G.R. No. L-980 - Guinto vs. Veluz

The case involves a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by Laureano Arcilla, challenging an Order issued by Judge Francis J. Militante of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX.
The challenged Order, dated May 18, 1977, denied Laureano Arcilla’s Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed by Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

Civil Case No. 395-T was filed on May 28, 1973 by the Arcilla siblings (private respondents), seeking annulment of a deed of sale and damages.
Laureano Arcilla was one of several defendants in the action, where the suit originally involved an action for annulment of the deed executed by Segunda Vda. de Arcilla.

The case was set for pre-trial conferences after the filing of the defendants’ answer.
At the scheduled pre-trial on July 29, 1975, the lower court rescheduled the continuation for October 2, 1975, and notified the counsels in open court.
On October 2, 1975, neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared, leading to the declaration of default based on Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court.
As a result, plaintiffs were permitted to present their evidence ex-parte, and judgment was rendered on October 27, 1976.

A copy of the judgment was served to defendants’ counsel on November 8, 1976.
On March 25, 1977, petitioner, through new counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Default and set aside the decision, which was denied on April 12, 1977.
On April 16, 1977, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, alleging lack of proper notice for the October 2, 1975 pre-trial, among other claims of mistake or excusable neglect.
Petitioner's allegation emphasized that although the pre-trial was reset, there was no direct notice served on the defendants; they only learned of the judgment on March 24, 1977 when counsel presented a copy.

The petition invoked Section 3 of Rule 38, which mandates that a petition for relief must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and not more than six months following the entry of such judgment.
Petitioner argued that the default declaration arose improperly since he did not receive an actual notice of the October 2, 1975 pre-trial, thereby violating due process.
Despite these claims, the petition also relied on the substance of the underlying deed of sale, contending that Segunda Vda. de Arcilla voluntarily executed the deed despite her illiteracy and inability to understand a document drafted in English.

The respondent Judge denied the Petition for Relief from Judgment on May 18, 1977.
The respondent reasoned that notice to counsel is notice to the client, and since the judgment was received on November 8, 1976, the petition filed on April 16, 1977 was already filed out of time.
The exception provided by Rule 38 was not applicable since the petition did not meet the strict reglementary requirements.

Was the petition for relief from judgment filed within the reglementary period prescribed by Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court?
Does the fact that the petitioner claimed ignorance of the judgment until March 24, 1977 affect the computation of the filing period?

Did the lack of direct notice of the pre-trial on October 2, 1975 to the defendants constitute a denial of due process?
Is the procedural mechanism of serving notice through counsel sufficient for invoking the timely filing of a petition for relief?

Even if the petition contains substantial merits regarding the annulment of the deed of sale, can it still be entertained if filed outside the prescribed period?
Should the failure to comply with strict procedural requirements preclude the court from considering the merits of the petition?