G.R. No. 206020 - United Transport Koalisyon vs. Commission on Elections

On February 12, 2001, the Fair Elections Act (Republic Act No. 9006) was enacted, which, among other provisions, authorized the posting of election propaganda under certain conditions.

Section 9 of RA 9006 allowed the COMELEC to designate common poster areas for political parties, party-list groups, and independent candidates in public places, with size limitations specified for each.

On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 to implement RA 9006 for national and local elections, including the May 13, 2013 elections.

Section 7 of Resolution No. 9615 enumerated prohibited forms of election propaganda:

Section 7(f) prohibited posting propaganda outside the authorized common poster areas.

Section 7(g), particularly items (5) and (6), extended the prohibition to posting, displaying, or exhibiting campaign materials on privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals.

The resolution provided that violation of these items could result in the revocation of the public utility franchise and criminal liability under the Fair Elections Act.

In a letter dated January 30, 2013, petitioner 1-UTAK, through its president Melencio F. Vargas, sought clarification from the COMELEC.

The petitioner argued that the prohibition on posting campaign materials on privately owned PUVs and transport terminals infringed on the owners’ right to free speech.

They contended that such a restriction intruded upon their property rights as these facilities, although used for public transport, were privately owned.

On February 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc, via Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, denied the petitioner’s request.

The COMELEC opined that if the owners held a valid public utility franchise or certificate of public convenience, their properties were placed under state regulation during the election period to ensure equal opportunity for all candidates.

The Commission maintained that privately-owned PUVs and transport terminals, once placed in public use under a franchise, were subject to regulation to secure fairness in the electoral process.

It argued that political advertisements on these properties could unduly expose a captive audience (the commuters), thus justifying the prohibition as a measure to equalize campaign opportunities.

COMELEC further asserted that its authority under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution allowed it to supervise and regulate transportation utilities during the election period, including restrictions driven by considerations of equal time, space, and opportunity among candidates.

The COMELEC’s rationale drew upon prior cases such as Adiong v. COMELEC, which distinguished between regulating the operational aspect (franchise) of public utilities and the personal expression rights of individual owners.

The decision also referenced U.S. cases and doctrines (such as prior restraint and captive audience principles) to support its contention that certain regulations on speech could be justified when balanced against significant governmental interests.

Whether Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f) of Resolution No. 9615, violate the fundamental right to free speech of PUV and transport terminal owners.
Whether the challenged provisions are void as prior restraints on free speech and expression for failing to satisfy the O’Brien test for content-neutral regulations.
Whether permitting the posting of political advertisements on privately owned properties (like PUVs and transport terminals) would impair the constitutional objective of providing equal opportunity to inform the electorate.
Whether the ownership of public utilities (PUVs and transport terminals) is distinct from the franchise or permit to operate them, and thus, whether the COMELEC oversteps its regulatory authority by controlling their owners’ expression rights.