G.R. No. 214319 - Pasco vs. Cuenca

Complainant Victorino Simon filed a complaint on October 18, 2002, against Judge Alipio M. Aragon, the presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) in San Pablo, Isabela.
Simon alleged that Judge Aragon engaged in unauthorized notarial practice by notarizing private documents—including contracts and acts of conveyance—that bore no connection with the discharge of his official judicial duties.
The complaint pointed out that the notarized documents lacked the certification required by Circular No. 1-90, which attests to the nonexistence of a lawyer or notary public in the municipality of San Pablo, Isabela.

Judge Aragon admitted notarizing the documents attached to the complaint.
He explained that from 1983 to 1992 there were no lawyers or notaries public available in San Pablo, Isabela, which compelled him to notarize private documents ex officio.
Upon discovering Circular No. 1-90 in 1993, he voluntarily ceased notarizing private documents.
He maintained that notarial fees were collected by the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, indicating that he did not personally profit from his actions.
Additionally, he argued that his actions before the effectivity of Circular No. 1-90 (prior to February 26, 1990) could not be penalized as the circular was not yet in force.

On June 23, 2003, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, for investigation and recommendation.
Judge Isaac R. De Alban, in his report dated August 20, 2004, found that the respondent judge violated Circular No. 1-90 by notarizing private documents without the required certification.
Judge Alban recommended applying the circular prospectively (i.e., for notarizations after February 26, 1990) and imposed a fine of P1,000 for each of the seven documents notarized after this date.

After February 26, 1990, the respondent notarized seven specific private documents without the requisite certification.
The documents involved included various deeds, affidavits of extrajudicial settlement, and affidavits of waiver of rights notarized on different dates from January 28, 1991, to February 2, 2000.
The records clearly showed that these notarizations were outside the permissible scope of a judge acting as Notary Public ex officio since they were not connected with his official functions.

Circular No. 1-90 delineates that Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges may act as Notaries Public ex officio only in matters directly related to their judicial functions.
The decision referenced relevant jurisprudence (e.g., Borne v. Mayo; Penera v. Dalocanog) and legal provisions under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296 and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code, which define the scope of ex officio notarization by judges.
The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct was also noted for prohibiting judges from engaging in private practices that could conflict with their judicial duties.

Whether Judge Aragon, by notarizing private documents not related to his official functions, exceeded his authority as a Notary Public ex officio.

The issue centered on the unauthorized notarization of private documents in contravention of Circular No. 1-90.
It involved determining if the acts committed after February 26, 1990, were subject to sanctions despite his previous practice prior to the circular’s effectivity.

Whether the application of Circular No. 1-90 should be prospective or retrospective in assessing the acts of notarization committed by Judge Aragon.

The respondent argued that his actions prior to the promulgation of the circular should not be penalized.
The investigation and subsequent ruling had to decide on the temporal scope of the circular's enforcement.

The validity of notarizations performed by judges acting ex officio in municipalities lacking legal professionals.

The issue included whether the absence of a lawyer or notary public justified such actions, provided that the requirements of notification and government fee collection were met.
It also questioned whether such justifications extended to notarization acts that bore no direct relation to the judge’s official functions.