G.R. No. L-30683 - Gumabay vs. Baralin

A parcel of cornland with an area of seventeen thousand square meters, located at Barrio Tanuru, Enrile, Cagayan, was assessed in the name of Celestina Gumabay at a valuation of three hundred pesos (as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 17548-a dated August 24, 1956).
Celestina Gumabay duly paid the realty taxes on the said land for the years 1948 to 1956, establishing her interest and compliance with fiscal obligations.

On March 3, 1960, Celestina Gumabay filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against Juliana Baralin, Santiago Bunagan, Loreto Bunagan, Basilio Mamba, Balbino Catabay, Arcadio Maggay, Lupo Guiyab, and Francisco Calimaran, alleging that these defendants had forcibly entered the land on August 5, 1959.
Claiming poverty and inability to pay the docket fee, Celestina was permitted to sue in forma pauperis by the lower court.

The defendants contested the complaint by arguing that, as the incident of forcible entry occurred within one year prior to the filing, the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction, insisting that the case should be filed in a lower court per the relevant procedural rules and statutory provisions.
Despite the motion to dismiss by the defendants, the plaintiff was allowed to amend her complaint.

Celestina Gumabay filed an amended complaint, transforming her original forcible entry action into an action to quiet title, by adding the allegation that the defendants “are now asserting and claiming title and absolute ownership” over the disputed parcel.
The amended complaint was personally served on the defendants’ counsel on March 23, 1960.

The trial court, in its March 26, 1960 order, admitted the amended complaint, ordered the defendants to answer, and denied the earlier motion to dismiss. However, the order was sent later by ordinary mail on March 31, 1960.
On May 26, 1960, Celestina moved for the defendants to be declared in default due to their failure to answer, while the defendants argued that they had not received the order urging them to respond.
The trial court, through its June 4, 1960 order (served by registered mail on June 17, 1960), directed the defendants to answer the amended complaint. The defendants nonetheless did not file an answer.
Consequently, on August 6, 1960, the court declared the defendants in default and commissioned the clerk to receive Celestina’s evidence.

At the ex parte hearing, Celestina testified that the land was donated to her by her father at the time of her marriage and that her father had possessed it since her childhood.
She further testified that the land was cultivated by her father’s tenants—Mateo Luyun and his two sons—with corn and tobacco planted on it.
Celestina detailed that on August 5, 1959, the defendants entered the land, harvested five carts of corn, took four rolls of barbed wire, and continued working on the property against the tenants’ opposition.

Based on the evidence, the lower court declared Celestina Gumabay the owner of the disputed land, ordered the defendants to vacate the premises, restore its possession to her, and award damages of P620 along with P250 in attorney’s fees.
The defendants, having received the decision on September 6, 1960, later filed a petition on October 5, 1960 for relief from the order of default and judgment by default, attributing their failure to respond to the negligence of their two lawyers.
Along with their petition, the defendants submitted Tax Declaration No. 18252-a (dated September 30, 1957) in the name of Lucio Barlin, referring to a parcel of land different in area and location from the disputed property.
The petition for relief was denied by the lower court.

The defendants then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently elevated the case to the Supreme Court on the basis that the appeal involved solely legal issues (CA-G.R. No. 29202-R).
The defendants raised several contentions in their appeal regarding issues of jurisdiction, service, and the propriety of the amended complaint and default judgment.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting the amended complaint that transformed the action from one for forcible entry to an action to quiet title.
Whether the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over the defendants based solely on the initial service under the original complaint, thereby negating the need for issuing new summons for the amended complaint.
Whether the declaration of default against the defendants was proper given the alleged irregularities in the service of the court’s order directing them to answer the amended complaint.
Whether the petition for relief from judgment by default, predicating on alleged lawyer neglect, should have been granted, thereby warranting a new trial.
Whether dismissing the original complaint to require a new suit for quiet title would have been more appropriate, in light of judicial economy and the necessity to resolve the real issue of ownership in a single proceeding.