G.R. No. 170757 - Valiao vs. Republic

The Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), now the Philippine National Police (PNP), initiated OPLAN AJAX on May 24, 1990, to combat extortion activities by traffic policemen near Guadalupe Bridge, Makati.
The operation was designed to minimize or eliminate bribery and extortion practices in a targeted area.

At approximately three o’clock in the afternoon, two operatives of OPLAN AJAX—2LT Federico Bulanday, PC, and Intelligence Agent Angelito C. Leoncio—were traveling in a car (Plate No. NDK-238) along J.P. Rizal Street, Makati.
The vehicle was stopped by three uniformed policemen, identified as:

The policemen accused Bulanday and Leoncio of violating traffic regulations and proceeded to extort them by demanding money.
Bulanday and Leoncio handed over cash amounting to one hundred pesos (composed of two P20 bills, one P10 bill, and one P50 bill) which had been marked with ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
Upon witnessing the alleged extortion, additional operatives from the Counter-Intelligence Group (CIG) intervened. They managed to arrest petitioner Rodriguez and PFC Silungan, while PFC Pilandi escaped by commandeering a private vehicle.

Following the arrest, petitioner Rodriguez and PFC Silungan were taken to the PC Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for physical examinations, which confirmed the presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder on their persons.
The marked currency was recovered:

Subsequent to the incident, administrative cases for grave misconduct and summary dismissal were initiated against the three police officers:

An administrative case (Adm. Case No. 90-80) was filed with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and assigned to Atty. Narzal B. Mallares.
A separate administrative case (Adm. Case No. 01-91) for robbery/extortion was also lodged, under the supervision of P/Major Efren Santos as the Summary Hearing Officer.

On February 7, 1991, the then PNP Chief, Major General Cesar P. Nazareno, issued Special Order No. 35, which summarily dismissed Rodriguez, Silungan, and Pilandi from the police force.
Petitioner Rodriguez appealed his dismissal:

On March 27, 1991, he filed an appeal to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, alleging violation of due process, claiming that only a preliminary inquiry had been conducted without affording him ample opportunity to present his defense.
Later, on March 29, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on March 11, 1996.

Rodriguez escalated the case to the Court of Appeals by means of certiorari and mandamus.
The Court of Appeals, on October 22, 1997, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision was denied on May 27, 1998.
Finally, on July 13, 1998, Rodriguez filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45, challenging the dismissal and alleging grave abuse of discretion and lack (sic) of excess of jurisdiction when no proper appeal remedy was available.

Rodriguez claimed he was the victim of a frame-up by his colleagues.
He contended that his right to due process was violated during the summary dismissal proceedings.
He argued that he was not given a complete opportunity to defend himself, noting that his motion for reconsideration was insufficient and that the proper remedy should have been an appeal, which he had neglected to pursue.

Whether the petitioner's right to due process was compromised in the administrative and summary dismissal proceedings.

Did the procedures followed during the administrative investigation and the subsequent dismissal sufficiently afford petitioner Rodriguez an opportunity to be heard?
Was the mere filing of counter-affidavits adequate to discharge the due process requirement in administrative cases?

Whether certiorari and mandamus may serve as substitutes for the proper appeal mechanisms available under the civil service laws.

Can extraordinary remedies like certiorari and mandamus be invoked when dedicated appellate remedies are provided by law (i.e., appeals to the Civil Service Commission and the DILG Secretary)?
Did the petitioner properly exhaust the available avenues before resorting to the petition under Rule 45?

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that the petitioner had failed to avail the proper remedy of appeal in administrative proceedings.

Is the failure to pursue the designated appeal route a sufficient basis for dismissal of a petition for certiorari and mandamus?