G.R. No. 161793 - Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te

A complaint was filed alleging that on or about August 18, 1909, within the municipality of Cebu, Look Chaw (alias Luk Chiu) engaged in the business of selling, trading, and trafficking opium without authorization from the Collector of Internal Revenue or any lawful license.
The complaint explicitly charged him with selling opium in contravention of the law, notably without securing the requisite license and paying the prescribed license tax under Act No. 1761.

Testimony of C. J. Milliron, an internal-revenue agent, who related that Vicente Base had presented a can of opium (containing 200 grammes) to the governor of Cebu to demonstrate that the accused had engaged in an opium sale.
Upon his arrest, Look Chaw confessed before both the witness and the provincial fiscal:

He admitted to selling opium to Vicente Base on August 15, 1909.
He acknowledged that he had transacted thirty cans of opium but had not yet received the full sale price.

The presence of P1,500 in a box found aboard the British steamship Erroll, which the accused claimed had been obtained in Manila and later seized by the vessel’s captain.
The accused’s claim that he had purchased 137 cans of opium in Hong Kong with the intent of introducing them as contraband into Mexico, but due to a change in the steamship’s route, the opium subsequently arrived at Cebu.

Divided the case into two separate causes — one for the possession of opium and another for the sale of opium.
Tried the possession case first.

The accused was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and fined P2,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment provided in case of insolvency.
An order was issued regarding the confiscation of exhibits related to the case and a directive that, even after serving the sentence, the accused should be remanded to the customs authorities for enforcement of immigration laws.

Look Chaw contended that he could not be punished under Section 15 of Act No. 1761:

His defense argued that engaging in an isolated sale did not equate to “engaging in the business” of selling opium, as required by the statute.
The appellant maintained that negotiating a single sale did not constitute a habitual, professional undertaking.

The reliance on the accused’s confessions as the basis for his conviction.
The imposition of consecutive punishments for what was claimed to be a single continuous act, particularly arguing that charging him for both possession and sale amounted to double jeopardy.

Additionally, the case involved a jurisdictional issue concerning whether the bifurcation of the complaint into two separate charges was proper.

Whether a single isolated sale of opium constitutes “engaging in the business” of selling opium, as required for a violation under Section 15.
The distinct difference between an isolated sale and habitual, professional activity in the context of the law.

Whether the confessions of the accused, which were a significant part of the prosecution’s evidence, could be lawfully adduced as the sole basis for the conviction.

Whether the accused’s right against double jeopardy was violated by being charged separately for the possession and sale of opium.
The legal propriety of splitting the complaint into two causes and if this led to prosecuting the same act twice.

Whether the bifurcation of the case into two complaints (possession and sale) was justified and lawful.
The implications of such separation when one act (sale of opium) does not necessarily depend on the other (possession of opium) for its commission.