G.R. No. 189434 - Marcos, Jr. vs. Republic

In a decision rendered on 13 September 1916 in Cadastral Case No. 12 (LRC Rec. No. 9468), the then Court of First Instance of Cebu adjudicated Lot No. 6017. The decision apportioned the lot among several parties by awarding an eighth part each to various groups of adjudicatees and their heirs.
On 3 March 1925, the cadastral court issued an Auto reinstating the 1916 decision, thereby confirming the original adjudication.
On 1 March 1932, responding to motions filed by the spouses Carmen Rallos de Sotto and Filemon Sotto—who claimed to have acquired shares from certain adjudicatees or their heirs—the same court modified the allocation. The Auto specifically directed that the Sotto spouses be awarded the portions corresponding to the shares that had been sold by some of the original adjudicatees, listing each affected party and the fractional interest transferred.

Forty-two years after the 1916 decision (on 7 March 1974), certain claimants petitioned for the entry of a final decree of registration over Lot No. 6017 based on that decision and the modifying Auto of 1 March 1932.
Acting on the petition, Judge Francisco R. Burgos issued an order directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue the decree. The Commissioner’s subsequent Report (dated 5 August 1977) noted critical matters—including the omission of the civil status of the adjudicatees and uncertainties regarding the specific portions allocated to the Sotto spouses—thereby recommending that a tracing cloth or print copy of Subdivision Plan Psd-17733 be submitted along with its technical descriptions for court approval.

On 14 May 1979, private respondent Jose G. Paulin filed what became known as the Paulin petition. This petition sought court approval of a certified copy of Subdivision Plan Psd-17733, which subdivided Lot No. 6017 into Lots 6017-A to 6017-H with each sublot designated to specific claimants detailed by name, marital status, and residence.
On 30 July 1979, another petition was filed by Eugenia Llaban y Catalan, representing legal heirs who had retained their interests in Lot No. 6017. This petition, relying on the finality of the 1916 decision as reaffirmed by the 3 March 1925 Order, asked for the issuance of a decree of registration in accordance with that decision.
On 5 May 1980, Paulin supplemented his initial petition by attaching additional documentary evidence, including a deed of absolute sale for one of the sublots. In response, Atty. Jaban filed an opposition, arguing that the order of 7 August 1979 (which had directed the issuance of a final decree based on the 16 September 1916 decision) had already become final. He contended that petitioners’ claims should be addressed only through the partition of the lot by the heirs of the originally adjudicated parties, as the petitioners were not themselves adjudicatees or their legal heirs.

Without a formal evidentiary hearing, Judge Jose Ramolete of the lower court issued an Order on 16 February 1981. This order set aside the previous Order of 7 August 1979, finding that the 1 March 1932 Auto had, unchallenged, amended the 1916 decision.
Subsequent motions for reconsideration, based on allegations that Judge Ramolete had acted either without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, were denied by an Order of 4 August 1981.
Dissatisfied with the lower court’s handling, oppositors filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 29 September 1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition on the ground that the raised issues required addressing the merits of the case—a function outside certiorari’s limited scope.
On 15 February 1983, petitioners directly raised their concerns before the Supreme Court, alleging:

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court (sitting as a cadastral court) to modify the final 1916 decision through subsequent orders.
Grave abuse of discretion in issuing orders without due process, based solely on unverified allegations and without the presentation of supporting evidence.
Erroneous and self-contradictory reasoning in the Court of Appeals’ resolution of the procedural and jurisdictional controversies.

Petitioners argued that they were not afforded due notice of the Order of 1 March 1932 and were denied the opportunity to be heard, raising questions of due process.
The evidence presented—primarily in the form of unheared annexes and documents not formally offered in evidence as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court—failed to satisfy the mandatory procedural requirements.
These deficiencies underscored the contention that the lower court had overstepped its jurisdiction by attempting to alter an adjudication that had already attained finality.

Whether the lower court, acting as a cadastral court, had the legal power to amend or modify the final 13 September 1916 decision by issuing orders that allowed for a partition and the issuance of a second final decree in favor of parties not originally adjudicated.
Whether disputes arising from transfers and subsequent claims over the cadastral lot should be resolved within the cadastral proceeding or through a separate, ordinary civil action.

Whether the lack of notice and hearing for the petitioners violated the constitutional requirement for due process in determining exceptional orders such as reallocation and partition of a cadastral lot.
Whether the admission of evidence that was not properly offered and marked in court prejudiced the determination of the case.

Whether the 13 September 1916 decision, as modified by the 1 March 1932 Auto, had already become final and binding, making subsequent petitions for issuance of a new decree or modification impermissible.
Whether the principles of res judicata and finality in cadastral cases preclude reopening the case based on alleged procedural irregularities.

Whether Judge Ramolete abused his discretion by setting aside previous orders and by issuing a new order without a proper evidentiary hearing.
Whether the lower court’s actions constituted an impermissible attempt to alter a final adjudication, thereby undermining the stability and certainty of property titles.