Facts:

The case involves Rudy Gleo Armigos as the petitioner and Cristito Mata as the private respondent. The events precipitating the case began when Mata filed a complaint against Armigos for the collection of damages and attorney's fees with the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur. The case was registered as Civil Case No. 971. After proceeding through trial, the Municipal Court rendered a judgment favoring Mata on June 8, 1977. The following day, Armigos filed a notice of appeal, and by June 24, 1977, he submitted all necessary documentation to perfect his appeal, including an appeal bond and the payment of the required docket fee. However, when the case was shifted to the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur (Branch V) for review, Judge L. D. Carpio ruled that Armigos' appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period and subsequently dismissed it. Consequently, Armigos filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals, asserting that the interva

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Facts:

Background of the Case

• The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against Rudy Gleo Armigos (petitioner) with the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 971.
• The complaint sought collection of damages and attorney’s fees.
• After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Cristito Mata and against Armigos.

Timeline of the Appeal Process

• Armigos received a copy of the decision on 8 June 1977.
• On 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the Municipal Court.
• On 24 June 1977, he completed the requirements for the perfection of the appeal, including:
• Filing of an appeal bond.
• Payment of the appellate court docket fee.

The Court of First Instance’s Action

• Upon elevation of the case to the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur (Branch V), the presiding judge ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period.
• Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for being filed late.

Relief Sought by the Petitioner

• Armigos filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and a preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals.
• He argued that only fifteen (15) days had elapsed from 8 June 1977 (receipt of the decision) to 24 June 1977 (perfection of appeal).
• He advanced a novel interpretation that the computation of the period should begin at the hour the copy of the decision is received.
• He suggested that the first 24-hour period should run from 4:00 p.m. on 9 June 1977 to 4:00 p.m. on 10 June 1977.
• The last day should be counted similarly, i.e., from 4:00 p.m. on 23 June 1977 to 4:00 p.m. on 24 June 1977.

The Court of Appeals’ Response and Prior Jurisprudence

• The appellate court rejected the petitioner's interpretation because:
• It would lead to confusion regarding the actual time a decision, order, or pleading is received.
• It could result in unreliable testimonies regarding the exact hour of receipt.
• The court cited the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Encarnacion, emphasizing that:
• When the effective time of a law is considered, the entire day is taken into account rather than the exact hour.

Subsequent Developments

• A motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision was filed by the petitioner.
• On 7 December 1978, the motion was denied through a resolution.
• The present petition on certiorari was ultimately filed to challenge the dismissal of his appeal on the grounds of an erroneous computation of the reglementary period.

Issue:

Whether the appeal period should be computed based on the exact hour of receipt of the decision or merely the date on which it was received.

• The petitioner contended that the computation of the appeal period should begin at the hour the decision was received.
• The appellate court, however, maintained that the day as a whole should be considered, not the precise hour.

Whether the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of First Instance for a late filing was proper and in accordance with the established rules.

• The petitioner argued that only 15 days had elapsed and that his appeal was timely filed.
• The court had to decide if the traditional rule for computing periods (excluding the first day and including the last day) was applicable without additional subdivision into hours.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)