Title
Acaylar, Jr. vs. Harayo
Case
G.R. No. 176995
Decision Date
Jul 30, 2008
Dispute over 30,000 sqm land in Dapitan City; petitioner claimed prior possession since 1979, respondent alleged forcible entry post-sale. SC ruled petitioner had prior physical possession, dismissing respondent's complaint on technical and substantive grounds.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 176995)

Subject Property and Core Factual Allegations

The dispute concerns Lot 741‑B‑1 (30,000 sq. m.). Respondent alleges he purchased the lot from the spouses Acaylar by Deed of Sale executed 14 September 2004 and took immediate possession; petitioner allegedly entered the lot on 19 September 2004 by strategy, intimidation, threats and stealth, cut grasses, gathered coconuts and pastured animals. Petitioner contends the sold parcel formed part of his parents’ larger property (59,775 sq. m.), that he has possessed the property since 1979 as administrator, built his house thereon and farmed it, and that the sold portion was not clearly delineated.

Procedural History Through the Lower Courts

Respondent filed a forcible entry complaint in the MTCC (Civil Case No. 622). The MTCC, relying in part on an affidavit by Zoila Acaylar denying any designation of petitioner as administrator and attesting to the sale, found respondent lawful possessor and ordered petitioner and those claiming under him to vacate Lot 741‑B‑1. The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision. Petitioner sought relief in the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45), which the CA dismissed on procedural grounds and later denied reconsideration; petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner's and Respondent's Principal Contentions

Petitioner argued he had prior, peaceful, physical possession since 1979 and that the RTC erred in regarding respondent as prior possessor merely because of the Deed of Sale; he also relied on a later affidavit by Zoila (which recanted parts of her first affidavit). Respondent maintained he lawfully purchased and took possession on 14 September 2004 and was thereafter ousted by petitioner; he relied on Zoila’s first affidavit and the Deed of Sale.

Court of Appeals’ Grounds for Dismissal Reviewed

The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal largely because the petitioner invoked the wrong appellate remedy (a Rule 45 petition instead of a Rule 42 petition to review an RTC decision rendered in its appellate capacity). The CA also noted several technical defects: a shortfall in docket fees, omission of material dates and certain required content in the petition, failure to indicate full counsel particulars, and failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the RTC.

Supreme Court’s Approach to the Procedural Defects

The Supreme Court reviewed the procedural lapses and considered them excusable. The Court emphasized the discretionary nature of dismissal for unpaid fees (Rule 141, Sec. 5) and recognized precedent excusing omissions of material dates where such dates were apparent from the record (citing Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. and related decisions). The Court found petitioner had remedied or explained some deficiencies and that the ends of justice required resolution on the merits rather than disposal on technicalities.

Legal Framework: Forcible Entry versus Unlawful Detainer

The Court reiterated Section 1, Rule 70 distinctions: forcible entry is an action to recover possession from a party whose occupation was illegal from the outset (entry by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth) and requires proof that the plaintiff was in prior physical possession; unlawful detainer addresses a party whose possession was inceptively lawful (by contract) but became unlawful after termination of that right and requires a prior demand to vacate (a jurisdictional requirement).

Core Factual Issue: Who Had Prior Physical Possession?

Because the remedies and their requisites depend on whether petitioner had prior physical possession, the Court resolved the conflicting factual findings of the courts below. After re‑examining the record, the Supreme Court concluded that petitioner had been in actual physical possession of the disputed parcel prior to and at the time of the sale to respondent: petitioner entered possession as early as 1979, built his house and farmed the land, and respondent did not rebut this with clear and convincing proof of an uninterrupted, demonstrable possession by respondent from the time of sale.

Relevance of the Deed of Sale to Possession Questions

The Court explained that the Deed of Sale and consequent transfer of ownership do not automatically vest physical possession. In an ejectment context the dispositive question is de facto p

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