Title
Arcilla vs. Arcilla
Case
G.R. No. L-46674
Decision Date
Sep 16, 1985
Dispute over annulment of deed of sale by illiterate mother; petitioner declared in default, denied relief for late filing; SC upheld judgment, citing procedural rules and finality.
denial of petition
relief from judgment
fixed period
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-46674)

Factual Background

In Civil Case No. 395-T, private respondents instituted an action for Annulment of Sale with Damages against several defendants, including petitioner. The case proceeded through the joinder of issues upon the filing of defendants’ Answer and was scheduled for pre-trial.

On July 29, 1975, the lower court issued an Order resetting the continuation of pre-trial to October 2, 1975 at 8:30 a.m. in Cebu City, with counsel for the defendants notified in open court. When October 2, 1975 arrived, petitioner and the other defendants, together with their counsel, did not appear. Plaintiffs’ counsel then moved for default, and the court declared defendants in default pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, allowing plaintiffs to present evidence ex-parte.

On October 27, 1976, the court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The dispositive portion declared the deed of sale allegedly executed by Segunda Vda. de Arcilla in favor of petitioner void and annulled, declared the eight children of Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla (including petitioner) as co-owners on equal shares of specified portions of land covered by the tax declarations, dismissed the complaint as against the defendant Nemesio Jubay, and directed that a copy of the decision be furnished to the defendants through their counsel.

A copy of the decision was received by defendants’ counsel of record, Atty. Cosme D. Monteclaros, on November 8, 1976.

Petitioner later changed counsel and, on March 25, 1977, filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Set Aside the Decision dated October 27, 1976, which the trial judge denied in an Order dated April 12, 1977. Petitioner then filed, on April 16, 1977, a Petition for Relief from Judgment, anchored on Rule 38, alleging mainly that the order declaring default was improperly issued because defendants were not notified of the pre-trial date, and that petitioner learned of the decision only on March 24, 1977 when shown a copy by new counsel.

On May 18, 1977, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order denying the petition for relief.

Petition for Relief and Its Grounds

In his Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38, petitioner contended that the lower court had set the pre-trial for October 2, 1975, but that on the day itself the court declared defendants in default without sufficient examination whether defendants were duly notified. He invoked the idea that under Sec. 2, Rule 20, the declaration of default presupposes that the defendants actually knew of the setting. He further asserted that records showed no notice had been served. He claimed that the principal defendant, petitioner, learned of the decision only on March 24, 1977, when his new counsel showed him a xerox copy procured a day earlier.

Petitioner also alleged mistake and/or excusable neglect, attributing the failure to inquire either to the belief that Atty. Monteclaros would notify defendants of proceedings or that the court clerk would do so, and he asserted that the petition was accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit reflecting a defense against the plaintiffs’ claim.

Trial Court Ruling on the Petition for Relief

The lower court denied the petition for relief for being out of time. Respondent Judge accepted the plaintiffs’ position that the clock under Sec. 3, Rule 38 had started upon receipt of the decision by defendants’ counsel on November 8, 1976, because notice to counsel was treated as notice to the client.

The lower court reasoned that although it expressed sympathy for defendants if the declaration of default truly stemmed from no fault on their part, it viewed the period fixed by the rules as not subject to extension. It thus ruled that the petition for relief was filed beyond the reglementary period and denied it on that ground.

Parties’ Contentions in the Certiorari and Prohibition Proceedings

Before the appellate court, petitioner argued that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without jurisdiction in denying the petition for relief. His principal emphasis maintained that the order of default was illegal and improper because he was not notified of the pre-trial on October 2, 1975, and he asserted that all subsequent proceedings, including the judgment based on default, were null and void.

Respondents did not dispute the general framework of Rule 38, but relied on the timing provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 38 and the rule that a petition for relief must be filed within the stated periods.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Court

The Court first examined the controlling Rule 38 framework. Under Sec. 2, Rule 38, a party could seek relief from a judgment entered against him through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Under Sec. 3, Rule 38, the petition had to be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after the judgment or order was entered or the proceeding was taken. The petition also had to be accompanied by affidavits showing the grounds relied upon and the facts constituting a good and substantial cause of action or defense.

The Court treated the periods under Rule 38 as “absolutely fixed, inextendible, never interrupted, and cannot be subjected to any condition or contingency,” echoing Turqueza vs. Hernando, and stressed that the equitable remedy was a last chance whose lapse was fatal. It held that a petitioner seeking to overturn a dismissal for being out of time must show strict compliance with the reglementary periods.

Applying the facts, the Court noted the judgment sought to be set aside was rendered on October 27, 1976. Defendants’ counsel received the copy on November 8, 1976. Petitioner filed his petition for relief only on April 18, 1977, which was clearly beyond the time allowed by Sec. 3, Rule 38. The Court therefore ruled that the lower court’s denial on timeliness grounds could not be disturbed.

The Court then addressed petitioner’s attempt to reframe the issue around the alleged defect in the notice for pre-trial and the resulting declaration of default. It acknowledged that a declaration of default in the absence of notice of pre-trial constitutes denial of due process. However, it undertook a deeper examination of the pleadings and record and found facts inconsistent with petitioner’s claim of lack of notice. It held that petitioner had been present at the initial pre-trial on July 29, 1975, when the court reset pre-trial to October 2, 1975. It further held that on October 2, 1975, petitioner and his counsel were notified but nevertheless did not appear, which warranted default under Sec. 2, Rule 20.

The Court also examined petitioner’s petition for relief and found that the allegations did not establish the required grounds of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, nor did they show a valid defense sufficient to warrant relief. It observed that petitioner’s general allegation that he had a “good and valid defense” was not adequate compliance with the rules, particularly in light of the factual basis of the judgment. The Court recalled that in the original judgment, the deed of sale was written in English, and the seller, Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla, was an illiterate who could not read and write, having affixed a thumbmark. The Court observed that the trial court in the annulment case relied on the lack of proof that the contents of the English document were fully explained to the illiterate party, invoking Art. 1332 of the New Civil Code and jurisprudence such as Ayala vs. Balderama Lumber Manufacturing Co., Inc. (CA), as well as the protective mandate of Art. 1332 for illiterates and documents drawn in languages not understood by them.

Given those circumstances, the Court reasoned that it would have been easy for petitioner to secure affidavits from the notary public and witnesses involved in the execution to show that the document’s contents had been fully explained and that the illiterate seller voluntarily assented. It concluded that, even if the order of default and the judgment were reconsidered, reversal would be an “idle ceremony,” because petitioner’s petition did not present the kind of specific showing contemplated by Rule 38 to justify setting aside the judgment.

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