Title
Bautista vs. Salonga
Case
G.R. No. 86439
Decision Date
Apr 13, 1989
Mary Bautista's CHR appointment did not require CA confirmation; her permanent role was valid, rendering a second appointment void. EO 163-A was unconstitutional, as it compromised CHR independence.
appointment
confirmation
independence
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 86439)

Factual Background

On 27 August 1987 the President designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). On 17 December 1988 the President appointed petitioner as permanent Chairman of the CHR and advised that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. Petitioner took her oath of office before Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan on 22 December 1988 and immediately assumed the functions and duties of the chairmanship.

Commission on Appointments' Action

In January 1989 the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CA) requested petitioner to submit information and to appear before the CA Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights for deliberation on her appointment. Petitioner responded by letter of 13 January 1989 contending that the CA had no constitutional jurisdiction to review her appointment because the CHR chairmanship was not among the offices enumerated in the first sentence of Art. VII, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution. The CA thereafter treated the January appointment matter as an ad interim appointment and, on 25 January and 1 February 1989, disapproved petitioner’s ad interim appointment and denied a motion for reconsideration.

Motion by the Executive and Interim Replacement

Respondents attached a letter advising the Executive Secretary of the CA’s disapproval of what the CA characterized as an ad interim appointment extended to petitioner on 14 January 1989. News reports and correspondence reflected that the President designated respondent Hesiquio R. Mallillin as Acting Chairman pending resolution of petitioner’s case before the Supreme Court.

Petition and Relief Sought

On 20 January 1989 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order seeking to declare unlawful and without legal force any action by the CA and its committee to review or confirm her presidential appointment. Petitioner sought to enjoin the CA’s deliberations and any enforcement of resolutions arising from those deliberations. After filing an amended petition and other pleadings, the Court issued a temporary restraining order against respondent Mallillin enjoining him from effecting dismissals, requests for courtesy resignations, removal or reorganization of CHR personnel.

Procedural Course in the Supreme Court

Respondents filed comments. The Court, mindful of the co-equal status of the CA, refrained from issuing a temporary restraining order against the CA but proceeded to resolve the constitutional questions raised. The matter was heard en banc and the parties filed supplemental pleadings and replies as directed by the Court.

Legal Question Presented

The dispositive legal questions were whether the appointment of the CHR Chairman was subject to confirmation by the CA under Art. VII, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution, whether the President could thereafter submit an appointment already accepted and qualified for to the CA, and whether Executive Order No. 163-A making the tenure of the CHR Chairman and Members "at the pleasure of the President" comported with the Constitution.

Precedent and Threshold Doctrine

The Court reiterated its earlier ruling in Sarmiento III v. Mison, holding that under Art. VII, Sec. 16 only the offices expressly named in the first sentence of that provision required confirmation by the CA and that other presidential appointments designated in the second sentence were to be made without CA participation except insofar as Congress by law might vest appointment of lower officers in the President alone. The Court treated this doctrine as binding and controlling for the CHR appointment issue.

Majority Ruling on the CHR Appointment

The Court held that petitioner’s appointment of 17 December 1988 was a completed and valid presidential appointment that the President was empowered to make without review by the CA. Upon acceptance by the appointee, manifested by taking the oath and assuming office, the appointment became final and the office was filled. Accordingly, no vacancy existed on 14 January 1989 to which any subsequent ad interim appointment or submission for confirmation could attach.

Majority Reasoning on Executive and Legislative Limits

The Court reasoned that the Constitution fixed the allocation of appointment powers between the Executive and the CA, and that neither the President nor the CA could, by voluntary acts, alter the constitutional distribution of powers. The President could not lawfully subject to CA confirmation an appointment that the Constitution designated as one to be made without CA participation, because such voluntary submission and any resulting confirmation or rejection would be beyond the constitutional authority of the CA.

Ruling on Ad Interim Appointments and Vacancy

The Court explained that ad interim appointments under the 1987 Constitution operate only where CA review is required. Appointments that the Constitution vests solely in the President cannot be ad interim appointments. Because petitioner’s December 17 appointment was complete and accepted, there was no vacancy on the later date; the CA’s disapproval purportedly addressing an ad interim appointment therefore lacked jurisdictional basis as to that completed appointment.

Executive Order No. 163-A and CHR Independence

The Court declared Executive Order No. 163-A unconstitutional insofar as it made the tenure of the Chairman and Members of the CHR "at the pleasure of the President." The Court contrasted Executive Order No. 163, which provided a seven-year term without reappointment consistent with Sec. 17(2), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution, with 163-A, which substituted tenure at the President’s pleasure. The Court held that an independent constitutional office such as the CHR required security of tenure consistent with its constitutional purpose and that executive alteration of a constitutionally mandated term into an at-pleasure tenure was repugnant to the Constitution.

Removal and Due Process

The Court observed that although petitioner lawfully held office for the seven-year term fixed by Executive Order No. 163, she remained removable for cause under the law and with due process. The Court identified the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan as the constitutional and statutory mechanisms for investigating and prosecuting official malfeasance and for ordering su

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