Case Summary (G.R. No. 50654)
Factual Background
Rudy Gleo Armigos defended a civil action for collection of damages and attorney’s fees filed by Cristito Mata in Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 971. After trial the municipal court rendered judgment for Cristito Mata, a copy of which the petitioner received on 8 June 1977. On 9 June 1977 the petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the municipal court and, on 24 June 1977, he completed the remaining requisites for perfection of appeal, including posting an appeal bond and payment of the appellate court docket fee.
Proceedings in the Court of First Instance
When the docket was transmitted to the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V, for consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge ruled that the appeal had been filed beyond the reglementary period and dismissed the appeal on that ground. The judge thus treated the appeal as time-barred despite the petitioner’s contemporaneous acts to perfect the appeal within the calendar days following receipt of the municipal court decision.
Petition to the Court of Appeals
The petitioner sought relief in the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction, challenging the CFI judge’s dismissal of the appeal as belated. Rudy Gleo Armigos asserted that the computation of the reglementary period to appeal should commence from the exact hour he received the copy of the municipal court decision, so that the fifteen-day period ran from 4:00 p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 p.m. of 24 June 1977 and therefore his acts of 24 June 1977 perfected the appeal within time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner’s proposed hour-by-hour computation as novel and impracticable, observing that it would generate confusion and unreliable testimony as to the precise hour of receipt of orders, decisions, or pleadings. The CA relied on precedential reasoning that considers a day synonymous with the date in computing periods and invoked Republic of the Philippines v. Encarnacion to illustrate that reckoning by date rather than hour avoids arbitrary and uncertain determinations. The CA therefore dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution promulgated on 7 December 1978.
Petition for Review to the Supreme Court
The petitioner brought the present petition for review by certiorari, asserting that the CFI’s dismissal and the CA’s affirmance contravened proper computation of the statutory appeal period. The petition invoked the facts that notice of judgment was received on 8 June 1977, that a notice of appeal was filed on 9 June 1977, and that the appeal was perfected on 24 June 1977, a span of fifteen days by the petitioner’s calculation.
Supreme Court Disposition
The Court denied the petition. The Court held that the established rule for computing a period excludes the first day and includes the last, equating the word “day” with the calendar date rather than the exact hour. The Court concluded that the petition raised no justifying circumstance—such as fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence—that would permit the exercise of the trial court’s discretionary power to admit an appeal filed out of time. Consequently, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the appeal as untimely and imposed costs against the petitioner.
Legal Basis and Reasoning
The Court distinguished Article 13, Civil Code from Section 4, Code of Civil Procedure and the former Rule 28, Rules of Court, but found the computation principle uniform in practice: the day to be excluded is the date on which the triggering event occurs and the last calendar date is included unless it is a Sunday or legal holiday. The Court reasoned that equating “day” with calendar date promotes certainty because human memory regarding exact hours is fallible and would invite litigious disputes. The Court acknowledged a narrow exception where an hour-based computation might be appropriate, citing appeals in habeas corpus governed by Rule 41, Sec. 18, Rules of Court, which require computing a forty-eight-hour period f
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 50654)
Parties and Posture
- RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS was the petitioner who appealed from a municipal court judgment for collection of damages and attorney's fees.
- CRISTITO MATA was the private respondent and original plaintiff in Civil Case No. 971 before the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur.
- Judge L. D. CARPIO was respondent in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V, which dismissed the appeal for lateness.
- Court of Appeals determined the petition docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-07192-R and denied the petition for relief by writ.
- The petition before the Supreme Court was a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Key Facts
- The municipal court rendered judgment for Cristito Mata, and Armigos received a copy of that decision on 8 June 1977.
- Armigos filed a notice of appeal with the municipal court on 9 June 1977.
- Armigos completed the requirements for perfecting the appeal, including filing an appeal bond and paying the appellate court docket fee, on 24 June 1977.
- The Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V dismissed the appeal as being filed beyond the reglementary period.
- Armigos filed an original petition with the Court of Appeals invoking certiorari, mandamus, and a preliminary injunction, contending that only fifteen (15) days had elapsed from receipt to perfection.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied reconsideration in a resolution promulgated on 7 December 1978.
Issues
- Whether the computation of the period to perfect an appeal should commence from the exact hour a party received a copy of the decision.
- Whether the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of First Instance for having been filed beyond the reglementary period was erroneous.
- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the petition for extraordinary relief.
Contentions
- Armigos contended that the counting of the appeal period should run from the exact hour of receipt of the copy of the municipal court decision so that his appeal, perfected on 24 June 1977, fell within the fifteen (15)-day period.
- The Court of Appeals contended that the day, understood as the date, is the proper unit for computing the appeal period and that computing by exact hour would create confusion and unreliable proofs.
- The petitioner argued by analogy to temporal precision that the first hour of the day of receipt should mark the commencement of the period for appeal.
Statutory Framework
- Art. 13, Civil Code provided the rule that in computing a period the first day