G.R. No. 182760 - Republic vs. Narceda

The case originates from a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) decision dated 14 November 2007 and its subsequent 29 April 2008 Resolution.
The petition challenges the CA’s dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, emphasizing that the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the presumptive death is immediately final and executory by express statutory provision.

Robert P. Narceda (respondent) married Marina B. Narceda on 22 July 1987, with the marriage contract revealing that Marina was only 17 years and 4 months old at that time.
In 1994, Marina left for Singapore and never returned, leading to a complete lack of communication between the spouses.
Several years later, a town mate’s information indicated that Marina was seen living with a Singaporean husband.

In light of Marina’s prolonged absence and his desire to remarry, respondent filed a petition for a judicial declaration of her presumptive death on 16 May 2002 with the RTC of Balaoan, La Union.
The RTC rendered its Decision on 5 May 2005, declaring Marina presumptively dead for all legal intents and purposes under Rule 131, Sec. 3(w-4) of the Rules of Court, with a caveat regarding the possible effect of her reappearance.

Represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Republic appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, contending that respondent did not exercise the diligence required to establish a well-founded belief in Marina’s death.
The CA dismissed the appeal based on its lack of jurisdiction, holding that the summary proceeding under the Family Code (specifically Article 247, which mandates that the judgment be immediately final and executory) precluded an ordinary appeal.
The CA relied on Family Code provisions (Articles 238, 247, 253 and 41) and relevant jurisprudence, including Republic v. Jomoc and Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, to assert that the remedy available in such summary proceedings is not an ordinary appeal but rather a petition for certiorari to challenge abuse of discretion.

Petitioner (the Republic) later challenged the CA’s dismissal in the Supreme Court through Rule 45, contending that the CA erred in deciding the jurisdictional issue and that respondent failed to show a well-founded belief of death.
The OSG maintained that respondent’s failure to exercise due diligence in searching for Marina justified the RTC’s ruling and that the summary proceeding’s nature, as provided by Article 41 of the Family Code, did not permit an appeal.
The case discusses analogous decisions, notably Republic v. Jomoc, Bermudez-Lorino, Granda, and Tango, highlighting the established doctrine that judgments in summary proceedings under the Family Code are immediately final and executory—limiting the available remedy to a petition for certiorari within the prescribed reglementary period.

Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain an ordinary appeal in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code.
Whether the RTC’s ruling declaring Marina B. Narceda presumptively dead is immediately final and executory, precluding any ordinary appeal.

Whether respondent lacked a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was dead due to alleged insufficiency in conducting a proper search.
Whether the petitioner’s contentions regarding the respondent’s lack of due diligence could have been a basis for overturning the RTC’s decision if proper appellate procedure were followed.

Whether the remedy availed of by the OSG—a Notice of Appeal under Rule 42—was appropriate given that the proceeding was governed by the Family Code’s summary procedures.
Whether a petition for certiorari should have been the proper remedy instead of an ordinary appeal.