G.R. No. 216151 - Crisologo vs. Hao

The dispute originated from a complaint for establishing a right of way filed by petitioners against respondents in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte (Civil Case No. 2767).
The case eventually resulted in a Compromise Agreement dated 26 April 1994, under which respondent Cosme Hinunangan granted a two (2) meter-wide right of way in exchange for the payment of ₱6,000.00 by petitioners.

On 28 September 1999, respondents initiated a separate complaint for specific performance with damages, alleging that petitioners had blocked the passage provided under the Compromise Agreement (Civil Case No. R-311).
In their answer, petitioners denied any contravention of the agreement and argued that respondents were not actual residents of Barangay Tagnipa. They also claimed that respondent Cosme Hinunangan had sold his lot to petitioner Rodolfo Paderes.
Petitioners further filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, which was denied by the trial court.

The pre-trial was initially set on 24 April 2003 but was rescheduled to 3 June 2003 and eventually to 11 November 2003 due to various motions and scheduling conflicts.
During the 11 November 2003 session, although petitioner Baybay (one of the defendants) and the other defendants were present, petitioners’ counsel failed to appear.
The RTC noted a proposed settlement during the hearing, yet expressed disappointment over the continuous non-appearance of petitioners’ counsel, highlighting its significance given that the case had already reached the Supreme Court on other procedural matters.

A subsequent pre-trial session was set for 23 January 2004. Shortly before this date, petitioners’ counsel filed a Manifestation of Willingness to Settle with a request to cancel the hearing.
Despite the manifestation, the 23 January 2004 pre-trial was held. The private respondents, their counsel, petitioner Baybay, petitioner Paderes, and co-defendant Alago were present, yet petitioners’ counsel was absent.
The RTC then issued an order permitting respondents to present their evidence ex parte, citing the “failure of the defendants’ counsel to appear.”
A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the RTC.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari contesting the RTC’s decision. This petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on procedural grounds—specifically, for not attaching certain required documents and pleadings.
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration along with additional exhibits to remedy the defects; however, the Court of Appeals denied this motion, effectively ruling on the merits against petitioners.
The Supreme Court ultimately reviewed the case, focusing on whether the absence of counsel at pre-trial justified an ex parte presentation of evidence and default declaration against the defendants.

The case centrally involves an interpretation of the pre-trial rules under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, notably Section 5, Rule 18, which differentiates the consequences for a party’s absence versus that of counsel.
Precedents and prior judicial decisions (including those in United Coconut Planters Bank v. Magpayo, Jonathan Landoil International Co. v. Mangudadatu, Social Security System v. Chaves, and Africa v. Intermediate Appellate Court) were considered in determining the proper standard for establishing default and allowing ex parte evidence.

Whether the absence of counsel for the defendants at pre-trial, while the defendants themselves were present, constitutes a valid ground for declaring the defendant in default and permitting the opposing party to present evidence ex parte.

Whether the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring attendance at pre-trial apply equally to counsel and to the litigants.
The propriety of applying default or sanctioning measures based solely on the non-appearance of counsel as opposed to the absence of the defendant.

Whether the ex parte presentation of evidence, caused by the absence of counsel, violates the constitutional guarantee to due process by effectively depriving petitioners of a full opportunity to be heard.

The scope of the trial judge’s discretion in managing pre-trial proceedings and enforcing attendance, including whether alternative measures (such as admonishment or scheduling adjustments) could have remedied the situation without resorting to ex parte evidence.