Title
United Transport Koalisyon vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 206020
Decision Date
Apr 14, 2015
COMELEC's ban on campaign materials in PUVs and terminals violated free speech, overstepped authority, and lacked necessity, ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 206020)

Procedural History

1-UTAK wrote COMELEC seeking to allow private PUV and terminal owners to post campaign materials. COMELEC denied reconsideration, citing its supervisory power under Art. IX-C §4 to regulate franchises and ensure equal campaign opportunity and spending restraint. 1-UTAK filed a certiorari petition under Rules 64 and 65.

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The prohibition infringes owners’ freedom of speech and property rights.
  • No substantial public interest is threatened by allowing political advertising on private PUVs and terminals.
  • Any restriction on speech is overbroad relative to the goal of equalizing candidate opportunities.

COMELEC’s Arguments

  • Privately owned PUVs and terminals are “public places” subject to regulation under Art. IX-C §4.
  • The ban is a valid content-neutral regulation to guarantee equal time, space, and opportunity, and to protect a captive audience of commuters.
  • Regulation is unrelated to suppressing speech and is no greater than essential for election integrity.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether Resolution No. 9615 §7(g)(5)–(6), in relation to §7(f), violates owners’ free speech.
  2. Whether it fails the O’Brien test for content-neutral restrictions.
  3. Whether equal opportunity objectives are impaired by allowing such postings.
  4. Whether COMELEC may regulate ownership versus franchise or operation of public utilities.

Court’s Rationale on Prior Restraint

The prohibition constitutes a prior restraint on speech, triggering a heavy presumption of invalidity. Freedom to express political preference via one’s property is central to free speech (Adiong v. COMELEC). The rule effectively chills owners from posting campaign materials under threat of franchise revocation and criminal penalty.

Content-Neutral Regulation Analysis

Though content-neutral (time-place-manner), the ban fails the O’Brien test:

  1. It exceeds COMELEC’s constitutional power (Art. IX-C §4 applies only to franchises and permits, not ownership).
  2. It is not essential (less restrictive measures exist).

Scope of COMELEC’s Regulatory Power

Art. IX-C §4 permits supervision of “franchises or permits” for public-utility operation but does not extend to private ownership or property rights (Tatad v. Garcia Jr.). Posting campaign decals does not affect PUV operation, safety, routes, fares, or other franchise-related concerns.

Necessity of Restriction

Existing statutes (RA 9006 §§6, 9; RA 7166 §§13, 14) already secure equal media time, space, and spending limits. No additional speech curtailment of PUV or terminal owners is necessary to achieve election-integrity objectives.

Captive-Audience Doctrine

The claimed “captive audience” is insufficient to justify censorship. Commuters may avert their eyes or ignore posted materials. U.S. precedents (Consolidated Edison; Erznoznik) reject bans where avoidance is practical. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights is inapp

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