G.R. No. 92649 - Spouses Badua vs. Cordillera Bodong Administration

On July 17, 1991, Senior State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno, Sr., acting also as Chairman of Task Force NAIA, filed an administrative complaint against Judge Baltazar R. Dizon of RTC, Branch 113, Pasay City.
The complaint alleged “gross ignorance of the law” due to Judge Dizon’s repeated acquittals in four separate cases involving illegal-possession of firearms.
Judge Dizon dismissed the complaint as the reaction of a “disgruntled State Prosecutor” whose lost cases were attributed to his own prosecutorial incompetence.
On January 20, 1992, the case was referred to Justice Artemon D. Luna of the Court of Appeals for investigation, with a directive to report within 90 days.

A German national was arrested at NAIA on March 11, 1991, for possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber firearm marked “S & W Special CTG.”
Key evidence included testimony by airport personnel (an x-ray operator and his supervisor), affidavits, and the physical discovery of the firearm inside the accused’s luggage.
At trial, Borchert claimed he was unaware of the presence of the gun, suggesting that it might have been inadvertently placed in his luggage by a woman with whom he had shared accommodations.
Judge Dizon acquitted Borchert on the ground that the information failed to allege that the firearm was used or intended for use in the commission of an offense and that the possession was temporary or incidental.

An American businessman was apprehended at NAIA on May 31, 1991, when his suitcase, showing the shadow of a firearm, was inspected.
The information charged him with holding, in possession, and control over a .9mm firearm, magazines with bullets, and additional ammunition without a valid license.
The accused entered a plea of “not guilty” and later moved to quash the information, asserting that the facts did not constitute an offense, and that jurisdiction required filing by the City Prosecutor of Pasay City rather than the State Prosecutor.
While Judge Dizon sustained the state prosecutors’ authority to file the case, he ultimately quashed the information on the ground that it lacked the necessary allegations—specifically, that the firearm was used or intended for use in a crime.

Nelson Leonor, a U.S. citizen, was charged with the illegal possession of a .380 caliber pistol upon his arrival at NAIA.
Customs examiner Hermogenes Caylan, III testified that during a routine check, Leonor’s luggage was found to contain the firearm, which was dismantled and later reassembled in the presence of customs and PAFSECOM personnel.
Leonor admitted to purchasing the firearm for personal security, claiming ignorance of the licensing requirement.
In his judgment, Judge Dizon reiterated previous reasoning: the charge lacked sufficient allegation of usage or intent, and that mere possession, given the absence of ammunition and accompanying indication of use, failed to sustain an offense.

A fourth case filed by Senior State Prosecutor Zuno involved similar facts wherein the accused was arrested at NAIA under allegations of illegal possession of firearms.
The decision in this case followed a similar pattern of Judge Dizon’s acquittals based on the ammunition’s absence and the failure to allege that the firearm was carried or intended for criminal use.

Justice Luna’s investigation, culminating in a report dated September 28, 1992, scrutinized all four criminal cases, noting:

The repeated reliance of Judge Dizon on the precedent set in People vs. Asuncion and similar cases where the requirement of “intent to use” the firearm was emphasized.
The failure of the prosecution in these cases to allege that the firearms were used, carried on the person, or intended to be used in the commission of a crime.

Judgments and orders in the four criminal cases.
Affidavits from investigative personnel and airport security.
Relevant resolutions and prior administrative decisions (e.g., Padilla vs. Dizon and the resolution of Secretary Bello in IS No. 89-2967).

The decision details a historical overview of legislation regarding unlicensed firearms:

Reference to Section 1 of P.D. 1866, which penalizes possession of unlicensed firearms irrespective of criminal intent.
A timeline of laws and executive orders (Commonwealth Act 56, RA 4, RA 482, PD 9, and subsequent Presidential Decrees and Executive Orders) which provided temporary amnesty for unlicensed possession but expired by December 31, 1987.

Emphasis on the principle that, under PD 1866, mere possession of an unlicensed firearm is considered a malum prohibitum offense, not necessitating proof of criminal intent.
The administrative complaint argues that Judge Dizon’s continued reliance on outdated precedents (e.g., People vs. Asuncion) demonstrated a gross ignorance of current law post-amnesty period.

Whether Judge Dizon’s repeated acquittals based on the absence of allegations showing "intent to use" a firearm were legally tenable under Section 1 of P.D. 1866.

The core issue centered on whether mere possession of an unlicensed firearm—without any evidence of use or motive—satisfied the offense under the prevailing law.
The question arose whether the doctrine in People vs. Asuncion, which required a demonstration of intent or carrying of the firearm, was applicable once the relevant amnesty periods had expired.

Whether Judge Dizon’s reliance on outdated jurisprudence (specifically People vs. Asuncion and related cases) reflected a gross ignorance of the law.

An issue was raised as to whether his legal reasoning, particularly his characterization of possession as “temporary, incidental, casual or harmless” in specific circumstances, undermined sound legal principles.
The legitimacy and correctness of his ruling in the context of established legal doctrine governing offenses under special laws (mala prohibita) were also questioned.

Whether Judge Dizon’s actions and decisions, in view of his previous administrative case (Padilla vs. Dizon), demonstrated an ongoing pattern of gross incompetence and disregard for judicial duties.