Case Summary (G.R. No. 197593)
Petitioner
Bank of the Philippine Islands filed suit for recovery of funds wrongfully credited to a “suspense account” and sought restoration of P9 million plus interest.
Respondents
– Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (formerly Central Bank of the Philippines)
– Citibank, N.A.
Key Dates
– October 14, 1981: Fraudulent accounts opened with BPI Laoag and Citibank Greenhills.
– January 28, 1982: BPI Laoag discovers P9 million discrepancy.
– February 9, 1982: BPI lodges letter-complaint with CBP; NBI investigation agreed.
– January 21, 1988: BPI files complaint for sum of money.
– April 24, 2001: RTC Decision in favor of BPI.
– January 26, 2011: CA Decision reversing the RTC.
– July 8, 2011: CA Resolution denying reconsideration.
– October 12, 2020: Supreme Court grant of petition for review.
– December 12, 2022: Supreme Court Second Division Decision.
Applicable Law
– 1987 Philippine Constitution (Article XVI, Section 10: State may be sued only by its consent)
– Republic Act No. 265, as amended by PD 72 (Charter of the Central Bank; Section 107 mandates interbank clearing facilities)
– Civil Code of the Philippines, Articles 2176 and 2180 (quasi-delict and employer’s liability)
– Central Bank Circular No. 580, Series of 1977 (loss of clearing items borne by sending bank)
Antecedents
BPI and Citibank, both Clearing House members, maintained demand deposit accounts with CBP. BPI Laoag discovered a P9 million shortfall in interbank reconciliations and prompted an NBI probe, which revealed a criminal syndicate’s scheme: infiltration of CBP Clearing Division, pilferage of out-of-town checks, tampering of clearing manifests/statements, and withdrawal of funds via Citibank Greenhills from checks drawn on BPI Laoag. CBP credited only P4.5 million back to BPI under a “suspense account,” refusing the remaining P4.5 million plus interest.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The Makati RTC held CBP liable under Articles 2176 and 2180 for the tortious acts of its employees Valentino and Estacio. It ordered:
- Credit of P4.5 million plus 6% p.a. from September 23, 1986 to full payment.
- Restoration of the full P9 million demand deposit by deleting “suspense account.”
- Payment of 10% attorney’s fees;
- Costs;
- Dismissal of Citibank third-party complaint for lack of merit.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA reversed and dismissed BPI’s complaint, concluding:
– Under Article 2180, the State (or CBP) is liable only for quasi-delicts committed by special agents. Valentino and Estacio were ordinary employees, not special agents, and acted outside their official scope.
– Even if CBP performed proprietary functions, it exercised “ordinary diligence” in employee selection and supervision (civil service exams, NBI/NISA clearances).
– The loss-in-transit provision of Circular No. 580 did not obligate CBP to charge Citibank for the pilfered checks.
Issues
- Whether CBP may be sued in relation to its governmental or proprietary functions.
- Whether CBP’s clearing operations are proprietary.
- Whether CBP exercised due diligence in supervising Valentino and Estacio.
- Whether Citibank, as sending bank, bears liability under Circular No. 580.
Arguments of BPI
– Clearing operations are proprietary: private Philippine Clearing House Corporation performed Metro Manila clearing; regional clearing could likewise be privatized.
– RA 265, Section 4 confers CBP authority to sue and be sued without limiting governmental functions.
– CBP employees acted within scope; mere pre-employment screenings do not satisfy supervisory diligence.
– CBP refused application of Circular No. 580 to recover P4.5 million from Citibank.
– Interest should run from extrajudicial demand (June 15, 1982) at legal rate (12% p.a. from judicial demand).
Arguments of Citibank
– CBP’s susceptibility to suit under RA 265 and its own third-party claim constitutes implied waiver of immunity.
– Clearing services are proprietary; CBP collected fees.
– Citibank complied with all procedures; checks were free of alterations and deemed honored after three-day clearing period without dishonor notice.
– Circular No. 580 applies only to losses in transit, not to tampering at the clearing center.
– CBP failed to prove that Citibank contributed to the fraud or that Citibank was negligent.
Arguments of CBP
– Clearing is a governmental function mandated by Section 107 of RA 265 as amended.
– Consent to suit in CBP’s Charter does not waive defenses to acts performed in a governmental capacity.
– Under Civil Code Article 2180 and Article 1280, the State is liable only for special agents’ torts. Valentino and Estacio were ordinary employees acting outside their duties.
– CBP exercised proper diligence: civil service exams, NBI/NISA clearances, standard supervision.
– BPI and Citibank employees also contributed through collusion; CBP’s liability, if any,
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 197593)
Parties and Procedural History
- Petitioner: Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
- Respondents: Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and Citibank, N.A.
- RTC Branch 64, Makati City, Civil Case No. 18793: April 24, 2001 Decision in favor of BPI awarding P4.5 million plus interest, restoration of full P9 million, attorney’s fees and costs, dismissal of Citibank third-party complaint
- CA, CA-G.R. CV No. 70699: January 26, 2011 Decision and July 8, 2011 Resolution reversing RTC, dismissing BPI’s complaint and canceling the P4.5 million credit
- Supreme Court G.R. No. 197593: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by BPI; decision rendered December 12, 2022
Factual Antecedents
- Both BPI and Citibank were members of the CBP-supervised Clearing House, maintaining demand deposit balances for interbank clearing
- January 28, 1982: BPI Laoag City Branch discovers a P9 million discrepancy in CBP reconciliation statements
- February 9, 1982: BPI files letter-complaint with CBP and requests investigation; CBP and BPI agree to refer matter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
NBI Investigation Findings and Fraud Scheme
- Organized syndicate employed a “pilferage scheme” involving CBP Clearing Division personnel
- Key elements of the scheme:
- Infiltration of CBP Clearing Division by syndicate with help of CBP personnel
- Pilferage and tampering of “out-of-town” checks, clearing manifests, and statements
- Opening of current and savings accounts at BPI Laoag and Citibank Greenhills by syndicate members Bustamante and Desiderio
- Deposits of altered checks drawn on BPI Laoag into Citibank’s MMC account, later withdrawn after presumed clearing
- Specific transactions:
- October 14, 1981: Bustamante opens BPI savings (P3,000) and current (P1,000) accounts
- October–November 1981: Citibank receives and transmits to CBP checks totaling P9 million drawn on BPI Laoag
Pilferage at CBP Clearing House
- CBP Bookkeeper Manuel Valentino and Janitor-Messenger Jesus Estacio intercept and remove checks from clearing envelopes
- They tamper manifests and statements to conceal original P-amounts before forwarding to BPI Laoag Clearing Center
- BPI Laoag could neither dishonor nor honor the missing checks; originals returned after reconciliation with altered manifests
Criminal Prosecution and Convictions
- Sandiganbayan convicts Desiderio, Estacio, and other syndicate members of estafa through falsification of public documents
- Valentino is discharged and becomes state witness; case against BPI’s Vicente dismissed for insufficiency of evidence and recantation
Administrative and Extrajudicial Remedies
- June 15, 1982: BPI demands CBP to restore full P9 million plus interest
- CBP credits only P4.5 million to BPI’s demand deposit account (held as “suspense account”)
- CBP refuses to cred