminent domain in Civil Case No. 94-72282.
- The dispositive language ordered the reversal and a perpetual injunction preventing the trial court from proceeding with the expropriation complaint.
- The Court of Appeals denied two motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner in its February 23, 2000 resolution.
Issues Raised by Petitioner in Supreme Court
- Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in:
- Giving due course to the Serranos’ petition under Rule 65 despite declaring the writ improper and the petition filed in the wrong appellate court.
- Concluding that the October 9, 1998 order (authorizing immediate entry upon deposit of assessed value) equated to condemnation done without prior showing of compliance with acquisition alternatives under Sections 9-10 of R.A. No. 7279, thereby violating respondents' due process by doctrinaire application of Filstream.
- Permanently prohibiting, by writ of injunction, the trial court from proceeding with the City's complaint for expropriation in Civil Case No. 94-72282.
Court’s Analysis — Proper Remedy: Rule 65 vs Rule 45
- Petitioner argued respondents should have filed a petition f