G.R. No. L-10564 - Mandian vs. Leong

Mandian (Manoba), the plaintiff and appellee, is the widow and second consort of the late Leon Lung.
In 1955, Mandian filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Davao charging defendant Dionisio Leong (appellant) with usurpation of a parcel of land and coconut plantation in Trinidad, Davao.
The disputed property was registered in Mandian’s name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 561 of Davao.

Defendant Dionisio Leong denied the allegation of usurpation.
He pleaded that he possessed and administered the property as part of the estate of his late father Leon Lung, in accordance with an agreement with the plaintiff.

Celestino Leong, the defendant’s brother, intervened in the case on his own petition.
On June 6, 1955, Celestino filed an answer in intervention admitting that the lot was acquired during his father’s second marriage to Mandian.
The answer clarified that although the title was placed in Mandian’s exclusive name, it was done so because the husband was not a Filipino citizen.
Celestino’s answer contained a cross-claim against Dionisio Leong, asserting his exclusive possession of the father’s estate, alleging that Dionisio had failed to distribute the fruits of the estate among the co-heirs, and prayed for an accounting, distribution of shares, and attorney’s fees.
A copy of Celestino’s answer in intervention was duly served on counsel for Dionisio on the same day, June 6, 1955.

By an order dated June 27, 1955, the court admitted Celestino’s answer in intervention and subsequently ordered Mandian to answer the cross-complaint.
On July 1, 1955, counsel for defendant-intervenor filed an ex-parte motion noting that Dionisio had not yet answered the cross-claim, despite the lapse of 26 days since service.
On July 2, 1955, the court declared Dionisio Leong in default for his failure to answer the cross-claim.
On July 11, 1955, Dionisio filed a petition for reconsideration with the contention that the period to answer should have been counted from the date the court admitted the intervention (June 27, 1955) rather than from the date of service (June 6, 1955).

The trial court denied Dionisio’s petition for reconsideration of the default order.
Subsequently, Dionisio appealed the order declaring him in default.
The appeal was challenged on the grounds that the order was interlocutory and, hence, premature for appeal since it was preliminary to the hearing of the merits of the case and the cross-claim.

Whether the defendant’s (Dionisio Leong’s) declaration of default could be appealed before a final judgment on the merits was rendered.
Whether the default order, being interlocutory and preliminary, was subject to immediate appeal.

Whether the period for filing an answer to the cross-claim should be reckoned from the service of the intervenor’s answer (June 6, 1955) or from the date the court admitted it (June 27, 1955).
Whether the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (filed on July 11, 1955) appropriately served as a Rule 38 motion seeking the setting aside of the default declaration.

Whether any appeal at this stage, prior to a final judgment on the merits or prior to securing a proper Rule 38 motion, would be premature and potentially futile if the merits of the cross-claim turn out to favor the plaintiff or intervenor.
The legal sufficiency of the appellant’s grounds, particularly in the absence of a formal Rule 38 motion to set aside the default order.