G.R. No. L-28327 - People vs. Abboc

The case originated from two complaints-affidavits filed on January 18, 2001, by respondent Cecille S. Abalos against petitioner Bernadette L. Adasa for the crime of Estafa.
The allegations asserted that petitioner, by deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without her knowledge and consent, and later failed to pay the proceeds despite repeated demands.

In response to the complaints, petitioner initially filed a counter-affidavit on March 23, 2001, admitting receipt and encashment of the checks.
Subsequently, in a Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2001, petitioner recanted her earlier admission and alleged that a third party (Bebie Correa) had received and cashed the checks, and that such person subsequently left the country after misappropriating the funds.
On April 25, 2001, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution finding probable cause against petitioner and directed the filing of separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document under the Revised Penal Code.
Two criminal cases were instituted (Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No. 8782) with the former raffled to Branch 4 and the latter to Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City.
On June 8, 2001, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 8782 directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation, which confirmed the finding of probable cause in a resolution dated August 30, 2001.
Petitioner, during her arraignment on October 1, 2001 (in Criminal Case No. 8782), entered an unconditional plea of not guilty.

Dissatisfied with the finding of the reinvestigation, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ on October 15, 2001.
In a Resolution dated July 11, 2002, the DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the Information against petitioner.
The City Prosecutor then acted upon this directive by filing a Motion to Withdraw Information on July 25, 2002.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on July 26, 2002, challenging the DOJ’s action on the ground that the petition for review should have been dismissed outright for being filed after petitioner’s arraignment—citing Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70.
The DOJ, in a subsequent resolution dated January 30, 2003, denied the Motion for Reconsideration, relying on the discretionary language in Section 12 of the circular that allowed the Secretary of Justice to entertain such petitions.
On February 27, 2003, the trial court dismissed Criminal Case No. 8782 based on the DOJ’s resolution.

Respondent, aggrieved by the DOJ resolution, filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA, in its Decision dated July 21, 2004, reversed the DOJ resolutions by holding that:

The DOJ should have dismissed the petition for review because petitioner had already been arraigned before its filing.
The issue of probable cause was not a proper subject matter for the CA’s intervention in a Petition for Certiorari.
The dismissal order issued by the trial court was based solely on the flawed DOJ resolutions and therefore was void.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the CA, asserting, among other things, that:

The language of Sections 7 and 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 was merely permissive and did not preclude the DOJ from considering the petition even after arraignment.
Relevant case law (e.g., Crespo v. Mogul, Roberts v. Court of Appeals, Marcelo v. Court of Appeals) supported her contention that the DOJ could review the case regardless of arraignment.
The trial court’s dismissal rendered the petition moot and that her arraignment was flawed.

Whether the DOJ gravely abused its discretion by giving due course to petitioner’s petition for review after she had already been arraigned.

The crux of this issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70.
Whether the mandatory prohibition in Section 7 should override the purported discretion indicated in Section 12.

Whether there existed probable cause for the crime of Estafa against petitioner and if petitioner is thereby probably guilty.

The dispute centered on whether the trial court, based solely on the DOJ resolution, had properly assessed evidence or improperly deferred to the prosecutorial recommendation.

Whether the petition for review had become moot and academic due to the trial court's order dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782.

This issue examined if the subsequent dismissal of the case by the trial court, rooted in the void DOJ resolutions, effectively nullified petitioner’s ongoing claims.