Case Digest (G.R. No. 173252)
Facts:
Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation v. Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Kleto Chung, G.R. No. 173252, July 17, 2009, Supreme Court Second Division, Quisumbing, J., writing for the Court. Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel covered by TCT No. 176253 which bears a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement of right of way originally in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo and annotated since the time of the original owner, Encarnacion S. Sandico. Hidalgo’s property was later transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung (TCT No. 121488). A certified English translation of the 1924 court annotation described a right of way from Lot No. 2 through Sandico’s land to the estero and to Callejon/Matienza Street.On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a petition to cancel the memorandum of encumbrance on the ground that the dominant estate now had an adequate access to a public road (Matienza Street) and therefore had no need to use the servient estate. The trial court initially dismissed the petition as a land registration case, petitioner moved for reconsideration, and after an ocular inspection (which found that the dominant estate had doors and a wide opening to Matienza Street) the trial court thereafter granted petitioner’s motion and, in a Decision dated August 19, 2002, ordered cancellation of the memorandum of encumbrance.
Respondents answered, pleading prejudice to the locality, laches on petitioner’s part, and essentially insisting on the continued validity of the voluntary easement. The trial court denied claims for damages and attorney’s fees for lack of basis.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in a Decision dated October 27, 2005 (and a subsequent Resolution of June 19, 2006), reversed the trial court and dismissed the petition to cancel. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction only after service of summons and that the easement was voluntary and thus not extinguished by the mere existence of an alternative outlet; a voluntary easement can be extinguished only by mutual agreement or renunciation by the dominant owner. Petitioner brought a petition before the Supreme Court assailing the ...(Subscriber-Only)
Issues:
- Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over respondents notwithstanding its initial dismissal and later reconsideration?
- Whether the right-of-way annotation is a voluntary easement whose existence petitioner admitted and which thus cannot be extinguished by the opening of an adequate outlet to a public road.
- Whether the easement is purely personal (binding only the original parties) and therefore not binding on heirs, assigns or subsequent registrants of the dominant estate.
- Whether subdivision or registration of the dominant estate without annotation, or respondent’s failure to pay compensation, extinguished the easemen...(Subscriber-Only)
Ruling:
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Ratio:
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Doctrine:
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