Case Summary (G.R. No. 143375)
Key Dates
Check date: 8 May 1998.
Date of presentment: 20 October 1998 (166 days after date on check).
Dishonor: Drawee bank returned the check for insufficiency of funds.
Complaint filed: 16 March 1999, City Prosecutor of Cavite City.
Investigating prosecutor’s resolution recommending filing: 22 April 1999.
ORSP resolution denying petition for review: 25 June 1999; reconsideration denied 31 August 1999.
Court of Appeals resolution denying due course: 26 October 1999.
(Applicable constitutional framework for the decision: 1987 Philippine Constitution.)
Procedural History
Private respondent presented the dishonored check to the City Prosecutor, triggering a preliminary investigation. The investigating prosecutor recommended filing an Information for violation of BP 22; the City Prosecutor approved. Petitioner sought administrative review by the ORSP, which denied relief, and then petitioned the Court of Appeals, which dismissed her petition. The Supreme Court granted review of the CA resolution, treating the matter as raising a significant legal question despite procedural objections.
Legal Issue(s) Presented
Primary legal question: Whether a drawer of a check can be prosecuted under BP 22 when the check was presented for payment after the 90-day period from the date appearing on the check (i.e., whether late presentment defeats criminal liability under BP 22). Ancillary procedural question: Whether decisions of prosecutors in preliminary investigations are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as decisions of a quasi-judicial body.
Applicable Law and Statutory Provisions
- Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), particularly Section 1 (definition of offenses and two distinct paragraphs) and Section 2 (prima facie evidence provision tied to 90-day presentment and the five‑banking‑day arrangement requirement).
- Rule 43, Rules of Civil Procedure (appeals from quasi‑judicial agencies).
- Department of Justice Department Order No. 223 (cited by ORSP as governing review jurisdiction).
The Court applied principles under the 1987 Philippine Constitution in reviewing jurisdictional and procedural issues.
Court’s Analysis on the Quasi‑Judicial Nature of Prosecutorial Preliminary Investigation
The Court analyzed whether a prosecutor’s preliminary investigation is quasi‑judicial such that ORSP or the Court of Appeals could entertain appeals under Rule 43. While past authority acknowledges that preliminary investigation is quasi‑judicial “in the sense” that a prosecutor exercises powers akin to a court, the Court distinguished preliminary investigation from other quasi‑judicial proceedings because: the prosecutor does not adjudicate guilt or impose judgment; preliminary investigation is inquisitorial and limited to determining whether probable cause exists to charge an accused; the ultimate determination of guilt is made by the courts. Consequently, the Office of the Prosecutor is not treated as a quasi‑judicial agency for purposes of Rule 43 appeals, and resolutions approving the filing of an Information are not ordinarily appealable to the Court of Appeals under that rule. The Court noted that ORSP’s appellate jurisdiction over prosecutors’ resolutions is limited by DOJ orders and statute to certain cases only.
Court’s Disposition on Procedural Remedies and Prosecutorial Discretion
The Court emphasized the settled rule that courts will not interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion to file charges absent grave abuse of discretion. The prosecutor may dismiss or proceed with a complaint after evaluating sufficiency and probable cause. Where the ORSP lacked authority under Rule 43 to entertain the petitioner’s appeal and there was no showing of grave abuse, the petitioner’s remedy is to present her defenses at trial. Despite procedural infirmities, the Supreme Court nonetheless gave due course to the petition because the case raised a novel issue under BP 22 and to avoid procedural technicalities frustrating substantive rights.
Statutory Interpretation: Elements of the Offense under Section 1 of BP 22
The Court parsed Section 1 and identified two distinct prosecutable acts under BP 22:
- Making, drawing and issuing a check knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank (first paragraph).
- Having sufficient funds when the check was issued but failing to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit to cover the check if presented within 90 days from the date on the check (second paragraph).
The Court clarified that the two paragraphs describe different factual predicates: in the first, the check is worthless at issuance; in the second, the check is good when issued but becomes dishonored within 90 days due to failure to maintain funds.
Role and Effect of Section 2 (Prima Facie Presumption) — Evidentiary, Not Elemental
Section 2 provides that a check dishonored for insufficiency when presented within 90 days of the date appearing on it is prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. The Court held this is an evidentiary provision—not an element of the crime. The elements of the offense (for the first paragraph) are: (a) making/drawing/issuing a check to apply on account or for value; (b) the maker/drawer knows at the time of issue that he lacks sufficient funds or credit; and (c) the check is subsequently dishonored for insufficiency (or would have been dishonored absent a stop payment). The 90‑day presentment period is not among those elements for the first paragraph; rather, it affords the prosecution a statutory evidentiary presumption of the critical mental element (knowledge) when the check is presented within 90 days.
Consequence of Late Presentment and Burden of Proof
Because the 90‑day presentment requirement in Section 2 is evidentiary, late presentment (after 90 days) simply means the statutory prima facie presumption of knowledge does not arise. The prosecution can nonetheless prove knowledge of insufficiency by other competent evidence. The absence of the presu
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 143375)
Case Citation and Panel
- Reported at 413 Phil. 159, Second Division, G.R. No. 143375, July 06, 2001.
- Decision penned by Justice Bellosillo; concurrence by Justices Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.; Justice Quisumbing on official leave.
Parties and Roles
- Petitioner: Ruth D. Bautista.
- Private complainant / respondent in factual sense: Susan AloAa.
- Government respondents: Court of Appeals and the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP), Region IV.
- Docket reference for preliminary investigation: I.S. No. 99-302 (as footnoted in source).
Material Facts
- Sometime in April 1998, petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued Metrobank Check No. 005014037 dated 8 May 1998 for the amount of P1,500,000.00, drawn on Metrobank Cavite City Branch.
- Private respondent Susan AloAa alleges petitioner assured her the check would be sufficiently funded on maturity date.
- The check was presented for payment on 20 October 1998 and was dishonored by the drawee bank for being drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
- Private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Cavite City on 16 March 1999, alleging issuance, dishonor, and that repeated demands to petitioner to arrange payment within five (5) working days after receipt of notice were made but ignored.
- Petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit asserting that presentment within 90 days from maturity is an essential element of BP 22 and that the check was presented 166 days after its date (i.e., beyond 90 days). Petitioner also claimed that she had assigned to private respondent her condominium unit at Antel Seaview Condominium, Roxas Boulevard, as full payment for the bounced checks, thereby extinguishing criminal liability (as alleged by petitioner in defense).
Procedural History
- 22 April 1999: Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending filing of an Information against petitioner for violation of BP 22; this was approved by the City Prosecutor.
- 13 May 1999: Petitioner filed with the ORSP, Region IV, a petition for review of the 22 April 1999 resolution.
- 25 June 1999: ORSP denied the petition in a one-page resolution, citing Department Order No. 223 to the effect that only resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint were cognizable for review by that office.
- 5 July 1999: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the ORSP.
- 31 August 1999: ORSP denied reconsideration.
- 1 October 1999: Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the ORSP resolution dated 22 April 1999 and its order dated 31 August 1999 denying reconsideration.
- 26 October 1999: Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the petition for lack of due course and denying relief. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali, concurred in by Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (Rollo, pp. 100-102).
- Petitioner thereafter sought relief by filing the present petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Primary Legal Question Presented
- Whether the drawer of a check dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds can be prosecuted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22, The Bouncing Checks Law) when the check was presented for payment after ninety (90) days from its date.
BP 22 – Statutory Provisions Quoted in the Decision
- Section 1 (substantive offense):
- First paragraph (as quoted): "Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished ... "
- Second paragraph (as quoted): "The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank ..."
- Section 2 (evidentiary presumption):
- Quoted: "The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee."
Legal Issues Raised by Petitioner
- Petitioner argued that presentment within ninety (90) days from the date of the check is an essential element of the offense under BP 22, and because the subject check was presented 166 days after its date, she could not be criminally liable under BP 22.
- Petitioner relied on Section 2 and secondary authority (Judge David G. Nitafan's treatise) to interpret Section 2's ninety-day presentment period as an element of the offense and contended that a dishonor occurring after the ninety-day period would not attract BP 22 criminal liability but only civil collection remedies.
- Petitioner claimed extinguishment of criminal liability through assignment of a condominium unit as full payment for the bounced checks.
Respondent/Appellate Court and Prosecutor Positions
- The ORSP denied review of the prosecutor's approval resolution on the basis that only resolutions dismissing complaints are cognizable for review by that office under Department Order No. 223 (as amended).
- The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition for review, reasoning that Rule 43 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) applies to quasi-judicial agencies and specified bodies such as the Court of Tax Appeals, and that a petition for review under Rule 42 is appropriate from a decision of the Regional Trial Court exercised in appellate jurisdiction. The appellate court noted petitioner’s assigned errors principally charged "serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion," which the court characterized as grounds more properly cognizable by certiorari, and that the proper remedy may lie in the Regional Trial Court f