G.R. No. L-56077 - Republic vs. Court of Appeals

The case centers on the registration of 885 hectares of public forestal land located in Mulanay, Quezon.
In Land Registration Case No. 81-G filed in the Court of First Instance at Gumaca, Quezon, Judge Vicente del Rosario issued a decision on March 21, 1961.
The decision ordered the registration of Lot 1 in the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales, subtracting 200 hectares meant for the Heirs of Lorenzo Consolacion.
A decree and an original certificate of title were subsequently issued, solidifying the registration.

On June 20, 1969, the Republic of the Philippines filed an amended petition with the Gumaca court to annul the decision, decree, and the certificate of title.
The grounds for annulment were:

The land in question was still part of the unclassified public forest, rendering it unalienable and non-disposable.
A possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares—not the 885 hectares registered.

The petition was verified by the Acting Director of Forestry, lending governmental weight to the allegations.

After a hearing on the merits, Judge Agana denied the petition on September 8, 1970.
The order was served on the assistant provincial fiscal on September 16, 1970, and on special counsel Jaime Dispo of the Bureau of Forestry on November 26, 1970.
A copy of this order was transmitted by the fiscal to the Solicitor General’s Office on September 2, 1971—nearly one year after the issuance of the decision.
The Solicitor General’s Office, after being apprised of the order, filed an appeal on September 24, 1971 along with a motion for time extension to submit a record on appeal.

The underlying dispute involves a significant discrepancy between the Spanish composition title and the registered area:

The composition title, issued on July 30, 1888, granted Prudencio Tesalona possessory rights over 29 hectares of pasture land, with boundaries defined by local creeks.
Survey evidence, including a survey conducted in 1959, indicated an area of 970 hectares, with the registration covering 885 hectares (and an additional 84 hectares for a separate lot not involved in the case).

Conflicting evidence from tax declarations and reports further complicated the land’s true dimensions:

Tax declarations over the years record varying areas—ranging from 36 hectares to 120 hectares—contradicting both the composition title and the later registered extent.
Testimonies and reports (e.g., from forest wardens and inspectors) corroborated that the lot falls within public forestal land and that its inclusion in the certificate of title was erroneous.

Applicant Prudencio Maxino testified regarding the land’s identification, its boundaries, and its use as grazing/pasture land, noting discrepancies in the actual versus purported area.
Additional evidence, including a deed of sale from September 24, 1935 and testimony from another witness, Fortunato Nanadiego, cast doubts on the validity of the Spanish composition title.
Documentary exhibits (such as Director of Forestry certifications, land classification maps, and reports by foresters) uniformly pointed to the fact that the land remained within the public forest and was improperly registered.

Whether the appeal by the Solicitor General’s Office from the trial court’s 1970 order of denial was made within the reglementary thirty-day period.
Whether the counting of the thirty-day period should be based on the service of the order on the Solicitor General’s Office itself rather than on its agents (special counsel and fiscal).

Whether the registration of the public forestal land is valid considering that it falls within unalienable public forest land.
The impact of the discrepancy between the Spanish composition (adjustment) title covering 29 hectares versus the actual surveyed area (885 or 970 hectares) on the validity of the registered title.

Who holds the ultimate authority to decide on the filing of an appeal—the Solicitor General’s Office or its representatives (such as the special counsel and fiscal).
The extent to which service on the representatives can bind the Solicitor General’s Office in determining appeal timeliness.