G.R. No. 228739 - Bowden vs. Bowden

The case originates from a dispute over the possession of a 30,000‑square‑meter parcel of land, specifically identified as Lot 741‑B‑1 in Dapitan City, which was allegedly sold by the spouses Acaylar to respondent Danilo G. Harayo on 14 September 2004.
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) rendered a decision on 28 March 2005 awarding possession of the subject property to respondent based on evidence including an affidavit by Zoila Acaylar.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, subsequently affirmed the MTCC decision on 20 January 2006, stating that the sale had vested both ownership and possession in respondent and that petitioner’s acts on 19 September 2004 constituted forcible entry.
Petitioner Pablo D. Acaylar, Jr. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed or refused to reconsider his petition on technical grounds (e.g., payment shortage of docket fees, improperly stated material dates, insufficient copy furnished to the RTC, and a failure to concisely state the issues).
The Court of Appeals, through its Resolutions dated 28 July 2006 and 30 January 2007, held that petitioner’s improper filing (labeling and technical defects) failed to avail him the correct remedy under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Respondent claimed that immediately after the execution of the Deed of Sale on 14 September 2004 he took possession of the property, and that petitioner’s entry on 19 September 2004 constituted an unlawful forcible entry.
Petitioner, however, contended that he had already been in actual physical possession of the property since 1979, having built his house and conducted farming there, and maintained that his entry and continued possession were lawful and either with the permission or tolerance of his parents, the actual owners.
A significant piece of evidence was provided through conflicting affidavits by Zoila Acaylar:

The First Affidavit denied that petitioner had been given authority to administer or remain on the property.
A later Second Affidavit recanted such denial, although this recantation did not alter the established fact that petitioner had been in possession long before the sale.

The parties also noted that separate legal proceedings were initiated by petitioner and his sisters for the annulment of the 14 September 2004 Deed of Sale, emphasizing the dispute over the precise delineation and sale of the subject property.

The MTCC and RTC rulings revolved around the nature of petitioner’s entry into the property after the sale to respondent, characterizing such entry as repugnant to the purchaser’s rights.
Petitioner argued that a mere sale document, without concomitant physical possession being transferred, was insufficient to deprive him of his longstanding occupation, which began in 1979.
The factual inquiry required a determination of whether petitioner’s prior physical possession was continuous and lawful enough to override the effects of the subsequent deed and respondent’s brief possession period (of approximately five days).

Whether petitioner was in actual and prior physical possession of the subject property before respondent took possession by force.
Whether the technical defects in petitioner’s Petition for Review on Certiorari (such as the failure to state material dates, insufficient docket fee, and improper filing format) should bar a substantive review of his claim.
Whether respondent’s action for forcible entry was the appropriate remedy given the nature of petitioner’s possession and the circumstances surrounding the sale.
Whether the rules of procedure and the requirement for a proper statement of facts and dates should be applied strictly or with flexibility to serve substantial justice.