Case Digest (G.R. No. 79811)
Facts:
In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. No. 139405, the respondent, Arturo Pacificador y Fullon, along with co-accused Jose T. Marcelo, was charged on October 27, 1988, before the Sandiganbayan with violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). The Information alleged that from December 6, 1975, to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila, Pacificador, as Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, unlawfully conspired with Marcelo, the President of the Philippine Smelters Corporation. They were accused of facilitating the sale of property worth P862,150.00 for only P85,144.50, causing significant undue injury to the government. After his arraignment, Pacificador filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information on July 15, 1998, arguing that the crime was time-barred due to prescription and that the Information failed to charge an offense based on a precedent case. The Sandiganbayan init
Case Digest (G.R. No. 79811)
Facts:
Background of the Case:
- The case involves Arturo F. Pacificador, who was charged with violating Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for allegedly facilitating the sale of government-owned land to a private corporation, Philippine Smelters Corporation, at a price grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Chronology of Events:
- Alleged Crime: The crime was allegedly committed between December 6, 1975, and January 6, 1976, when Pacificador, as Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (a government-owned corporation), facilitated the sale of land to Philippine Smelters Corporation for P85,144.50, despite the land's fair market value being P862,150.00.
- Filing of Information: On October 27, 1988, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging Pacificador and Jose T. Marcelo (President of Philippine Smelters Corporation) with violation of R.A. No. 3019.
- Motion to Dismiss: On July 15, 1998, Pacificador filed a Motion to Dismiss on two grounds: (a) the crime had prescribed, and (b) the Information did not charge an offense, citing a Supreme Court ruling in San Mauricio Mining Corporation v. Ancheta.
- Sandiganbayan's Initial Ruling: On November 10, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office interrupted the prescriptive period, and the second ground was premature.
- Motion for Reconsideration: On December 7, 1998, Pacificador filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the crime had prescribed and that the San Mauricio Mining case should be considered.
- Sandiganbayan's Reconsideration: On February 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan granted the Motion for Reconsideration, dismissing the case on the ground of prescription, applying Act No. 3326 instead of the Revised Penal Code.
- Petition to the Supreme Court: The People of the Philippines filed a petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the prescriptive period should be 15 years under R.A. No. 3019 and that the crime was discovered only on May 13, 1987.
Issues:
- Prescription of the Offense: Whether the crime charged had prescribed under the applicable law, considering the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019.
- Applicable Law for Prescription: Whether Act No. 3326 or the Revised Penal Code governs the computation of the prescriptive period for offenses under R.A. No. 3019.
- Discovery Rule: Whether the crime should be deemed discovered only on May 13, 1987, when a complaint was filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
- Constructive Notice: Whether the registration of the Deed of Sale in 1975 constituted constructive notice of the crime, thereby starting the prescriptive period.
Ruling:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Ratio:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court held that the crime had prescribed, and the Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the case. The registration of the Deed of Sale in 1975 served as constructive notice, and the prescriptive period began to run from that date. The Court emphasized that statutes of limitations are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused, and the longer prescriptive period under the amended R.A. No. 3019 could not be applied retroactively.