G.R. No. 200903 - Kalipu ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. vs. Robredo

Petitioner: Dinah B. Tonog, the mother of Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog.
Private Respondent: Edgar V. Daguimol, a licensed physician and the biological father of the minor.
Nature of the Relationship:

The parties cohabited, with petitioner being a nursing student and respondent a practicing physician.
They lived together with respondent’s family in Quezon City, where the child was welcomed as part of the household.

On September 23, 1989, petitioner gave birth to Gardin Faith, an illegitimate daughter.
Soon after the birth, petitioner left for the United States, where she worked as a registered nurse.
Gardin Faith was left under the care of her father and paternal grandparents.

On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053).
The trial court rendered judgment on March 9, 1992, appointing the father as legal guardian of the minor.
Petitioner learned of this judgment only on April 1, 1992, and consequently filed a petition for relief from judgment on May 27, 1992.

In a resolution dated September 15, 1992, the trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed petitioner to oppose the petition.
Petitioner later filed a motion on October 4, 1993, to remand the custody of Gardin Faith to her.
On November 18, 1994, the trial court resolved in favor of petitioner by granting her custody while denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner moved for immediate execution of the court’s resolution.

Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 35971) challenging the trial court’s actions.
On March 21, 1995, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of merit.
After the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, the appellate court modified its decision on August 29, 1995:

Although finding the petition dismissible concerning certain resolutions, the court discerned strong grounds to allow physical custody of the child to remain with the petitioner, with whom the child had been living since birth.
Emphasis was placed on avoiding the psychological harm to the child that might result from transferring her custody, especially given pending guardianship proceedings.

Subsequently, on November 29, 1995, the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the modified resolution.

Petitioner contended that as the mother of Gardin Faith, she was entitled to custody as a matter of law, citing natural parental authority and statutory presumptions favoring the mother, particularly when the child is below seven years of age.
It was noted, however, that Gardin Faith had reached the age of twelve, which allowed for the expression of her preference.
The overall dispute centered on the ongoing guardianship proceedings and the determination of final custody, with both parties asserting claims to the welfare of the minor.

Whether the trial court’s judgments and resolutions concerning custodial arrangements, including the setting aside of its initial guardianship decision and subsequent rulings, were proper under the law.
Whether the appellate court’s modification of the trial court’s decision—allowing the minor to remain under the custody of the petitioner temporarily—was legally tenable.

Whether the child’s welfare and emotional stability justified maintaining the status quo by allowing the petitioner to retain physical custody pending final adjudication.
Whether the doctrine prioritizing the best interests of the child mandates that the custodial arrangement should not be altered during the pending guardianship proceedings.

The extent to which statutory provisions, particularly those of the Family Code (Articles 176, 213, and 220), guide the resolution of custody disputes, especially in cases involving illegitimate children.
Whether the minor’s age (exceeding seven years) and ability to express preference should influence the custodial decision despite the presumptive favor given to the mother by law.

Whether the temporary custody arrangement, as ordered by the appellate court, adequately balances the respective parental claims and the potential psychological impact on the child if custody were transferred.