Case Summary (G.R. No. 136586)
Applicable Law and Procedural Framework
Governing constitution: 1987 Philippine Constitution (decision date 2007 → 1987 Constitution applies). Rules and administrative issuances: Rules of Court (Rule 45 — review on certiorari; Rule 116, Sec. 11(c) — suspension of arraignment), DOJ Circular No. 70 (procedures for petitions for review to the Secretary of Justice), and pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Arts. 315, 171, 172). Doctrinal authorities considered: Crespo v. Mogul; Roberts v. Court of Appeals; Marcelo v. Court of Appeals; and jurisprudence cited in the prompt.
Key Dates and Chronology (case-specific)
- Complaints filed: January 18, 2001 (two complaints-affidavits by respondent).
- Petitioner’s counter-affidavit: March 23, 2001 (initial admission), supplemental affidavit March 29, 2001 (recantation, imputing Bebie Correa).
- City Prosecutor resolution finding probable cause: April 25, 2001.
- Criminal cases filed: Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No. 8782 (instant petition concerns No. 8782).
- Trial court order for reinvestigation: June 8, 2001.
- Reinvestigation resolution affirming probable cause: August 30, 2001.
- Arraignment (petitioner pleaded not guilty): October 1, 2001.
- Petition for review to DOJ: October 15, 2001.
- DOJ resolution reversing prosecutor and directing withdrawal: July 11, 2002; motion for reconsideration denied January 30, 2003.
- Trial court ordered withdrawal/dismissal: February 27, 2003.
- Court of Appeals decision granting certiorari for respondent and reversing DOJ: July 21, 2004 (Resolution June 10, 2005 affirmed CA denial of MR).
- Supreme Court decision (affirming CA): February 19, 2007.
Factual Background
Respondent alleged petitioner deceitfully received and encashed two checks issued in respondent’s name without respondent’s knowledge or consent and failed to remit proceeds despite demands. Petitioner initially admitted receipt/encashment but later alleged a third person (Bebie Correa) actually handled and misappropriated the proceeds. The city prosecutor found probable cause, informations were filed, and petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Petitioner sought reinvestigation and appealed the prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice.
Procedural Posture and Contentions
Petitioner sought review by the DOJ after arraignment and after reinvestigation affirmed probable cause. DOJ reversed and ordered withdrawal of information. Respondent moved for reconsideration at DOJ, which was denied. The trial court then granted the prosecutor’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the case. Respondent filed a certiorari petition in the Court of Appeals challenging DOJ’s exercise of review after arraignment and arguing DOJ acted with grave abuse. The Court of Appeals reversed DOJ; petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
Issues Presented to the Courts
- Whether the Department of Justice gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to petitioner’s petition for review despite the petition’s being filed after petitioner had been arraigned.
- Whether probable cause existed for estafa and whether petitioner was probably guilty (a factual inquiry).
- Whether the petition before the Court of Appeals was rendered moot or academic by the trial court’s dismissal of Criminal Case No. 8782.
Court of Appeals’ Reasoning (as reviewed)
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, interpreting its language as mandatory: where an information has been filed and the accused already arraigned, the petition for review “shall not be given due course” and thus the Secretary must dismiss it. The CA read Section 7 together with Section 12 (which lists grounds to dismiss and uses the word “may”), resolved any apparent tension by treating Section 7 as mandatory and converting the permissive “may” in Section 12 effectively into a “shall” when read contextually. The CA also held that arraignment and a plea operate as waiver of the right to preliminary investigation and reinvestigation, and that factual issues (probable cause) were not cognizable in a certiorari proceeding.
Supreme Court Majority Reasoning and Holding
- Interpretation of DOJ Circular No. 70: The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ interpretation that Section 7’s second sentence — “If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned” — is clear and mandatory. Section 7 prescribes the action the DOJ must take when an appeal is presented after arraignment, while Section 12 enumerates the possible modes of disposition of an appeal. There is no irreconcilable conflict; the provisions are harmonized by reading Section 7 as directing non-acquiescence (dismissal) when arraignment precedes the appeal.
- Contemporaneous construction: The Court rejected petitioner’s reliance on the contemporaneous construction by the Secretary of Justice since the provision is unambiguous and the DOJ’s contrary practice was held to be erroneous and therefore not controlling. The Court reiterated the established principle that contemporaneous administrative construction is persuasive but not binding if the law or rule is clear or the construction is erroneous.
- Waiver by arraignment: The Court affirmed that when an accused is arraigned and pleads (here, an unconditional plea of not guilty with counsel present), that constitutes a waiver of the right to preliminary investigation and to question irregularities in it — this rule extends to reinvestigation and review. Thus, petitioner’s arraignment effectively foreclosed her appeal to the Secretary.
- Voidness of DOJ resolutions and trial court order: The DOJ’s resolutions granting petitioner’s appeal after arraignment were held to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion and therefore void. Because the trial court’s dismissal was based solely on those void DOJ resolutions without the court’s independent assessment, the trial court’s order was likewise void and a complete nullity. The Supreme Court therefore denied the petition for review (i.e., it affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution), holding the DOJ acted beyond its mandate by giving due course to a petition filed after arraignment.
- Scope of relief and factual inquiry: The Court reiterated that under Rule 45 only questions of law may be raised and the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; hence it declined to independently evaluate the existence of probable cause on the merits.
Principles of Statutory and Administrative Interpretation Applied
- Plain meaning and mandatory language: Where a rule is clear and unambiguous, its plain language controls; words of positive prohibition or mandatory import (e.g., “shall not”) are to be given effect. Section 7’s clear prohibition against giving due course to appeals filed after arraignment was therefore enforced.
- Harmonization: Different provisions (Sections 7 and 12) were harmonized — Section 7 prescribes mandatory action in a specific circumstance (arreignment precedes appeal); Section 12 lists general grounds and options for disposition. The Court rejected a rule-based application of the “last-in-order” principle because no irreconcilable conflict existed.
- Weight of contemporaneous agency construction: The Court acknowledged that administrative interpretation is entitled to weight but is not controlling where the regulation is unambiguous or the administrative construction is clearly erroneous.
Effect and Legal Consequences of Arraignment and Plea
The decision reiterates that an unconditional plea and arraignment effectuate a waiver of the right to preliminary investigation and related remedies, including reinvestigation and appeal to the Secretary of Justice, such that the Secretary should not entertain petitions filed after arraignment. Accordingly, prosecutors and accused must be mindful of the timing of appeals to the DOJ under Circular No. 70.
Void Judgment Doctrine and the Trial Court’s Dismissal
The Supreme Court emphasized that a judgment or order founded solely on a void administrative resolution is itself void. The DOJ resolutions were held void for grave abuse; therefore, the trial court order dismissing the criminal case pursuant to those resolutions was void and a nullity. The Court noted that the absence of respondent’s motion for reconsideration or appeal from the trial court order was immaterial because the dismissal itself was void ab initio.
Separate Opinion (Concurring — Justice Ynares‑Santiago)
- Agreement in result: Justice Ynares‑Santiago agreed that the trial c
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 136586)
Case Caption, Citation and Procedural Posture
- G.R. No. 168617; Decision promulgated February 19, 2007; Third Division; reported at 545 Phil. 168.
- Petition for Review under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Bernadette L. Adasa seeking nullification of:
- Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 July 2004 (CA-G.R. SP No. 76396) and
- Court of Appeals Resolution dated 10 June 2005, which had reversed and set aside Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
- Relief sought: annulment of the Court of Appeals rulings and reinstatement of the DOJ Resolutions that had directed the withdrawal of the information for estafa.
Factual Background — Complaints and Initial Prosecutorial Action
- On 18 January 2001 respondent Cecille S. Abalos filed two complaints-affidavits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City charging petitioner with Estafa.
- Allegation: Petitioner received and encashed two checks issued in respondent’s name without respondent’s knowledge and consent; petitioner failed and refused to pay proceeds despite repeated demands.
- Procedural chronology at investigation stage:
- 23 March 2001: Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting receipt and encashment of the two checks.
- 29 March 2001: Petitioner filed a Supplemental Affidavit recanting the admission and alleging that a third person, Bebie Correa, received and encashed the checks and absconded with the proceeds.
- 25 April 2001: Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution finding probable cause and ordered filing of two Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual (Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172, RPC, as amended).
- Two criminal cases were filed against petitioner, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 8781 and 8782; this petition concerns Criminal Case No. 8782.
Trial Court Reinvestigation Order, Reinvestigation Result, and Arraignment
- 8 June 2001: Upon motion of petitioner, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 8782 ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation.
- 30 August 2001: After reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution affirming the finding of probable cause against petitioner.
- 1 October 2001: Petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 8782 and entered an unconditional plea of not guilty.
Petition for Review to the DOJ and DOJ Action
- 15 October 2001: Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) — filed after petitioner’s arraignment.
- 11 July 2002: DOJ issued a Resolution reversing and setting aside the 30 August 2001 reinvestigation resolution of the City Prosecutor and directed the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner.
- 25 July 2002: Office of the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information pursuant to the DOJ Resolution.
- 26 July 2002: Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the DOJ, contending DOJ should have dismissed the petition outright because Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 prohibits giving due course to petitions filed after arraignment.
- 30 January 2003: DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration and maintained that under Section 12 in relation to Section 7 of Circular No. 70 the Secretary may exercise discretion to entertain appealed resolutions even where the accused has been arraigned (permissive language “may” in Section 12).
Trial Court Dismissal and Subsequent Appellate Proceedings
- 27 February 2003: Trial court granted the prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw Information and dismissed Criminal Case No. 8782; no party filed an appeal from that dismissal.
- Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals challenging the DOJ Resolutions (11 July 2002 and 30 January 2003).
- Issues raised before the Court of Appeals included:
- Whether DOJ gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to petitioner’s petition despite petitioner’s arraignment;
- Whether probable cause existed for estafa and petitioner’s probable guilt;
- Whether the petition before the Court of Appeals was rendered moot and academic by the trial court’s order dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782.
Court of Appeals Ruling (21 July 2004) — Key Holdings and Reasoning
- The Court of Appeals granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and reversed the DOJ Resolutions dated 11 July 2002 and 30 January 2003.
- On the first issue (DOJ’s authority to entertain petition filed after arraignment):
- Relied heavily on Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70: “If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned.”
- Concluded DOJ was required to dismiss the petition because petitioner had been arraigned prior to filing the petition for review; arraignment entails waiver of right to reinvestigation and to question irregularities surrounding preliminary investigation.
- On the second issue (probable cause):
- Court of Appeals declined to address existence or absence of probable cause, declaring factual issues inappropriate for a petition for certiorari.
- On the third issue (mootness due to trial court dismissal):
- Held the trial court’s dismissal did not render petition moot; the trial court order was void because it relied solely on DOJ’s resolutions without the trial court conducting its own independent assessment of the evidence as required when disposing of a motion to dismiss.
Petitioner's Contentions to the Supreme Court (Grounds in Brief)
- DOJ may give due course to a petition for review even if filed after arraignment; arraignment is “not at all relevant.”
- Reliance on prior Supreme Court cases (Crespo v. Mogul; Roberts v. Court of Appeals; Marcelo v. Court of Appeals) to show DOJ retains authority to review prosecutorial resolutions even after arraignment and that the trial court still has discretion on motions to dismiss regardless of arraignment or reinvestigation.
- Statutory construction arguments:
- The last-in-order provision or later section should prevail;
- Contemporaneous construction by the Secretary of Justice should be given weight;
- The word “shall” may be construed as permissive under certain precedents (per Agpalo’s Statutory Construction).
- Contended Section 7 applies only to original resolutions (not reinvestigation resolutions) and argued her arraignment was null and void; further contended any waiver was nullified by the trial court’s order of reinvestigation.
Supreme Court Majority Ruling — Disposition and Principal Legal Reasoning
- Petition DENIED. Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 July 2004 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
- Interpretation of DOJ Circular No. 70:
- Section 7 is clear and mandatory when read in context: if an information has been filed in court and the accused already arraigned, the petition shall not be given due course.
- Section 12 lists grounds upon which the Secretary may dismiss, affirm,